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Abstract
This study examines Mapuche political organization in Chile from 1920-1960
through the lens of transnational indigenismo. In that period, politicians, academics
and social reformers across the Americas were questioning how to incorporate
indigenous populations into modern national states. While many historical accounts
of similar phenomena in other countries have drawn categorical distinctions
between indigenismo (as a movement led by white elites) and indigenous activism
(led by Indians themselves), this work places the two phenomena side-by-side to
explore connections between them. That approach shows that collaboration,
periodic conflict and strategic alliance making were important components of
indigenous politics in Chile. It also brings indigenous agency to the fore, and in doing
so challenges historical interpretations of indigenismo that have characterized it as
a paternalistic mechanism of the neocolonial state. It joins a growing body of
scholarship that recognizes indigenismo as an important influence on and precursor
to identity-based indigenous social movements that emerged in the late-twentieth
century.
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Introduction
In December 1924, the Chilean presidency was up for grabs. For the moment,
control fell to a military junta brought to power by a group of young officers intent
upon breaking the stalemate between a reform-minded president and a parliament
committed to the status quo. Meanwhile, in the southern region known as La
Araucanía, 15,000 Mapuche Indians assembled to pray for the military government.
Manuel Aburto Panguilef, a Mapuche chief with “sword in hand,” called upon his
shaman to lead the people in prayer and ritual sacrifice so that the Almighty might
bless the junta and bring great benefit to the country.3
Three years later in 1927, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ibañez del Campo, one
of the brash young military officers who had brought the junta to power by “rattling
their sabers” on the floor of the Chilean Congress, seized the presidency and ruled as
a dictator until 1931. In the 1920s and early 1930s, Aburto and the political
organization he founded radicalized, aligned their interests with the far left, and
went so far as to propose the creation of an autonomous indigenous republic in
southern Chile. During that time, Ibañez had his agents surveil Aburto’s activities
and confiscate the archives of his organization. Aburto Panguilef was arrested,
detained and sent into internal exile in the capital of Santiago. Yet by the late 1930s,
Aburto joined forces with more moderate and conservative Mapuche leaders to
form a single umbrella organization to better represent the political interests of

El Diario Austral, Dec. 16, 1924. Cited in Rolf Foerster and Sonia Montecino,
Organizaciones, Lideres y Contiendas Mapuches (1900-1970), Santiago de Chile: Ediciones
CEM, 1988, p. 39.
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their people. Despite the earlier repression, Aburto Panquilef and other Mapuche
leaders again supported Ibañez in his 1938 and 1952 presidential campaigns.
Throughout Latin America in this era, politicians, indigenous leaders and
non-indigenous intellectuals were wrestling with broad questions about how to
incorporate indigenous populations into modern national states. Those questions
had their roots in the colonial and early national periods, when only small segments
of large, diverse American societies were afforded political rights. In the twentieth
century, efforts to spur economic and social development while supporting native
political participation gave rise to a transnational intellectual movement called
indigenismo. Participants in that movement were known as indigenistas, and
although they did not typically claim an indigenous identity themselves, they
respected and promoted indigenous art, culture and history. Indigenistas were
mostly men – although some women made important contributions – who were
based in urban areas, well educated and of European descent, and many were
trained in anthropology. Through their work in literature, the arts, politics and
social science, indigenistas sought to improve the lives of Indians and incorporate
them into the national fabric.4
Traditional interpretations of indigenismo have characterized indigenistas as
paternalistic do-gooders and set their perspectives apart from those of the Indians
they sought to help, as seen in the following editorial excerpt from an indigenista
publication entitled “Dialogue on Indian Questions.”
Note on terminology: Throughout the text, the English word “Indian” and the Spanish
“indígena” are used interchangeably. In Spanish, “indígena” is used to connote respect for
indigenous peoples. By contrast “indio” is a derogatory term. “Mapuche,” which translates
literally as “people of the land,” is used as both singular and plural forms.

4
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Indigenista:
“In order to achieve the acculturation of the Indian, it must be done gradually in
accordance with the stages of evolution to which he is incorporated. First, it is
necessary to understand the nature of the many psycho-cultural pre-Columbian
surviving characteristics related to these stages, using the methods of social
science. In this way practical means of acculturation can be formulated
authoritatively.”
Indian:
“I want more money to satisfy my needs, but I do not want to change my way of
living which comes from my ancestors. During the colonial period, I lived as a
slave and since then, I have been exploited and deceived frequently. Even those
who try to help me do not understand that they live in one world and I live in
another.” 5

In some countries, for example Mexico and the United States, indigenistas held
important positions within the structures of their respective states, and steered the
course of national Indian policy. In Chile, indigenismo was less formalized and
therefore less influential in the period studied here. Both Chilean indigenismo and
indigenous activism resist neat classification and challenge traditional
interpretations that arose from other national contexts.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, some Mapuche organizations
were founded with the assistance of indigenistas, but others were founded and led
by Mapuche themselves. Non-indigenous Chilean intellectuals contributed to the
transnational indigenista discourse and influenced national indigenous policy, but
so too did Mapuche leaders, several of whom became important elected officials.
Mapuche organizations and their leaders embraced a wide range of political
philosophies and forged alliances with one another, Chilean leaders, and other
national and international actors. The era of indigenismo was one phase of a longer
and more complex history between the Mapuche people and the state, in which
Manuel Gamio, “Dialogue on Indian Questions,” Boletín Indigenista, Vol. 14, no. 4, Instituto
Indigenista Interamericano: Mexico City, 1954, pp. 232-239.
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patterns of hostility, negotiation and mutual dependence – tactics rooted in the
colonial era – persisted. Those patterns also created substantial division within the
Mapuche movement. Nevertheless, the large and sustained mobilization of Mapuche
made it possible to insert indigenous leaders and their ideas into the apparatuses of
the state.
By showing that in Chile distinctions between Indians and indigenistas were
blurred, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the way in which
indigenistas and Indians worked together and at odds in twentieth century projects
of state formation. Indigenismo was not simply an outsider’s attempt to improve
indigenous life in Chile; indigenous agency was crucial. Although they often
partnered with non-indigenous Chileans, I argue that Mapuche were themselves
leading contributors to Chilean indigenismo in ways that challenge us to reinterpret the movement itself. Such a view modifies our understanding of
indigenous collective action in Chile, and shows that partnership with (and
leadership of) the indigenista movement represent important foundations of more
recent identity-based indigenous activism. In other words, indigenous social
movements that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s drew from longer and broader
traditions of conflict, collaboration and compromise rooted in the indigenista
discourse half a century earlier.
To illustrate those foundational connections, four of the five chapters that
follow examine some of the most important participants in Chile’s indigenous
debate from the 1920s through the 1950s. Chapter one explores the roots and
emergence of Mapuche political organization, establishing Manuel Aburto Panguilef
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as an archetypal Mapuche activist. Chapter two examines the indigenismo of
Monsignor Guido Beck de Ramberga, a Bavarian Catholic missionary who became
the leader of the Church’s efforts to educate and assimilate Mapuche into EuroChilean society through a conservative political and cultural philosophy. Although
Aburto and Beck occupied opposite ends of the spectrum on most indigenous issues,
placing them side-by-side shows that they served as foils for one another in the
formative period from 1926-1938. Comparing their contributions to the indigenista
discourse also informs our understanding of the movement’s later evolution in
important ways.
Chapters three and four shift the focus first toward the transnational
indigenista discourse that officially began with the founding of an international
institute in 1940, then to a detailed examination of the life and career of Alejandro
Lipschütz, Chile’s most prolific indigenista. While Lipschütz began his indigenista
career with a theoretical treatise on race in the Americas and an ethnographic study
of indigenous Fuegians, by the 1960s he became an advocate for indigenous
autonomy and self-deterimination within national states. Finally, chapter five
studies an important episode in the career of the most successful Mapuche leader of
the era, as he founded and led the national Office of Indigenous Affairs from its
inception in 1953 until 1958. Over the course of his career, Venancio Coñuepán
brought the major Mapuche organizations together to form a unified political front,
used that to win election to the Chilean National Congress three times, and then
convinced President Ibañez to establish an official government agency to protect the
rights of Indians in Chile. In doing all that, he himself contributed to the
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transnational indigenista discourse and identified his indigenous-led organization
as part of the indigenista movement.6 Together, Aburto, Beck, Lipschütz and
Coñuepán demonstrate the tremendous variety of voices and positions within
Chilean indigenismo, and show that the categories of Indian and indigenista were
dynamic, fluid and permeable.

Historiography
By situating the Mapuche movement within the political context of Chile and
the broader Pan-American indigenista movement, this dissertation bridges a
historiographical divide between studies of indigenous activism and studies of the
intellectual questions surrounding indigenismo. It also contributes to an expanding
body of literature on Pan-American indigenismo and recent studies of indigenista
projects that show a great diversity of goals, participants and outcomes in distinct
national contexts. Chilean indigenismo is not the only example in which indigenous
leaders played an active role in developing indigenista ideas and projects, but until
recently indigenous contributions have largely been overlooked.7 Historian Laura
Gotkowitz has shown how local and regional indigenous leaders engaged
indigenista debates in Bolivia in the 1930s and 1940s. In A Revolution for our Rights,

In 1945 the Mapuche organization Corporación Araucana added the subtitle “Movimiento
Indigenista de Chile” to their name, emphasizing the deep connections between
indigenismo and indigenous activism in Chile.
7 For an introduction to the idea that Indians were themselves important actors in the
indigenista movement, see Laura Giraudo and Juan Martín-Sánchez, “’Soy Indígena e
indigenista’: Repensando el indigenismo desde la participación de algunos, no tan pocos,
indígenas,” in Protaganismo Ameríndio de Ontem e Hoje, Maria Cristina dos Santos and
Guilherme Galhegos Filippe, eds. Brazil: Paco Editorial, 2016, pp. 257-294.
6
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she argues that indigenous leaders and activists challenged the authority of large
landowners and power brokers in rural Cochabamba, thus influencing military
leaders to adopt more populist political strategies at the national level and
contributing an overlooked causal strand of the 1952 Bolivian Revolution.8 In
contrast to traditional assumptions that indigenismo was rooted in the
contributions of white urban intellectuals, Gotkowitz demonstrates that in Bolivia
rural indigenous peasant leaders meaningfully impacted the course of national
politics.
Although indigenista projects did produce some short-term improvements in
the lives of Indians in certain contexts in the 1940s and 1950s, indigenismo as a
whole did not lead to lasting change on a large scale across Latin America. By the
1960s, indigenous questions were subsumed by a broader class-based discourse
and rural Marxist uprisings that were sometimes carried out in indigenous
territories. Therefore, in the 1970s many critics looked back on the previous efforts
of indigenistas as broad failures. But in the 1980s, indigenous activists began to
form identity-based social movements in many countries, especially in response to
political repression in the previous decade.9 Indigenous collective action expanded
and accelerated in the leadup to the 1992 quincentennial of Columbus’s “discovery”

Laura Gotkowitz, A Revolution for our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in
Bolivia, 1880-1952, Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
9 Chile and Guatemala offer two examples of this phenomenon. In Guatemala, government
forces targeted Indians for providing aid and shelter to Marxist rebels during a protracted
civil war. In Chile, because of their previous support for socialist reforms during the Allende
presidency and their participation in unlawful land occupations, Mapuche became targets
for repression during the Pinochet dictatorship. Similar patterns can be found in Peru in the
1980s during the Sendero Luminoso uprisings, and in Colombia where the FARC sustained a
long-running guerrilla revolt against government forces for more than two decades.
8
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of the Americas. As neoliberal social and economic reforms became common across
Latin America in the 1990s, the view of indigenismo as an isolated period of statedirected reforms carried out on passive indigenous subjects went largely
unchallenged. More recently scholars have begun to re-examine the role that
indigenismo played in laying foundations for the rise of indigenous social and
political activism. That historiographical turn critiques previous interpretations that
characterized the movement as scientific and apolitical, or as a form of internal
colonialism that sought to assimilate and exploit Indians. In 2012, this emerging
body of scholarship was recognized in a special edition of the journal Latin American
Perspectives, entitled “Rethinking Indigenismo on the American Continent.” 10
In their introduction to that volume, lead authors Laura Giraudo and Stephen
E. Lewis showed that from the beginning, many indigenista efforts were complicated
by events on the world stage, including large-scale military conflicts, global trade
and economic cycles, and foreign policies that interfered with national agendas.11
The founding of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano (III – Inter-American
Indianist Institute) in 194012 epitomized those complications, coming just months
before the German army occupied France and began the aerial bombardment of

“Rethinking Indigenismo on the American Continent,” Latin American Perspectives, Issue
186, Vol. 39, No. 5, Sep. 2012.
11 Laura Giraudo and Stephen E. Lewis, “Pan-American Indigenismo (1940-1970): New
Approaches to an Ongoing Debate,” Latin American Perspectives, Issue 186, Vol. 39, No. 5,
Sep. 2012, pp. 3-11.
12 Althought the founding of the III represents a watershed moment for the movement,
indigenista activities had begun much earlier in several countries. In addition to the early
Chilean forms of indigenismo presented in chapter 1, which date to the decade of the 1910s,
the creation of an “Indian Protection Service” in Brazil in 1910 and the work of Luis
Valcárcel and José Carlos Mariátegui in 1920s Peru all predate the formalization of PanAmerican indigenismo. See Giraudo and Lewis, p. 3.
10
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Britain during World War II. The III was dependent upon member states for its
funding, much of which came from the United States government. But by 1940,
Native American issues in the U.S. had waned in importance in the six years since
the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, and the country would soon be
embroiled in the War and its aftermath. Following World War II, U.S. interest in
Latin American affairs shifted from the relatively non-interventionist aid programs
of the Good Neighbor Policy, to Cold War efforts to “contain” the spread of
communism by supporting regimes friendly to American-led capitalism. The case of
Guatemala illustrates this tendency, where “an indigenista movement took root
during the ‘Guatemalan Spring’ of 1944-1954, but it fell victim to the U.S.-backed
coup that ousted Jacobo Árbenz and ushered in a series of repressive, sometimes
genocidal dictatorships.”13
While broad transnational trends can explain some of indigenismo’s
challenges, they do not account for the tremendous variation in specific national
contexts. In her individual contribution to the same 2012 volume, Laura Giraudo
focused on the transnational connections that were forged through the III. She finds
that the effectiveness of the movement’s broader agenda was limited by the
willingness of member states to meaningfully contribute to its projects. Varying
levels and forms of support for national indigenista efforts in the United States,
Guatemala and Peru illustrate that indigenismo was neither fully “‘scientific’ nor

Giraudo and Lewis, p. 5. See also, Abigail E. Adams, “Antonio Goubaud Carrera: Between
the Contradictions of the Generación de 1920 and US Anthropology,” in After the Coup: An
Ethnographic Reframing of Guatemala 1954, Tim Smith and Abigail Adams, eds., Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2011, pp. 17-48.
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‘colonialist’” in those cases.14 In this study I show that while the class of indigenistas
in Chile was relatively small, some of them were well connected to the III and the
broader Pan-American discourse. But Chilean indigenistas received little direct
funding from the state, and so their effectiveness in achieving policy objectives
supported by scientific inquiry was limited. While the state and well-intentioned
indigenistas remained largely ineffective, Mapuche leaders themselves advocated
directly for their own interests, but in doing so they themselves participated in the
indigenista discourse and applied ideas to their own unique circumstances.
Following the failure of relatively conservative forms of institutional
indigenismo across the Americas in the 1940s and 1950s, indigenous activists and
Marxist revolutionaries sought new ways to advance their projects. It was in the
radical politics of the 1960s that the seeds of the 1970s critique of indigenismo were
sown. In the case of Peru, that transition can be seen in later historiographical
attempts to understand native participation in leftist political projects like the
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement.15 In Chile, leftist organizers
themselves have shed light on that transition in the lead-up to Salvador Allende’s
socialist experiment of 1970-1973.16 However, a full understanding of Latin
Laura Giraudo, “Neither ‘Scientific’ nor ‘Colonialist,’” Latin American Perspectives, Issue
186, Vol. 39, No. 5, Sep. 2012, pp. 12-32.
15 The anthology Shining and Other Paths (Steve Stern, ed. 1998) provides a variety of
explanations as to why the violent movement took root in the highland region of Ayacucho,
among a largely indigenous population. Particularly insightful for this project is Marisol de
la Cadena’s essay in that volume “From Race to Class: Insurgent Intellectuals de provincia in
Peru, 1910-1970,” and her book (Indigenous Mestizos, 2000) which together show that
Peruvian indigenismo was linked to very fluid notions of race and ethnicity that were bound
up with class identities and a profound rural-urban divide. See also, Jaymie Heilman, Before
the Shining Path (2010).
16 Rafael Railaf, et al, A Desalambrar: Historias de Mapuches y Chilenos en la lucha por la
tierra, Santiago de Chile: Editorial Ayun, 2006.
14
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American state formation projects should also take into account the historical voices
of indigenous activists themselves. This work shows that Indians navigated their
own path across the broad political landscape, seeking openings and opportunities
to protect their interests from within the political system when possible, or seeking
to modify the existing political order when necessary. The Chilean example
illustrates that independence, and also that Mapuche political organization arose
parallel to and intertwined with the emergence of an indigenista movement.
This study of Chilean indigenismo and Mapuche political action also adds
conceptually to studies of indigenismo in other national contexts by showing how
the discourse was formed, how it spread through public consciousness and how
indigenous activists altered the discourse and transformed ideas into strategies. It
challenges the view that indigenismo amounted to little more than a paternalistic
attempt by whites to “improve” native peoples or preserve their culture in a
national state that served as a kind of living museum. At the same time, this work
also adds an ethnic and racial dimension to the literature on twentieth century
Chilean politics and shows how the politics of race and class intersected, which was
significant but has been largely overlooked to date. This work also contributes a
study of the Mapuche political project to the North American literature on
indigenous politics in Latin America, and it critically examines indigenismo as a
contested corpus of ideas projected onto a landscape of unequal power relations.
For the past three decades, historians of Latin America have increasingly
tried to shed light on the participation of marginalized groups in episodes of
historical change. The roots of that transition can be seen in the late 1970s as labor
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historians shifted away from structural analyses of political economy and union
leadership, and toward studies of the lived experiences of workers.17 In the 1990s
the trend in labor history was complemented by studies that documented the roles
of subaltern groups in processes of state formation and nation building.18 One can
also observe a similar emphasis in the literature on the impact of the Cold War in
Latin America, which began with state-level analyses of U.S. foreign policy and
journalistic accounts that documented the involvement of state actors in military
interventions.19 Those were followed by historical works that expanded upon
themes of ideological warfare, terror and repression, and illuminated the much
more varied roles of Indians, peasants and activists in Cold War campaigns and the
impact of those experiences on historical memory.20 This study builds upon those
trends by combining “top-down” analysis of supranational and state-level politics
and guiding ideologies, with “bottom-up” analysis of the way political principles and
realities were understood by people on the ground.

This movement began following the lead of labor historians of the US and Europe inspired
by E.P. Thompson’s influential study of the English working class. By the late 1980s this
shift was well-documented and the best scholarship combined structural and experiential
analyses. See Emilia Viottti da Costa, “Structure vs. Experience” (1989) in which she points
to works by Peter Winn, Weavers of Revolution (1986) and Daniel James, Resistance and
Integration (1988) that combined analyses of political and economic structures with the
ways institutional change was experienced by workers.
18 See Joseph and Nugent, eds. Everyday Forms of State Formation (1994), Florencia Mallon
Peasant and Nation (1995), Peter Guardino, Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of
Mexico’s National State (1996).
19 Three of the most significant examples include the covert military and/or CIA
interventions in Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973 and El Salvador in 1981. See Schlesinger
and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit (1982), Constable and Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies (1991) and
Mark Danner, The Massacre at El Mozote (1993).
20 For select examples see Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre (2004), Joseph and
Spenser, eds. In From the Cold (2008) and Steve Stern’s fine trilogy on the role of violence on
historical memory, The Memory Box of Pinochet’s Chile (2004, 2006 and 2010).
17
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This project also draws from (and contributes to) the recent proliferation of
studies devoted to understanding the social, cultural and political experiences of
indigenous peoples in Latin America, a body of work that benefits from disciplinary
intersections between anthropology and history. Most existing studies of
indigenismo fall into this category, and have explored national contexts where
indigenous persons constitute a large percentage of the overall population.
Numerous studies of indigenismo exist in the Mexican historiography, in part
because indigenista projects were sponsored by the government and viewed as
integral to the consolidation of the post-revolutionary state, especially under
President Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1920s and 1930s.21 In Chile during the same
period, national politics tended to favor reform movements focused in urban areas
and supported by broad coalitions of political parties, as evidenced by the Popular
Front coalition of Radical, Socialist and Communist political parties from 1938 to
1946. Although their base of power rested more in the rural south, individuals and
groups of Mapuche began migrating to Chile’s cities in this era. Mapuche politicians
learned to maneuver across the shifting sands of political alliances and demographic
changes, and were courted for the relatively small but symbolically important
constituencies of voters they could deliver.

The orientation of indigenismo to anthropology can be seen in David Brading’s “Manuel
Gamio and Official Indigenismo in Mexico,” (1988). A more thorough treatment of the
panoply of indigenista programs of this era can be found in Alexander Dawson, Indian and
Nation in Revolutionary Mexico (2004). Dawson also takes pains to show how Indians
participated in those programs. The relationship of indigenista philosophy to post-colonial
theories of economic development is elaborated in Karin Rosemblatt, ““Modernization,
Dependency and the Global in Mexican Critiques of Anthropology” (2014).
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Much of the historiography of twentieth century Chile adopts class as a
central motif for explaining political conflict and change. Peter Winn’s Weavers of
Revolution complemented trends in Chilean historiography that had previously done
so, and was among the vanguard of new labor histories from the North American
academy that combined structural and experiential analyses of workers’
movements. Since its publication in 1986 that book has influenced a generation of
Chileanists to incorporate lived experience into their analyses, leading to several
important books explaining the ways that class and gender identities overlapped in
political projects across the twentieth century.22 What is largely missing from those
works is the role of race and ethnicity in the imagining of the modern Chilean
nation.23 This dissertation helps to fill that void by showing that debates about the
“Mapuche question” were also a central concern in many twentieth century political
projects, including those devoted to economic development and agrarian reform.24
While an extensive literature on the Mapuche now exists in the Chilean
historiography, only a handful of books have been published in English. Several

On the rise of urban manufacturing in the first decades of the century, see Elizabeth Quay
Hutchison, Labors Appropriate to Their Sex (2001). On male gender roles in the mining
sector, see Thomas Miller Klubock, Contested Communities (1998). On feminism and
political reform during era of populist coalition governments, see Karin Alejandra
Rosemblatt, Gendered Compromises (2000). On the role of women in agrarian reform, see
Heidi Tinsman, Partners in Conflict (2002). Although not explicitly about gender, Patrick
Barr-Melej’s Reforming Chile (2001) similarly focuses on class in discussing education
reforms and nationalism.
23 Klubock complements the gender and class foci of his book on copper mines with an
explicit discussion of the role of race and racism in mines of the same period in
“Nationalism, Race, and the Politics of Imperialism” in Gilbert Joseph, ed. Reclaiming the
Political in Latin American History (2001).
24 One of the few scholars of Chilean history that emphasizes the role of race in Chilean
politics is Karin Rosemblatt. While her co-edited volume Race and Nation in Modern Latin
America (2003) does not include an essay on Chilean history, her essay “Sexuality and BioPower in Chile and Latin America” (2002) does.
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ethnographic studies emerged in recent years that are largely focused outside the
scope of politics and activism.25 The most important scholar to publish sophisticated
historical work in English on the Mapuche and indigenous politics in Chile is
Florencia Mallon. Two recent books include a testimonial collaboration with
Mapuche activist Rosa Isolde Reuque Paillalef and a fine-grained monographic study
of one Mapuche community and their struggle to maintain control of their land over
the course of the twentieth century.26 Both studies provide points of guidance for
this dissertation project. The former makes the strong point that Mapuche activists
have always been distributed across the political spectrum, as Reuque Paillalef
herself is a member of the Christian Democratic Party and reports often feeling
ostracized from the male-dominated and predominantly leftist nature of the
movement since the 1960s. In Courage Tastes of Blood, Mallon shows that the issue
of land has been central to Mapuche political struggles across the twentieth century.
By illuminating the indigenista discourse, questioning how it shaped activism and
showing how Mapuche themselves participated in that discourse, strategies of
political alignment and the theme of dispossession from rightful territory are both
better understood.
While Mallon’s work has shown that Mapuche political strategies varied
dramatically over time, she argues that the position of the state remained fairly

Two examples are Ana Maria Bacigalupo’s work on gender and shamanism among the
Mapuche, especially Shamans of the Foye Tree (2007), and a recent book by Magnus Course
on Mapuche notions of selfhood, Becoming Mapuche (2011).
26 Rosa Isolde Reuque Paillalef, When a Flower is Reborn: The Life and Times of a Mapuche
Feminist (2002) and Florencia E. Mallon, Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community
of Nicolás Ailío and the Chilean State, 1906-2001 (2005).
25
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static.27 I set out to show that while state policies did consistently work to reduce
Mapuche land tenure, a variety of voices attempted to influence the state’s position
in favor of Mapuche rights over the course of the mid-twentieth century. In doing so,
this dissertation builds upon the survey of Mapuche cultural politics in the
twentieth century by historian Joanna Crow.28 By examining social, cultural and
political trends across the century, Crow demonstrates that the contributions of
Mapuche and Chilean artists, intellectuals and politicians all contributed to place
indigenous themes at the heart of many of the century’s most important events.
Chile’s two most important poets, Gabriela Mistral and Pablo Neruda, both
incorporated indigenous themes into some of their most significant works, and so
did the musicians of the Chilean New Song movement. Likewise, Mapuche activism
was deeply connected to some of the most significant political developments,
including agrarian reform efforts in the 1960s and Salvador Allende’s democratic
path to socialist revolution that commenced with his election to the presidency in
1970.
In addition, three important works of Chilean scholarship on Mapuche
politics in the twentieth century guide this study in significant ways. The first is a
book by two Chilean anthropologists that surveys the creation and rise of the major
Mapuche political organizations from the turn of the century until the Allende era.29
Their work is primarily based on newspaper reports of the organizations’ activities
and some private archives. It provides a framework for understanding the main
Mallon 2005, 234-236.
Joanna Crow, The Mapuche in Modern Chile: A Cultural History, Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 2013.
29 Foerster and Montecino (1988).
27
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thrust of each group’s ideological orientation and catalogues their leaders and
activities. The second is a recent biography of Alejandro Lipschütz, the most
important Chilean indigenista of the twentieth century, written by one of his former
students, an anthropologist himself with connections to the North American
academy.30 That book serves as an overview of Lipschütz’s life and career and
provides this study with a guide to using Lipschütz’s published work as primary
source material. The third is a collection of four essays that serve as a historical
manifesto of the Mapuche movement, written by Mapuche historians.31 That work
provides this study with an understanding of the role of history in the current
politics of the movement, as Mapuche activists have used historical methods to
document the loss of territory and the opposition and betrayal of state actors and
projects.

Sources
This work draws from four main categories of primary source material. The
first category is composed of the historical records of the largest and longest-lasting
Mapuche organizations of the period. Until 1938, the Sociedad Caupolicán,
Federación Araucana and Unión Araucana operated independently of one another,
but in that year they partially merged operations under the umbrella of the
Corporación Araucana. The Sociedad and Corporación archives have not survived,
Bernardo Berdichewsky, Alejandro Lipschütz: Su visión indigenista y antropológica,
Santiago: Ediciones UCSH, 2004. Berdichewsky taught at several universities in United
States and Canada while living in exile from the military dictatorship of Aug.o Pinochet.
31 Pablo Marimán, et al, ¡…Escucha, Winka…! (2006). Although the authors identify
themselves as “historians of the Mapuche movement,” Mallon notes that only Marimán has
had access to PhD studies (“Decolonizing the History of Allende’s Chile” lecture).
30
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but their activities were well documented in the regional press. As the group that
most regularly organized large gatherings, accounts of the Federación’s activities
also appeared frequently in the press. Although the state confiscated their official
archives in 1929, fragments of the Federación’s founder and leader Manuel Aburto
Panguilef’s prolific writing survive in several smaller caches. Aburto Panguilef’s
descendants retained some of his personal journals, which now are housed at the
Liwen Center at the Universidad de la Frontera in Temuco. Chilean scholars André
Menard and Jorge Pavez have published some of those documents, as well as other
fragments that Pavez discovered in the official archives of the Ministry of the
Interior.32 Because the Unión Araucana was founded, supported and directed
through much of its existence by Monsignor Guido Beck de Ramberga, its records
are well preserved and organized at the headquarters of the regional Diocese in the
southern town of Villarrica. Combined with newspaper accounts and scholarship
based upon oral history, these sources provide good insight into the activities of the
major Mapuche organizations during the decades of the 1920s and 1930s.
In the 1940s and 1950s, the transnational indigenista movement gained
momentum and benefited from the organization and coordination provided by the
Instituto Indigenista Interamericano. The III archives are housed in Mexico City, and
the two major journals that they produced during the period (Boletín Indigenista
and América Indígena) have been digitized. The work in chapter three draws
primarily from the Boletín, which served as a newsletter providing accounts and
updates on indigenista activities across the Americas. Larger countries and nations
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Archivo Nacional de la Adminstración (ARNAD), Ministerio del Interior, Libro 7321.
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with large indigenous populations, like the United States, Mexico and Peru, logically
had more activity and therefore received more coverage, but Chilean indigenismo is
represented there less extensively.
The personal papers of Alejandro Lipschütz, Chile’s most famous and prolific
indigenista, are housed at the University of Chile’s special collections library at the
Ñuñoa campus in Santiago. Lipschütz maintained regular correspondence with
many of the leading indigenistas of the day, including the U.S. Commissioner of
Indian Affairs John Collier, and Mexican anthropologist and III Director Manuel
Gamio. He also exchanged letters with many leading academics interested in
indigenous affairs from around the world. Taken together with the seven booklength texts Lipschütz published on indigenous themes, his papers and published
work provide key links that enable me to trace the exchange of ideas between Chile
and other national contexts through the transnational intellectual network of
indigenismo in chapter four.
Finally, the Chilean state produced official documents through several
bureaucratic channels that inform this study. Chapter five is largely based on
records generated by the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas (DASIN) found in the
Archivo Nacional de la Administración (ARNAD) in the capital of Santiago. President
Carlos Ibañez del Campo created DASIN in 1953 as part of a sweeping
reorganization of the national government, and Venancio Coñuepán led that agency
from its inception until shortly after the election of Jorge Alessandri in 1958. Not
only was Coñuepán the most successful Mapuche leader in terms of advancing
indigenous issues before the national government, but DASIN represents a high-
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water mark of more than thirty years of Mapuche organizing and political
mobilization. It also can be viewed as a formal counterpart to indigenista
institutions in other countries, like the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the United States
and the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (National Indigenous Institute) in Mexico.
While the historical record of Mapuche political activity in this period is
extensive, it is not complete or without limitations. The Sociedad Caupolicán was
perhaps the most influential and mainstream of the three major Mapuche
organizations between 1910-1938.33 The Mapuche leaders elected to Congress in
this period all rose through the ranks of the Sociedad. However, it is unfortunate
that the organization left no archives. It is likely that they were merged with the
papers of the Corporación Araucana after 1938, and that organization’s official
archives have not survived either. That archival void complicates this study by
limiting insight into the organizational history of the 1940s, during which time
Venancio Coñuepán used the Corporación to consolidate his leaderhip of the
Mapuche movement. Nevertheless, that history can be surveyed through newspaper
accounts of his activity and correspondence with leaders in other organizations. The
Federación and Unión archival caches are helpful in that regard, but it is worth
noting that this analysis of the Mapuche movement proceeds from a detailed look at
the two organizations that tended toward the extremes of the political spectrum
rather than the more centrist Sociedad and Corporación. That perspective supports

Although this claim is broadly true, it is important to note that in the late 1920s the
Sociedad drifted dramatically to the left under the leadership of Arturo Huenchullán, as the
broader Mapuche movement mobilized to oppose the 1927 indigenous law. After Venancio
Coñuepán was elected president of the Sociedad in 1931, he realigned the group under a
more centrist, pro-economic development agenda.
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the argument that the movement was ideologically diverse, and that the full breadth
of views impacted the course charted by the more mainstream leaders and
organizations.
Chile’s position on the periphery of the indigenista movement also limits how
much the III archives illuminate the discourse there. To begin with, Chilean
submissions to the Boletín Indigenista were less frequent and less abundant than
those from other countries, and the Chilean indigenista movement was smaller and
less formally established. Alejendro Lipschütz, as the Chilean indigenista most wellconnected to the transnational movement, was also limited in his ability to make
inroads with state bureaucracies because of his communist political views that
distanced him from the more centrist, rural and conservative orientation of the
main body of the Mapuche movement and their allies in government.34 Although
these factors present challenges to the analysis of both indigenismo and Mapuche
politics within Chile, they support a central contribution of the study, which is that
both movements were diverse and contested throughout the period.

Historical Context
This Mapuche story of political organization, resistance and ethnic
resurgence opens near the end of a fifty-year process of conquest, colonization and
subjugation. Through much of the nineteenth century, the Mapuche controlled the
Araucanía as a large autonomous territory between the Bío Bío and Toltén Rivers. In
that time they prospered as herdsmen and traders. But between 1861 and 1883 the
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22
Chilean state executed a military campaign in which they conquered the Mapuche
and occupied their territory. That campaign is euphemistically known as the
Pacification of Araucanía.35 Resettlement followed the war, and between 1883 and
1929 the state created a system of reducciones (reservations) by granting land titles
called títulos de merced to about 3,000 Mapuche heads of household. The process of
radicación (settlement) diminished Mapuche territory from approximately five
million hectares to 526,285,36 and the newly formed communities continued to lose
land through widespread legal fraud accompanied by violence and intimidation. By
the end of the 1920s, Mapuche lands totaled less than ten percent of the territory
they had controlled before the Pacification.37
Parallel to the radicación, beginning in the 1890s and carrying into the first
decades of the twentieth century, the state redistributed former Mapuche lands to
European and Chilean colonists through a mechanism of land grants. Chile’s policy
At about the same time, the Argentine army executed a series of military campaigns
known as the “Conquest of the Desert” to subdue Mapuche and other “Araucanized” peoples
on the eastern side of the Andes. Both campaigns were related to disputed border territory
along the cordillera and both countries’ mutual ambition to lay claim to Patagonia.
36 The Pacification, reducción and founding of Mapuche organizations in this early period is
narrated in English in Xavier Albó, “Andean People in the Twentieth Century,” in The
Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas, Frank Salomon and Stuart B.
Schwartz, eds., Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Albó relies
primarily upon Foerster and Montecino Organizaciones, Lideres y Contiendas Mapuche,
which remains the most comprehensive source on this formative period of Mapuche
politics. On the scope of land loss, see Albó p. 776.
37 Ibid, p. 787. Albó cites José Bengoa, Historia del Pueblo Mapuche: Siglo XIX y XX, Santiago,
Chile: Ediciones Sur, 1985, to estimate that by 1929 almost one-third of Mapuche
communities established by radicación had filed suit to recover lands subsequently
usurped, which likely amounted to the loss of another 105,000 hectares. Meanwhile the
total size of the Mapuche population was counted in the 1920 census at 105,162, which
amounted to 2.8 percent of the total population of Chile, which in 1920 was counted at
3,753,799. Dirección General de Estadística. Censo de Poblacion de la República de Chile,
1920. Santiago de Chile: Sociedad Impresa y Litografía Universo, 1925. Available at:
http://www.ine.cl/estadisticas/censos/censos-de-poblacion-y-vivienda, accessed
6/29/17..
35
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of “concessionary colonialism” was rife with fraud and contributed to the further
loss of reserve land by Mapuche communities.38 The state granted huge tracts of
land to political insiders and colonization companies, the latter being charged with
recruiting colonists from Europe and other parts of Chile to settle across the region.
It was an effort to make land productive, and thereby increase the nation’s economic
might in an era when the Chilean economy was primarily devoted to the production
and export of agricultural and mineral resources. From the beginning, the
Pacification was part of the Chilean state’s attempt to increase, consolidate and
dominate its territory, inhabitants and their resources. As these processes unfolded,
some Mapuche families were never granted land in the first place, while others saw
their smallholdings decreased further through fraudulent land dealings of the
colonizers and their entrenched Euro-Chilean allies.
During this period, Mapuche leaders began to form “mutual protection”
societies for the purpose of defending their lands from usurpation and their culture
from the pressures of assimilation.39 From the very beginning the Mapuche
organizations were joint projects between Indians educated in Chilean society who
returned to the south as teachers and merchants, and white Chileans who
collaborated with them. The Mapuche leaders tended to be descendants of
traditional longkos (political leaders) who had been educated in Chilean schools and
attained measures of success in business or education. In the Araucanía, where a
large portion of society identified as Mapuche, many speaking only the native
Jesse Zarley, Settling the Mapuche Question: Concessionary Colonization in Chile, 19001912, unpublished manuscript. In this text, Zarley provides detailed accounts of land
usurpation and coins the phrase “concessionary colonialism.”
39 The first of these was the Sociedad Caupolicán, founded in 1910.
38
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Mapudungun language, the leaders of those organizations were quickly able to
utilize their organizational capacity to produce votes, and two Mapuche diputados
(deputies) were elected to the Chilean National Congress in the 1920s. It is
significant to note that those two leaders represented political parties at almost
opposite ends of the political spectrum. 40
While broad debates between conservative and liberal political ideologies
had embroiled Chilean national politics since independence in 1818, by the 1920s
both ideologies were being challenged.41 During and after World War I, the nation’s
economy struggled under lower prices and decreased international demand for
nitrates, its principal export commodity. Riding a popular wave of political and

The first Mapuche representative elected to Chile’s lower house (Chamber of Deputies)
was Francisco Melivilu, representing the Partido Demócrata, one of the most progressive
parties in Chile at the time, and not-coincidentally part of President Arturo Alessandri’s
ruling coalition during his first term as president (1920-1924). Manuel Manquilef was the
second Mapuche elected the Cámara de Diputados in 1925, representing the Partido Liberal.
His firm commitment to the tenets of private property and classical liberalism is important
to understand the legislative reforms he proposed. In 1927, Manquilef proposed a new
indigenous law that encouraged the further fragmentation of Mapuche communal lands
through subdivision and the establishment of individual property titles. Chapters one and
two illustrate how this law created a significant rift in the Mapuche movement, with major
organizations aligning to either support or oppose subdivision.
41 The Chilean example follows similar dynamics in other Latin American countries in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For an introduction to the place of Native
Americans in nineteenth century state formation projects, see Brooke Larsen, Trials of
Nation Making (2004) and Rebecca Earle, The Return of the Native (2007). Larsen shows
how the existence of large indigenous populations in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia
posed fundamental challenges to Liberal state formation and economic development
projects, and how dominant racial ideologies conditioned the way elites in those countries
grappled with various “Indian problems” there. Earle focuses on national mythologies of
pre-Colombian indigenous peoples, and how memories of their valiant past influenced
culture and politics throughout the century. For select examples on the role of race and
racial mixing in processes of state formation in the twentieth century, see Jeffrey Gould, To
Die in this Way (1998), Marisol de la Cadena, Indigenous Meztizos (2000), Greg Grandin, The
Blood of Guatemala (2000) and Applebaum, Macpherson and Rosemblatt, Race and Nation
in Modern Latin America (2003). For an example of Latin America’s export economies and
their dependence upon the industrialized capitalist countries of the Global North, see Paul
Gootenberg, Imagining Development (1993).
40
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economic dissatisfaction, Arturo Alessandri was elected to the presidency in 1920,
supported by an alliance of the Liberal, Democrat and Radical Parties, in an
unprecedented election that threatened to end the thirty-year period of
parliamentary oligarchic rule. His fiery campaign rhetoric earned him the nickname
“the Lion of Tarapacá” as he promised reforms to the popular sectors of society. But
following his election, the parliamentary regime in Congress stymied his proposals
and kept Alessandri from delivering on his campaign promises. The public (and
eventually the military) became increasingly frustrated with the government’s
inability to function effectively. Some blamed the legislative branch for blocking
Alessandri’s reform proposals, while others blamed the president for pushing them
in the first place.42
The persistence of this stalemate prompted the military to intervene in
Chilean politics in September 1924, and eventually enabled Carlos Ibañez del Campo
to ascend to the presidency in 1927.43 Ibañez pushed forward a host of social
reforms that had been frustrated in the first half of the decade, but two of the most
significant to the Mapuche people were the Southern Property Law and the Ley
Indígena 1.469 of 1927. The former sought to stem the tide of fraudulent land
dealings in the south, where settlers, colonization agents and political insiders had
stolen tens of thousands of acres from the Chilean government.44 The latter created
a process whereby communally held Mapuche lands, only recently established as

Frederick M. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed
Forces, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970, pp. 1-17.
43 Nunn, pp. 3-4.
44 See Thomas Miller Klubock, La Frontera: Forests and Ecological Conflict in Chile’s Frontier
Territory, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014, p. 97.
42
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reducciones through the granting of titulos de merced to heads of household and
their extended families, could be subdivided and titled individually at the request of
a single member of the community.45
By the 1920s, Mapuche communities increasingly found themselves
defending their lands against settler incursions legitimized by state policies. Using
their organizations, Mapuche appealed to the state for redress through courts and
elected representatives. The reducciones had been established as a form of
communal land ownership, with tracts granted to longkos who would hold land in
trust and distribute parcels to members of the community for agricultural purposes.
The 1927 indigenous law was premised on classical liberal notions of private
property, and some Mapuche supported the subdivision of communal lands to
establish individual title so they could sell or borrow against their property. But the
major Mapuche organizations fought to maintain communal ownership as they
defended and promoted indigenous cultural practices, and they increasingly allied
with more left-leaning parties to protect their people from further loss of land.
Broad Mapuche opposition to the law ultimately forced its modification in 1931.
The 1930s brought continued political instability, a second period of military
intervention in civilian politics, and vacillation between conservative and
progressive political impulses. Mapuche organizations adeptly navigated the full
breadth of the political spectrum to advance their interests. For example, when the
largest Mapuche groups came together to form the conglomerate Corporación
Araucana as a politically moderate entity in 1938, a second group of leaders formed
Ley 1.469, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile,
https://www.leychile.cl/N?i=24531&f=1930-02-11&p, accessed Nov. 19, 2017.
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a more left-leaning umbrella organization.46 As Chilean presidential politics
stabilized in the late-1940s and 1950s, the Corporación developed into a de facto
“Mapuche political party,” defined by the indigenous ethnic identity of its leaders
and supporters.47 The Corporación and its long-time leader Venancio Coñuepán
developed a kind of hegemony over the Mapuche movement, and channeled that
power to form an alliance with the populist but fairly conservative Ibañez, who
returned to the presidency in 1952 as a stable alternative to the partisan chaos of
national politics in the 1940s. Ibañez created an Office of Indigenous Affairs within
the Ministry of Land and Colonization, which he tapped Coñuepán to run. In this
way, Mapuche leaders were able to carve out space for their people within the
Chilean state as it developed over this fifty-year period.

Chapter Outline
The first two chapters open this dissertation by summarizing the emergence
of Mapuche organizations in the early twentieth century. As popular movements
brought changes to the Chilean political landscape in the early twentieth century,
the major Mapuche organizations were founded with the help of non-Mapuche
allies, but most rapidly became independent of non-native leaders. As they did so,
some made use of new political openings made available by left-leaning political
parties. Chapter one focuses on Manuel Aburto Panguilef and his Federación
Araucana, which represent the more radical elements within the Mapuche

Here I refer to the Frente Único de Araucanía, which quickly curried the favor of the Frente
Popular coalition led by President Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941).
47 Albó, 818.
46
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movement. Aburto’s political thought and strategy were premised upon older
traditions of alliance making between Mapuche leaders and Spanish/Chilean state
actors that extended back to the colonial era. When Aburto developed ties with the
Socialist and Communist Parties, he used them to oppose Liberal Party projects that
had the potential to further diminish Mapuche lands. In the same era, he also fought
to preserve Mapuche cultural traditions by organizing large religious ceremonies
and by supporting and practicing polygamy. At one point Aburto even went so far as
to propose the creation of an autonomous indigenous republic for the Mapuche in
southern Chile, which he believed would be supported by his socialist and
communist allies.
But Aburto’s radical proposals did not go unchallenged; he was watched and
arrested by federal police, and other elements in Chilean society organized a
response to the prospect of greater independence for Indians. In chapter two I show
that the Catholic missionary and bishop Guido Beck helped found and lead the
Unión Araucana as a response to Aburto and the Federación. Beck and his Mapuche
collaborators advanced a more conservative form of indigenismo, one that
staunchly opposed the spread of communism and sought to assimilate Indians to
western social norms through Catholicism. But their efforts to carry out the
subdivision of communally-held indigenous lands using a new indigenous law in
1927 caused the other Mapuche organizations to unite in opposition, pushing the
main body of the movement further to the left of the political spectrum. Shortly after
that frustration, Beck had a falling out with Antonio Chihuailaf, the president and
indigenous face of the Unión, which was publicized in the regional press and
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threatened to undercut Beck’s influence with state actors. His response was to
continue attacking Aburto and the Federación, and as a result he maintained a level
of importance within the movement by providing a connection to indigenous
populations that did not fundamentally challenge state control of southern property
or indigenous populations. The more conservative orientation and deep connections
to state actors proved valuable to the movement, and the right-wing Unión joined
the left-leaning Federación and the more centrist Sociedad Caupolicán to form the
Corporación Araucana when they came together in 1938.
The next two chapters shift the focus from Mapuche and indigenista
organizing within Chile to consider the impact of the emergent transnational
indigenista movement after 1940. Chapter three first provides an overview of the
indigenista discourse by framing it within global and hemispheric geopolitical
trends before shifting the focus to Chilean indigenismo more specifically. I show
how the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano was formed at a critical but imperiled
moment. During and after World War II, geopolitical events shifted the foreign and
domestic policies of the most powerful governments in the hemisphere from
populist and progressive efforts supported by international cooperation in the
1930s toward new priorities, principally the consolidation of the post-revolutionary
state in Mexico and the containment of communism led by the United States. The III
did initiate and guide significant development projects toward the improvement of
Indian populations in Mexico and other countries. However, those efforts unfolded
as development schemes shifted their focus from integrated models that combined
social enhancements with economic growth, toward more targeted development
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projects that prioritized growth in economic production over other forms of
improvement. In Chile, indigenistas contributed their insight to a variety of
indigenous projects both within the country and through the III.
Chapter four brings the analysis of indigenismo even more directly to Chile
by examining the life and career of that country’s most accomplished indigenista.
Alejandro Lipschütz was born in Latvia and trained as a biologist before emigrating
to Chile in 1920. Once there, Lipschütz became interested in biological, social and
political questions pertaining to indigenous populations in the Americas, and
gradually developed a productive avocation as an indigenista. Between the 1930s
and his death in 1980, he published seven books on indigenous topics, and
developed deep personal connections to indigenistas around the world. Lipschütz
corresponded regularly with leading indigenistas linked to the III. In addition to
participating in several international indigenista conferences, he helped found a
national indigenista institute (Instituto Indigenista Chileno – IIC) in Chile and tried to
convince the government to ratify the Patzcuaro Convention and support the
institute’s work, but was largely unsuccessful. As an avowed communist living and
working in Santiago, I argue that Lipschütz and his counterparts at the IIC struggled
to influence the Mapuche movement or the Chilean government directly. As the
transnational indigenista movement gained steam, Mapuche leaders based in the
rural south and Chilean state actors were moving toward a more conservative brand
of indigenismo. They utilized long-standing traditions of political clientelism and
alliance-making, which effectively marginalized both Euro-Chilean indigenistas and
more radical voices within the Mapuche movement at the same time.
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The fifth and final chapter closely examines the work of Venancio Coñuepán
during his time as Director of the Office of Indigenous Affairs (DASIN), and
interprets that episode as an example of formal, institutionalized state indigenismo.
The critical period from 1952-1958 represents the height of Mapuche influence in
Chilean national politics during the second presidency of Carlos Ibañez del Campo.
While in many ways DASIN can be viewed as analogous to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs in the United States or the National Indian Institute in Mexico, its work was
underfunded and consumed with functional tasks related to its supervision of the
Indian courts in southern Chile. Those courts attempted to sort through decades of
land claims that were complicated by persistent fraud perpetrated by Euro-Chilean
landowners, colonists and their allies in the legal system, and sustained by collusion
between those sectors. In some cases, Coñuepán was able to use the mandate given
to DASIN by Ibañez as leverage to improve systems for researching legal claims,
administering contracts and lending money to Mapuche smallholders. But by the
end of the decade, during the administration of President Jorge Alessandri (19581964), the political winds shifted and Coñuepán was forced from his post as
Director at about the same time that many Mapuche politicians were swept from
office. Thereafter the agency ceased to be an effective bulwark of protection for the
Mapuche people. When the Mapuche movement did reorganize in the 1960s, the
previous order that sought alliances with politicians and parties in power gave way
to more radical forms of political organizing and agitation affiliated with the left.
This dissertation brings together these disparate forces to understand the
complex set of relationships between Mapuche leaders, state actors, indigenistas
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and their ideas. In combining those perspectives, I map the terrain upon which the
Mapuche people were incorporated into the Chilean state in the forty-year period
from 1920-1960. I show that indigenous leaders adeptly borrowed from the
transnational flow of ideas that circulated throughout the period. Although the story
ends as the tide of Mapuche influence ebbed, the movement would quickly rebound
to form a main source of support for Salvador Allende’s electoral socialist revolution
in the early 1970s. It would later emerge as a vibrant and multi-faceted identitybased movement that helped to bring democracy back to Chile after the seventeenyear dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet ended in 1990. This dissertation joins a
growing list of studies that critically re-examine the role of indigenismo and the
origins of indigenous activism in the mid-twentieth century. While relatively small
groups of Chilean indigenistas and Mapuche activists were on the periphery of the
Pan-American movement, their connections to it provided a framework that enabled
Mapuche leaders to formulate demands, and which state actors could access to
understand and respond to those demands.
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Chapter 1: The Roots of Mapuche Activism

Across the twentieth century, Mapuche activists, organizers and politicians
expressed many different viewpoints on the central challenges facing their people.
Traditional interpretations of the Mapuche movement have focused on the central,
compromising character of leaders, specifically Venancio Coñuepán and his alliance
of organizations under the auspices of the Corporación Araucana after 1938. This
chapter and the next one explore the diversity of thought, strategies and alliances
within the Mapuche movement by focusing on two organizations at the extremes –
the Federación Araucana and the Unión Araucana – in the period from 1920-1938,
before they came together to form the Corporación.
Chapter one shows that Mapuche activism emerged in partnership with
white Euro-Chileans who exemplified the traditional characteristics of
indigenistas.48 Thirty years before the institutional framework of indigenismo was
formalized with the creation of the III, the first Mapuche organizations were
founded in the 1910s. Even in that early period, Mapuche leaders chose a range of
strategies and political alliances to advance their goals. Those choices show that the
movement was broad, diverse and influenced by many factors. Then focusing more
directly on Manuel Aburto Panguilef’s thought, philosophy, early influences and his

Foerster and Montecino use the phrase “huincas ‘indigenistas.’” Huinca (also spelled
“winka” or “wingka”) is a phrase that means white and non-Mapuche, but also carries
connotations of the unbalanced power relationship in the process of Chilean colonial
expansion. Foerster and Montecino, 16-18. Mallon points out that “wigka” originally meant
“thief who operates quickly and violently.” See Florencia Mallon, 2005, p. 255.
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leadership of the Mapuche movement through the Federación Araucana, I show that
Aburto drew from a long tradition of engagement with colonial and Chilean
authorities, and that his projects and positions were conceived in a reflexive way.
Aburto not only drew ideas from both opponents and allies, he understood that both
contributed to his own prestige and authority. The Federación Araucana and the
projects it carried out were clearly influenced by (and reactive to) the broader
social, cultural, economic and political circumstances of Chile in the 1920s and
1930s. But in the process of advocating for a particular set of solutions to Mapuche
problems, Aburto effectively constituted specific terrain and social roles for his
people. In effect, his work was part of the ongoing creation of the Mapuche
indigenous identity.

The First Mapuche Organizations
As Chilean settlers advanced into the Araucanía in the late nineteenth
century they established schools. The first Mapuche organizations were founded
with the help of non-Mapuche educators associated with those schools. Their
projects were initially collaborative, and illuminate a Chilean form of indigenismo in
which white, educated intellectuals helped indigenous Mapuche leaders establish
themselves and promote the interests of their people. Mapuche leaders derived
from a relatively high social stratum within Mapuche society, the foundations of
which predated the Pacification. This understanding provides an intellectual
jumping-off point to guide analysis of their evolving political philosophy and later
strategic alliance making.
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Perhaps due to the influence of the indigenistas, but also deriving from their
own familial and cultural backgrounds, early Mapuche leaders brought distinct
perspectives to the Mapuche movement and the organizations they founded and led.
Historian Joanna Crow has analyzed the intellectual underpinnings of three of those
Mapuche leaders’ views on land and culture in the 1920s and 1930s: Manuel
Manquilef, Manuel Aburto Panguilef and Venancio Coñuepán. Manquilef was a
strong proponent of individual land rights and the subdivision of communally held
land. He spearheaded the passage of the Ley Indígena 1.469 in 1927, which created
a process for subdividing Mapuche communal land so that individuals could sell,
borrow against and improve their lands. Manuel Aburto, on the other hand, saw the
preservation of community land (and recovery of lost land) as central to his people’s
ability to maintain their cultural practices and therefore their identity as Indians. He
also held out hope for the re-creation of an independent Mapuche republic, which
put him at odds with the Chilean state and made him a target for incarceration and
repression.49
Although they both strove for the betterment of their people, Manuel
Manquilef and Manuel Aburto held competing visions of the indigenous past of the
Mapuche. On one hand, Manquilef expressed ambivalence between the glorious,
prosperous and warlike past and the Mapuche’s destitute and repressed present.
Accounting for that difference, he blamed a lack of education and Mapuche
ignorance of Chilean legal and economic practices, hence his perseverance in
demanding educational opportunities and ultimately a greater measure of
Joanna Crow, “Negotiating Inclusion in the Nation: Mapuche Intellectuals and the Chilean
State,” Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, Jul. 2010, pp. 131-152.
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assimilation for Mapuche in the 1920s. Aburto, on the other hand, felt no
ambivalence toward the past or contradiction in the value of Mapuche culture in the
present. It was not necessary for individuals to give up aspects of indigenous culture
in order to prosper in the 1920s, it was only necessary for the Chilean state and
people to gain a measure of respect for that culture and value it as equal (or at least
equivalent) to their own.50
Foerster and Montecino trace this distinction to the hereditary roots of the
two leaders. Manquilef was the son of a cacique aliado (a chief who cooperated with
the Chilean army during the Pacification) and a captive Chilean mother. Aburto
descended from the Mapuche “huilliche” culture group in territory further south and
less directly affected during the Pacification. A distant ancestor had served as a “gobetween” and had participated in the peace treaty signed in 1793 between the
Spanish Crown and Mapuche caciques in the southern region of Osorno. That
accord, the authors argue, resulted from a significantly less traumatic “pacification”
than the one that occurred a hundred years later and further north.51 It also
occurred before the period of Mapuche prosperity in the mid-nineteenth century,
and therefore reinforced Aburto’s conception that traditional Mapuche culture did
In chapter three, I establish a continuum of cultural preservation-assimilation that is a
useful tool in understanding the indigenista approach to uplifting Indians. Without
exploring that concept fully at this point, it is interesting to note that these three indigenous
leaders occupied different places on that continuum as well, related to the positions they
took on specific questions related to social and economic advancement.
51 For a different perspective on the “trauma” produced by the Spanish colonial subjugation
of the Huilliche, see Jesse Zarley, “Towards a Transandean Mapuche Politics: Ritual and
Power in Chile and Argentina, 1792-1834,” PhD diss., University of Maryland, College Park,
2017. Zarley shows that although the Huilliche peoples around Valdivia maintained a
tenuous peace with Spanish colonial authorities, they were the victims and perpetrators
significant episodic violence. In particular, the 1793 Parlamento of Negrete was precipitated
by a brutal campaign against Huilliche longkos who had pushed back against colonial
incursions on their territory (chapter 3).
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not need to be abandoned.52 Those differences aside, they both supported their
people against perceived injustices from the state and Chilean society. As early as
1915, Manquilef was trying to overcome the racial prejudices that Chilean society
had of Mapuche. In his book Las Tierras de Arauco, Manquilef listed and refuted
several commonly held prejudices, including the notions that Indians were lazy,
dirty and dishonest. Ten years later in an interview published in the region’s
newspaper of record El Diario Austral he added, “It can be said that all of the vices
that are today attributed to Indians are fictitious. They are the products of efforts
made by those who would steal their last inch of land.”53
Venancio Coñuepán, meanwhile, charted a pragmatic middle course in which
he maintained support for the rights of Mapuche to hold land in common and
thereby prevent the division and sale of land by individuals. However, he also
viewed economic progress as critical for Mapuche survival and therefore recognized
the need for some measure of cultural assimilation.54 Coñuepán’s pragmatism
enabled him to become a kind of political insider. He went on to unite and then lead
the major Mapuche organizations under the umbrella of the Corporación Araucana
in 1938. Then he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1945 and 1949, and
appointed as Minister of Land and Colonization in 1953. Finally, he oversaw the
creation of an Office of Indigenous Affairs within the Ministry of Land and
Colonization and served as the Director of that office from 1953 until 1960. That
period represents a high-water mark for the incorporation of the Mapuche
Foerster and Montecino, pp. 81-88.
Manuel Manquilef, Las Tierras del Arauco, Temuco: Imprenta Modernista, 1915. Cited in
Foerster and Montecino, p. 82.
54 Joanna Crow, 2010, p. 132.
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movement into the Chilean state. But in order to fully understand the process by
which the Corporación came together, and why that component of the movement
was able to penetrate the state while others were excluded, we must step back and
explore more fully the roots of these Mapuche political organizations and the
spectrum of political issues and positions they supported.

La Sociedad Caupolicán
The first major Mapuche political organization, La Sociedad Caupolicán, was
founded in 1910, with the assistance of Tomás Guevara and Charles Sadleir. Guevara
was the Director of the Liceo Temuco, a secondary school in the regional capital that
educated Mapuche youth, and Sadleir was an Anglican minister whose mission
founded several schools that functioned as gathering places for Mapuche leaders
and their children in the first decades of the century. Foerster and Montecino
explain that their presence at the founding banquet of the Sociedad illustrated a
connection between the Mapuche-led organizations and “white ‘indigenistas’ who
promoted education.” However, they add that their partnership was not exactly one
of equals. “We can appreciate that the indigenista ideas of the Sociedad Caupolicán
were based on the notion of equality between Mapuche and Huinca. However, this
equality was not real because ‘reason’ was a source of power in the hands of whites.
Only by being compassionate and handing over ‘reason’ could equality be
realized.”55

55

Foerster and Montecino, p. 18.

39
Although their partnership carried with it an imbalance of power tilted in
favor of the indigenistas, the Mapuche leaders of the Sociedad soon eclipsed them in
leading the organization. In 1916, Manuel Manquilef rose to become president of the
Sociedad Caupolicán. Manquilef was the son of a Mapuche longko and his Chilean
wife. He had been educated briefly at one of Sadleir’s mission schools, but later
studied at the Liceo Temuco, where he met Tomás Guevara.56 Manquilef and
Guevara co-authored several books on Mapuche history, culture and linguistics, and
Manquilef would pioneer the publication of bilingual Spanish-Mapudungun texts
with his Comentarios del Pueblo Araucano in 1911.57
Under his leadership, Manquilef built a platform for the Sociedad that
included the settlement of communities not yet granted land, tax exemption for
Mapuche lands, education and persistent denunciation of the abuses received by
Mapuche. For a time the Sociedad was able to work together with the leaders of
other Mapuche organizations that were founded later in the 1910s, like the
Federación Araucana and Moderna Araucanía.58 But in 1925, Manquilef resigned his
leadership position in the Sociedad in order to run for a seat in the Cámara de
Diputados. Soon after his election, he introduced a revised indigenous law to the
Chilean National Congress that facilitated the division of Mapuche lands. On that

Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile,
https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Manuel_Segundo_Manq
uilef_Gonz%C3%A1lez, accessed Feb. 22, 2018.
57 Manuel Manquilef, Comentarios del Pueblo Araucano (la faz social), Santiago de Chile,
Imprenta Cervantes, 1911.
58 Moderna Araucanía was an organization founded by Antonio Chihuailaf. In 1926,
Chihuailaf became the president of the Unión Araucana, a role that is explored more fully in
chapter two. Although Moderna continued to exist throughout the period, it did not develop
a major role in the movement.
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issue, the Sociedad and other Mapuche organizations broke with Manquilef and
began to organize their opposition to the law.59
In 1925, the Mapuche schoolteacher Arturo Huenchullán Medel succeeded
Manquilef as president of the Sociedad. Huenchullán aligned the Sociedad more
strongly against Manquilef’s proposed Ley Indígena. For two years they fought
against the law, but in 1927 Ley Indígena 1.469 was promulgated by the Senate and
signed by President Carlos Ibañez del Campo. Huenchullán left Chile to study in the
United States, and José Cayupi took the reins of the Sociedad with Esteban Romero
as his Secretary. All three men would later win election as diputados themselves, but
in the meantime tried to use the law’s provisions to recover usurped lands and
called for the establishment of a fund to loan money to indigenous farmers for
agricultural development.
Resistance to the division of community lands continued, and in 1929 the
tribunal that had been tasked with subdividing lands was disbanded. Romero took
over the presidency of the Sociedad, with Venancio Coñuepán as Secretary, at a time
when the Sociedad had maintained a relatively antagonistic position toward
President Ibañez’s reform of southern property and indigenous landholding through
Manquilef’s Ley Indígena 1.469.60 It is worth noting that although many Mapuche
leaders rose to prominence through their leadership of the Sociedad, those leaders
took a range of political positions and the organization itself moved across the
political spectrum over time. Manuel Manquilef’s land reform project was based
upon classically liberal notions of private property, Arturo Huenchullán moved the
59
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group to the left to oppose Manquilef’s law and Coñuepán ultimately charted a more
moderate middle path to bring the disparate movement together after 1938.
In 1931, Coñuepán would assume the presidency of the Sociedad, which
marked a new phase not only in the political orientation of that organization, but
soon all Mapuche organizations. In that year, Coñuepán joined other Mapuche
leaders like Romero, Cayupí, Huenchullán and Manuel Aburto to support the
candidacy of Arturo Alessandri for President of Chile. For his part, Coñuepán viewed
economic advancement as central to the aspirations of the Mapuche people, and
believed that they could achieve a measure of equality within Chilean society by
collaborating with the ruling class. In Alessandri, those Mapuche leaders saw a
candidate who would champion the working classes and return Chile to the rule of
law following years of dictatorial and junta rule. Although Coñuepán, Romero and
Cayupi tended to favor economic advancement, Huenchullán supported
improvements in education and Aburto fought for cultural independence, they all
agreed that the defense of Mapuche landholding was central to their cause, and for a
time saw Alessandri as a champion for the Mapuche people in the highest office in
the land.61

La Federación Araucana
La Federación Araucana was the brainchild of Manuel Aburto Panguilef, a
descendant of a distinguished line of Mapuche longkos, from the southern town of
Loncoche. In 1916, Aburto formed the Sociedad Mapuche de Protección Mutua de
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Loncoche (Mapuche Mutual Protection Society of Loncoche), which from the
beginning had as its primary aim the preservation and continuation of Mapuche
cultural traditions that were being eroded and undermined by the processes of
radicación, Euro-Chilean settlement in the region, and agricultural development.
Those forces were combining to divide Mapuche communities and parcel off their
land. One of their earliest cultural efforts included a theater tour that brought a
Mapuche troupe through Valparaiso and Santiago, introducing indigenous songs and
dances to white, urban Chilean society. In 1921 Aburto organized the first Congreso
Araucano (Araucanian Congress), which brought together Mapuche from
throughout the region in a gathering that expressed their common cultural
characteristics and the need to unite in order to defend indigenous culture, land and
community against the onslaught of migration and development. In 1922, in order
to broaden the organization’s focus, Aburto reconstituted it as the Federación
Araucana, which he would go on to lead until his death in 1952. At its inception the
organization was led entirely by Mapuche. Although Sadleir supported the
Federación and participated in the Congresos it organized as “Cacique General,” that
title was more ceremonial than functional, and throughout its existence the
Federación would remain the most radical, autonomous and for a period of time
left-leaning of the major Mapuche political organizations.62 The adoption of the
name “Federación” mirrored the terminology used by two of the most important
leftist organizations of the period, the Federación Obrera de Chile (FOCh – Workers’
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Federation of Chile) and the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile
(FECh – Federation of Students of the University of Chile).
In 1924, Aburto used the Federación to form a committee to support the
candidacy of Francisco Melivilu, another young Mapuche who had been educated at
the Liceo Temuco under Tomás Guevara’s tutelage.63 In the same year Aburto
formed the Comité Ejecutivo de la Araucanía (Executive Committee of the
Araucanía), which served to bring together the leaders of several Mapuche
organizations, most importantly the Federación and Sociedad Caupolicán, and
coordinate the annual Congresos that he used to mobilize rank and file
participants.64 Melivilu campaigned to become a Diputado in the Chilean National
Congress representing the Partido Demócrata (PD), which emerged as the first
significant pillar of support for Mapuche interests within the Chilean political
landscape in the 1920s. Not inconsequentially, the PD was also part of President
Arturo Alessandri’s ruling coalition. In the same year, Aburto joined other Mapuche
leaders with different political allegiances in a regional Parlamento where those
assembled agreed on proposals to suspend payments of property taxes, subdivide
indigenous property and found an industrial and agricultural boarding school for
Mapuche in Temuco.65 Although Aburto and the Federación worked with the other
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Mapuche organizations, they maintained a cultural and religious character in their
political action that set them apart from mainstream Chilean society and even the
other Mapuche groups.66
As the 1920s wore on, more Mapuche leaders were elected to national office
and they made more concrete proposals for the subdivision of land. As mentioned,
Manuel Manquilef was elected as a Diputado representing the Liberal Democratic
Party, and he pushed for a new Ley Indígena that subdivided Mapuche community
land. Aburto and the Federación vehemently opposed Manquilef’s law, and that put
them at odds with other Mapuche leaders. For example, in the same year, the
outspoken Martín Collío published a letter in El Diario Austral (paper of record in
Temuco and throughout Cautín Province) in which he called Aburto the “caudillo
(strongman) of communism” and referred to the Federación as “the Soviet of the
Mapuche.”67 Those charges situate Aburto and the Federación within the political

and thereby advance Mapuche interests in recovering usurped land. It is also possible that
Aburto’s support for Manquilef was principally for the creation of a new law, and that need
superseded his concern over subdivision. Foerster and Montecino make the point that early
in this period (1915-1925) Manquilef, Melivilu and Aburto were united in their criticism of
the process of radicación and they all argued for a new law that took as a starting point the
indigenous perspective. As it turns out, however, Manquilef saw subdivision as the answer,
while Aburto was concerned that subdivision would further the loss of culture, and that
difference of opinion pitted them against one another. (see also Foerster and Montecino, pp.
68-73).
66 Aburto joined Manuel Manquilef and Antonio Chihuailaf in the 1924 Parlamento. As we
have seen, Manquilef’s Ley 1.469 would later divide the two over the issue of land reform.
Chihuailaf was at this time the leader of Moderna Araucanía, a small Mapuche organization
based in the southern town of Cunco, but he would later be chosen by Guido Beck to lead
the Unión Araucana. His leadership of the Unión is examined more fully in chapter three.
67 Martín Collío R., letter to El Diario Austral, Jul. 8, 1926, cited in Foerster and Montecino,
pp. 40-41. See also, Martín Collío R., letter to El Diario Austral, Jul. 5, 1926. Published in
Menard and Pavez 2005a, p. 99, where Collío uses the same language to lambast Arturo
Huenchullán and the Sociedad. For their part, members of the Unión Araucana also accused
Collío of having communist sympathies. See complaint sent by Antonio Trangulao
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landscape of Chile in the 1920s, which was an era in which workers’ parties were
being organized and left-wing factions were breaking off of mainstream parties. As
political parties evolved and contested one another for power in Chile, Aburto
attempted to navigate this shifting terrain to advance the interests of his people. His
allegiance with left-leaning parties would have broad significance that extends
beyond Chile’s borders. Scholars have pointed out that in the Cold War period, the
hesitance of the United States to participate more officially in transnational
indigenismo was due in part to procommunist attitudes within indigenous politics
and the indigenista movement.68
In 1927, the same year that Carlos Ibañez seized power and promulgated
Manquilef’s Ley 1.469, the rift between Mapuche organizations grew, with
Huenchullán’s Sociedad and Aburto’s Federación opposing the law and Manquilef,
Collío and Guido Beck’s Unión Araucana supporting it. As the divide grew, the
rhetoric escalated. In March of that year, the Sociedad and Federación hosted a joint
rally attended by as many as 5,000 Mapuche. The Mexican Protestant preacher
Roberto Tellez spoke about Mexico’s history of revolution where Indians rose up to
demand land and rights from an oppressive liberal regime. According to a report in
El Diario Austral, the crowd was whipped into frenzy, shouting “war” and “cannon,”
at which point “Aburto increased the dread by emptying his revolver with five shots

Huentecura to Intendente de Cautín, Jul. 6, 1928 and responses, Archivo Diócesis de
Villarrica, Carpeta Unión Araucana 1. See also footnote 217.
68 Jorge Iván Vergara and Hans Gundermann, “Chile y El Instituto Indigenista
Interamericano, 1940-1993: Una Visión de Conjunto,” Chungara, Revista de Antropología
Chilena, 2016, p. 3.
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into the air.”69 Such actions drew not only the criticism of the Bishop Guido Beck,
who called Aburto “the seducer of the Araucanian people” who “openly spread antiChristian, subversive and ill-fated propaganda and knows how to stir their baser
instincts,” but also the future President Ibañez himself. As Minister of the Interior,
Ibañez sent a telegram to the Intendencia of Temuco, threatening Aburto and
Huenchullán with jail or exile if they persisted in propagandizing against the
government and the proposed law.70
Ibañez would make good on his threat six months after his uncontested
election to the presidency. In November of 1927, Ibañez called on his newly created
national police force, the Carabineros de Chile, to detain Aburto and send him into
internal exile, where he would remain until March 1928. The following year, Aburto
organized the ninth Congreso Araucano, which boasted the largest crowds yet with
about 10,000 Mapuche in attendance. The Congreso subsequently sent their accords
to President Ibañez in the form of a telegram, which included calling for a study of
potential reforms to the Ley 1.469 and the return of the archives of the Federación
and Comité Ejecutivo, which had been seized in 1929.71 In this period, Aburto was
increasingly well connected with actors on the left, although the extent to which that
contact was intentional and strategic is debatable.72
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As Chile plunged into a second period of political crisis, in which the country
had a total of eight different presidents between Ibañez’s resignation in July of 1931
and the second presidency of Arturo Alessandri that began in December of 1932,
Aburto worked to bring the Federación and Sociedad Caupolicán together. He relied
on his partnership with Arturo Huenchullán, who still had great influence with the
Sociedad and would later be elected to the Chamber of Deputies himself in 1933. But
in the meantime the Aburto and Huenchullán collaborated to support Alessandri’s
campaign in the fall of 1931. Aburto’s political positions and aspirations were
becoming significantly more ambitious and increasingly moving toward the left. In
order to understand how those transitions were compatible with his support for
Alessandri, we must remember that Chile’s political turmoil began when
Alessandri’s populist legislative reforms became mired in parliamentary gridlock
during his first presidency in the early 1920s. Aburto also saw Alessandri as a
candidate who would be willing to help him solve the central problems facing his
people.73
Meanwhile, the Federación, Sociedad Caupolicán and other Mapuche
organizations came together to celebrate the eleventh Congreso Araucana in
December of 1931. That gathering produced the most radical elements of Aburto’s
vision for his people, including his utopian dream of an independent Mapuche
republic. Moreover, the Congreso coincided with a political transition in which
Aburto worked to create allegiances with the most radical segments of Chile’s
political left, including the Partido Comunista (PC – Communist Party) and the
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FOCh.74 In order to more fully understand the reasons behind and significance of
Aburto’s transition toward the left in the late 1920s and early 1930s, we next turn to
examine Aburto’s personal and family background.

Manuel Aburto: Portrait of a Mapuche Leader
Many of the twentieth century Mapuche leaders, organizers and activists
descended from powerful chiefs and merchants of nineteenth century Araucanía.
That was certainly the case for Manuel Aburto Panguilef, and an examination of his
lineage provides a window into his framework for thinking about political practice
and the issues that he engaged during his career. Although he sometimes staked out
positions that could be considered radical or extreme from a Euro-Chilean
perspective, he maintained a respect for political authority that made him seem
somewhat contradictory as a revolutionary figure. In the mid-nineteenth century
Aburto Panguilef’s great grandfather José Ayiñamco adopted the surname “Aburto”
as a symbol of a pact he made with the Chilean Francisco Aburto y Ramírez.
Members of the Aburto family had served in the capacity of comisario de naciones
(literally, “commissioner of nations”) since the late-eighteenth century, a role that
functioned as a kind of ambassador between the Spanish colony (and later the
Chilean state) and various Mapuche chiefs in the frontier region. Because the
comisario de naciones had the authority to create treaties, the Mapuche longkos
who interacted with them derived some of their own authority from that
relationship. It also put them in a privileged position relative to other Mapuche
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longkos, as they had the authority to negotiate with the state and represent other
longkos in doing so. Chilean historian André Menard examines this lineage in detail
in his presentation of Aburto Panguilef’s Libro Diario.75
Aburto Panguilef’s paternal uncle, Bernardo Aburto Namuncurá, also figured
prominently in the development of Aburto Panquilef’s political mindset. Aburto
Namuncurá served as a secretary to the renowned longko Juan Calfucurá, which put
him in a position to collaborate and negotiate with both Chilean and Argentine
authorities to draft treaties in the 1870s as the Pacification and War of the Desert
unfolded. Namuncurá derived his authority and prestige from his proximity to
Calfucurá and Chilean authorities, and also from his ability to speak, read and write
the Spanish language. Speaking of his grandfather and Uncle Bernardo in a 1923
interview, Aburto Panguilef said they “played a great role in the pacification of
Araucanía in the province of Valdivia, and never allowed the Indians to lack the
respect owed to the government.”76 Considering that Aburto Panguilef is often
characterized as the most radical of the Mapuche leaders in this period, and also
that he was surveilled and persecuted by Chilean authorities in the 1920s and
1930s, this insight provides a counterbalance to the view of Aburto Panguilef as a
radical when trying to ascertain his intentions and understand his political strategy.
Aburto Namuncurá and other leaders of his father’s generation figured
importantly in the creation of the Anglican mission at Quepe, which was founded by
André Menard, “Estudio Preliminar: Manuel Aburto Panguilef y los archivos de la
Federación Araucana,” in Manuel Aburto Panguilef, Libro Diario del Presidente de la
Federación Araucana: 1940, 1942, 1948-1951, André Menard, ed. CoLibris: Santiago, Chile,
2013, pp. XX-XXIII.
76 Manuel Aburto Panguilef, “Los fines que persigue la Federación Araucana de Loncoche,”
El Mercurio, Santiago de Chile, Jan. 20, 1923, p. 14. Cited in Menard 2013, p. XX.
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the Canadian missionary Charles Sadleir.77 Namuncurá and the longko Ambrosio
Payllalef adopted the Christian faith and spent considerable time at the mission. In
the next generation, Aburto Panguilef and Manuel Manquilef were both educated
there, and established important indigenista contacts through the mission. Charles
Sadleir corresponded with the famed Chilean linguist and folklorist Rodolfo Lenz
between 1896 and 1912.78 Manuel Manquilef began his education at the mission’s
school, then went on to graduate from Liceo Temuco where he studied with Tomás
Guevara, and eventually returned to the Quepe mission as a teacher.79 Sadleir would
also later attend many of Aburto’s Congresos, adopting the ceremonial title “Cacique
General de la Araucanía.”
Manuel Aburto Panguilef originally set out to become a missionary himself,
and the training he received at the Quepe mission school established the roots of his
profound spirituality, which remained an important thread in his writing
throughout his prodigious career. However, upon graduating from the school, he
took his first job working for the Protectorado de Indígenas (Indian Protectorate) in
Valdivia, where he served as a translator for the court.80 There he himself entered
the tradition of Mapuche “go-betweens” as his grandfather and uncle before him. In
the introduction to Aburto Panguilef’s published diaries from the 1940s, Menard
shows how this family and personal history shaped his life, work and writings from
his founding of the Sociedad Mapuche de Protección Mutua de Loncoche in 1916
For a photographic introduction to the work of Sadleir at the Quepe mission, see André
Menard and Jorge Pavez, Mapuche y Anglicanos: Vestigios fotográficos de la Misión Araucana
de Kepe, 1896-1908, Ocho Libros Editores: Santiago de Chile, 2007.
78 Mapuche y Anglicanos, pp. 174-181.
79 Ibid. 158.
80 Menard 2013, p. XXIV.
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and throughout his career.81 Menard traces those influences through three distinct
phases, which correspond to the evolution of his political activities and
organizations, and also to the existing archival sources that remain. To follow
Menard’s work, let us take a brief aside to explain and establish the chronology of
Aburto Panguilef’s political career.
The corpus of archival material relating to Aburto Panquilef’s life and career
includes three distinct caches. In 1929, Carabineros (Chilean military police) raided
the offices of the Federación/Comité Ejecutivo and confiscated their archives.82
Some of those documents ended up in the National Archives collection of the
Ministry of the Interior, and were discovered by sociologist Jorge Pavez in 2003.83
Those constitute a sample of approximately 170 pages, dating from 1924-1929.
Although Aburto Panguilef (and later his son Germán) repeatedly and officially
requested the return of all the confiscated documents, it is not clear what became of
the remainder. The second cache of documents is found in the Museo Municipal de
Loncoche, where about 300 pages of material from 1933-1955 represent internal
documents related to the function of the Federación, Comité Ejecutivo and the
annual Congresos they organized.84 Finally, descendants of Aburto Panguilef
retained in their family archive a series of journals that he wrote, which totaled
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nearly 1,900 pages.85 With the exception of one early notebook recording
genealogical and historical information related to his family from the 1910s, the rest
were produced between 1940 and his death in 1952, although some may have been
confiscated in 1929 and subsequently disappeared. The period covered by these
journals was a time in which Aburto’s dominance over the Mapuche movement had
waned and in which his writings had become increasingly spiritual in nature.
Combined, these three caches represent only a fragment of the written material this
important leader produced during his career, but nevertheless are an extensive set
of resources.86
Surveying this vast collection, we can identify at least four distinct categories
of his work. First, working through the Federación in particular, Aburto sought to
mediate disputes, both between individual members of the Federación, and between
those individuals and the state. Disputes over land possession and titles were
common, but he also received claims and requests for things like education and legal
representation. Second, the annual Congresos organized through the Federación
and Comité Ejecutivo produced elaborate accounts of cultural and political
ceremony, and also extensive lists of demands and proposals to the state. The latter
include suggested legal reforms, requests for the creation and funding of state
schools, forms of political representation and a host of other things. Third, the
Federación maintained a civil registry in which Aburto Panguilef recorded births,
deaths and marriages, including plural marriages that were not recognized by the
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church or state.87 Finally, and especially in the years following the integration of the
Federación into the Corporación Araucana, Aburto Panguilef’s writings became
increasingly spiritual in nature, recording dreams and visions he had that were
often related to the past, current status and future of the Mapuche people as part of,
or distinct from, the Chilean state.88
André Menard and Jorge Pavez have argued that this proliferation of work
amounts to a kind of “written sovereignty,” expressed by Aburto Panguilef as a
counterpoint to the territorial sovereignty they had lost through the processes of
conquest and resettlement.89 His re-appropriation of the written word turned the
tools of European colonialism against the Chilean state, and it almost seems as if
Aburto Panguilef was “writing the Mapuche state into existence.” Menard believes
this “archivistic tendency” is a cultural marker that predates the post-radicación
period in which the Mapuche movement flourished, the roots of which can be seen
in the production of Mapuche scribes in the nineteenth century, for example the
work of Bernardo Namuncurá.90
All of this background is important to a full understanding of Aburto
Panguilef’s political project in several distinct ways. It shows that his work was not
purely a response to the aggression of the state in the immediate period, but rather
was constructed upon a much longer and deeper tradition of political engagement
with Spanish and Chilean states. That longevity is significant to the debate about
Menard 2013, pp. XXVIII-XXX.
Ibid. pp. XCII-C.
89 André Menard and Jorge Pavez, “El Congreso Araucano: Ley, raza y escritura en la política
mapuche,” Política, Vol. 44, Autumn, 2005(b), p. 217, 230.
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why and how Aburto Panguilef, and potentially other Mapuche activists, allied
themselves with particular political parties at the times and in the ways they did.
For example, José Bengoa has characterized the explosion of Mapuche political
activity after 1910 as arising out of a vacuum of leadership created by the process of
radicación.91 Menard’s work, on the other hand, shows that the Mapuche political
legacy and activity stretched back much further, and that it only seemed new in the
1920s because the broader Chilean political landscape was rapidly transforming in
that period.92 Whereas Bengoa explained Aburto Panguilef’s political strategy as one
of alignment with the working classes, Menard shows that his strategy only
appeared class-based in the 1920s. Bengoa’s argument fails to explain Aburto
Panguilef’s later criticism of the left and support for Ibañez del Campo (a much more
conservative figure) in the late 1930s and 1940s, despite his surveillance and
repression of Aburto in the 1920s and early 1930s.93
In a 2003 interview, Aburto Panguilef’s son Germán explained that his
father’s worldview was in part shaped by the pre-existing class order of Mapuche
society, in which his family figured prominently as a kind of aristocracy. Menard
suggests that in addition, the spiritual dimension of Aburto’s politics cut across his

José Bengoa, Historia de un Conflicto: El estado y los mapuches en el siglo XX, Santiago,
Chile: Editorial Planeta, 1999.
92 Menard 2013, pp. XLVII-XLVIII. Here Menard refers to the end of a century of oligarchic
rule that came about with the election of Arturo Alessandri in 1920, who adopted a populist
political strategy in an era when new political ideas related to anarchism, socialism and
communism were circulating through Chile, and when miners and other workers began
organizing to press demands upon the Chilean bourgeoisie. For a detailed of state
repression against anarchists in this period, see Raymond Craib, The Cry of the Renegade:
Politics and Poetry in Interwar Chile, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
93 Menard 2013, pp. XLIX-LI.
91

55
entire career and tied back to even older traditions from the nineteenth century.94
“In other words, the material forces (military, political and economic) belonged to
the state, while the ancestral and the spiritual pertained to the Araucanian race.”95
Ultimately, Menard proposes a deeper look at the turbulent period of the 1930s to
understand the immediate and pragmatic causes of Aburto’s shifting party
allegiance. From 1932-1936, Aburto walked a fine line between forging alliances
with the left without provoking Alessandri, although the president did eventually
send him into exile on the island of Chiloé in 1936 as a response his leftist
provocations.96 Menard acknowledges that Aburto was willing to shift allegiances
when it was politically expedient, but maintains that alliance with the state and/or
parties in power was his preference, in keeping with Mapuche tradition dating back
through the nineteenth century and into the colonial period.97
By the time the 1938 election was held, the Federación and Sociedad
Caupolicán had combined as the Corporación Araucana, which officially supported
Ibañez in his campaign for the presidency.98 But that support aggravated a rift
within the movement between the young, urban Mapuche who supported Pedro
Aguirre Cerda and the Frente Popular, and the older generation of leaders who
backed Ibañez. It also caused a bit of a row between the Federación and Sociedad,
due to the public pronouncements on both sides during the campaign. Aburto had
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initially lent his support to Marmaduke Grove as he formed and led the Frente
Popular from his position in the Socialist Party. However, the outcome of the
election cemented Aburto’s break with his previous allies on the left, especially the
Partido Comunista. Menard explains this as the result of two factors: the PC
advanced another Mapuche leader, José Andrés Huichalaf, as a candidate for the
Chamber of Deputies in 1936 without consulting with Aburto first, and they
supported a group of urban youth who formed a Congreso Nacional Araucano
(Araucanian National Congress) which Aburto saw as competition for his own
Congreso.99 Perhaps the larger issue was the emergence of a generational transition,
in which Aburto represented the old guard that was being challenged by a more
progressive urban youth on one side and a more centrist rural faction led by
Coñuepán on the other.
Menard argues that 1938 was a point of inflection for Aburto and the
Mapuche movement. Throughout the 1930s, the Federación had maintained strong
ties with the left and worked primarily for the recovery of usurped lands, which put
it at odds with the entrenched powers of the region. Meanwhile, the Sociedad
Caupolicán had worked for the creation of the Caja Indígena (Indigenous Fund –
established for making agricultural loans to Mapuche peasants) and for economic
and commercial advancement of the race, which made them politically more
moderate. The two groups, and their leaders, had very public rivalries, which made
their union difficult in 1938.100 The merger not only represented a break with the
parties of the left and a younger generation of urban Mapuche, it also represented
99
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Venancio Coñuepán’s eclipse of Manuel Aburto Panguilef as the hegemonic leader of
the Mapuche movement with the merger of their two organizations into the
Corporación Araucana under Coñuepán’s leadership.101

Proposals, Projects and Quotidian Assistance for Indígenas
Aburto’s efforts through the Federación Araucana engaged a host of
questions that were all related to Mapuche legal, cultural and territorial sovereignty.
His civil registry project, in which he began recording the names of both parents on
Mapuche birth certificates, took place in the same era that the Chilean state created
its own civil registry, which was technically established in 1884 but only began
requiring citizens to obtain passports and identification cards in 1924.102 By
recording births with the mother’s name, which the state registry often neglected to
do for indigenous children, Aburto helped Mapuche avoid later complications in the
inheritance of land stemming from the 1874 Ley Indígena.103 The functional aspects
of the Federación and Aburto’s other projects were able to directly assist Mapuche
in defending their material interests, especially related to land disputes.
When the indígena Antonio Maria Paillalef came to Aburto for help in making
a claim against Fermín Sebastian Miguel for assaulting him and destroying two
buildings on his property during a land dispute in 1924, Aburto first recorded his
testimony. He then helped him hire an attorney, who ordered a visual inspection of
the property. Aburto even helped Paillalef prepare his case to present to the
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court.104 In a similar complaint from 1927, Rufino Chepo Montecino accused
Luciano Raynante of attacking him on his own property, and subsequently seizing a
fallow field and constructing a house on it. Drawing from his early experience
working as an interpreter for the Indian Protectorate, Aburto collected testimony
from witnesses, typed a formal complaint, and helped Chepo prepare for his court
appearances.105 In a similar fashion, Aburto assisted Fernando Paillan Shayhueque
with a land dispute, in which he claimed that an engineer had deceived and
defrauded him while conducting a survey on behalf of the Commission for the
Settlement of Indians. Paillan maintained that he had cleared the land, which had
been virgin forest when he arrived, and that no one else had ever worked it. Aburto
was able to assist by securing a letter of support from the President of the
Settlement Commission, which he sent along with his own letter of support to the
Minister of Agriculture.106
Aburto first proposed the idea of an autonomous indigenous republic at the
11th Congreso Araucano in 1931. Almost immediately the idea was met with strong
and loud opposition from many sectors of Chilean society. When Armando Bergue, a
landowner from the south, wrote a letter to the editor of El Diario Austral in 1932 to
oppose the idea, Mapuche leader César Colima replied with his own vehement
defense of the idea. Colima passionately justified the right of Mapuche to assemble
and advocate for solutions to their problems. He referenced a long list of abuses in
Reclamo No. 227, May 14, 1924, Complaint of Antonio Maria Paillalef against Fermin
Sebastian Miguel. Ministerio del Interior, ARNAD, Libro 7321.
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the south, and said that Bergue raised alarm at the prospect of an indigenous
republic because he and his compatriots stood to lose the land and advantages they
had stolen from the Mapuche people.107
In more mundane affairs, Aburto used the official status of the Federación to
help members petition the government with a variety of requests. In August of
1928, Alonso Quilaqueo, a Mapuche Carabinero, wrote to Aburto to ask for his help
in securing a transfer to a squad closer to his family. Over a period of several
months, Aburto maintained a correspondence with the Director General of the
Carabineros to communicate and lend his support to Quilaqueo’s request.108 He also
helped Maria Loncomilla Santana clarify the relationship in which workers farmed
her property. He certified a rental agreement, in which she leased land to other
Mapuche farmers for cultivation.109 In these relatively mundane ways, Aburto both
engaged the state and assisted with or performed functions that the state otherwise
neglected. Aburto also assisted indígenas with their legal defenses when they were
accused of crimes. That was the case of Rufino Rainante Becerra, whose son Juan
was charged with robbery. Aburto traveled by train in order to advocate for Juan
Rainante before the Tribunal in the rural town of Pitrufquen.110
While in many cases, Aburto performed legal services for Mapuche that could
have otherwise been performed by non-Mapuche attorneys or advocates, he was
César Colima, letter to the editor, El Diario Austral, Jan. 6, 1932. Published in Menard and
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108 Alonso Quilaqueo to Manuel Aburto, Aug. 25, 1928. Ministerio del Interior, ARNAD, Libro
7321.
109 Reclamo No. 379-8, Jan. 13, 1926. Complaint of Maria Loncomilla Santana against Teófilo
Loncomilla Santana. Ministerio del Interior, ARNAD, Libro 7321.
110 Reclamo No. 379-37, Jun. 18, 1926. Rufino Rainante Becerra motion in defense of his son
Juan befor the Tribunal of Pitrufquen. Ministerio del Interior, ARNAD, Libro 7321.
107

60
also in the unique position to help with more culturally sensitive Mapuche concerns.
In October of 1925, Celestino Quileñan came to the Federación offices to refute
slanderous charges made against his wife, Anjelina Meliñamco, who had been
accused of witchcraft. Aburto drafted a formal statement on Quileñan’s behalf, in
which he said, “As this office represents the entity in which the sovereignty of all
Araucanians in the country is embodied, I wish to (renounce) before it these
slanderers and their criminal accusations.”111 Later that month, Quileñan returned
to the Federación office to request help in finalizing his second marriage, to Emilia
Urrutia. It seems that both families had initially given their support, but then
Quileñan received word that the parents of Urrutia had changed their minds. Aburto
drafted a statement on Quileñan’s behalf in which he stated that plural marriage was
“in agreement with the laws of the Araucanian race, all in perfect accord with the
parents of my second wife.” Although that was the case, this particular instance was
complicated by the fact that Urrutia was not indigenous. Ultimately, Aburto was able
to gain written consent from Urrutia’s parents, but her father requested a payment
of 500 pesos in exchange.

Collaboration and Division within the Mapuche Movement
Manuel Aburto Panguilef’s first efforts to support and promote the well being
of his people centered on the promotion and defense of Mapuche culture. Those
efforts were apparent in the theatrical shows he organized in the late 1910s, which
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introduced Mapuche art, song and dance to Chileans in major cities like Valparaiso
and Santiago. Then as the 1920s advanced, Aburto expanded his organizational
capacity and engaged more directly in political matters. As we have seen, the
Federación and Comité Ejecutivo grew parallel to the expansion of popular politics
in Chile during the first Alessandri presidency. In a 1923 interview, Aburto
explained that the first Congreso Araucano came about when in 1921 a law was
being considered that would have profoundly impacted Araucanian society, but that
no one debating it had any direct experience or understanding of the realities of
Mapuche life and culture. That conversation provided the impetus to bring together
Mapuche from across the region to consult and debate the needs of his people to
guide that legal project. At the Congreso, they decided to create the Federación
Araucana, which would be independent of all outside influences and could create its
own laws and governing structure to support and defend Mapuche customs, rights
and territory.112
From there, Aburto used his organizational capacity to help Francisco
Melivilu become the first Mapuche elected to the Chilean Congress in 1924. As noted
above, when Manuel Manquilef, in concert with Ibañez and the Unión Araucana,
pushed through a Ley Indígena that threatened to dissolve Mapuche lands, and by
extension the fabric that held together Mapuche culture, spirituality and identity,
Aburto expanded the political activity of his organization by forging alliances with
other Mapuche organizations and non-Mapuche political parties. He was thus able
to mobilize as many as 20,000 Mapuche to attend his Congresos, and demonstrate
Manuel Aburto Panguilef, interview in El Mercurio, Jan. 20, 1923. Cited in Menard and
Pavez, 2005b, pp. 213-214.
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that the vast majority of Mapuche opposed Manquilef’s law.113 Although they were
drastically opposed on the subject of communal versus private indigenous
landholding, Manquilef and Aburto both criticized various other laws that they
blamed for the impoverishment of the Mapuche people, while ignoring the class
hierarchies within Mapuche society. Both came from relatively privileged
backgrounds, descended from “caciques ‘civilizados’” and educated in colonial
schools, in fact the same primary school at the Anglican mission at Quepe. But
whereas Manquilef advocated for the dissolution of the Mapuche body politic into
that of the Chilean state, Aburto fought for the (re)creation of a Mapuche state.114
But neither advocated for the dissolution of class hierarchies.115
The 1927 Ley Indígena created a deep divide between ordinary Mapuche and
some of their leaders. Those divisions correlated to splits between the political
affiliations of those leaders. Francisco Melivilu was elected to the Cámara de
Diputados as a member of the Partido Demócrata, but Manuel Manquilef
represented the Partido Liberal Democrática, a decidedly more conservative party
that was originally formed in 1891 as a reaction to the creation of the parliamentary
republic that the junta sought to correct.116 As Manquilef proposed what would
become the Ley Indígena 1.469 and campaigned for support across the Araucanía in
1926, Aburto and other Mapuche leaders came together in the Congreso of 1926 to
oppose his project. In fact, Manquilef was not invited to participate, a meaningful
and public rebuke of his leadership. That Congreso revealed deep divisions between
Menard and Pavez 2005b, p. 212.
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factions within the Mapuche movement, with Manquilef and the newly formed
Unión Araucana supporting the law, and Aburto, Huenchullán and the membership
of the Federación and Sociedad vehemently opposing it.117
While the Ley Indígena 1.469 was ultimately revised in 1930 and 1931, the
opposition campaign pushed Aburto’s political allegiances to the left. Recently
declassified documents from the Comintern in Russia reveal that there were close
ties between the Partido Comunista and Mapuche activists in the early 1930s,
although Menard and Pavez point out that we ought to read those documents
critically. They are skeptical of the communists’ claims of broad support among
Mapuche, as their project tried to assimilate the organization and mobilization of all
workers and peasants into the class-consciousness raising efforts of international
communism.118
Nevertheless, as early as the 1926 Congreso, Aburto sent a copy of their
accords to the president of the Communist Committee in the Chamber of Deputies,
and other details from that Congreso bear out the political alignment of Aburto and
the Federación in that early period.119 But as the 1930s progressed, Aburto adeptly
navigated the shifting sands of Chile’s political landscape by continuing to court the
support of leftist parties, but also remaining in close collaboration with more
moderate Mapuche actors like Coñuepán and the Sociedad.120 Carlos Ibañez was
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forced to resign the presidency in July of 1931. A series of presidents associated
with the Radical Party succeeded him over the course of the next year, and then a
government junta briefly established a Socialist government in late 1932. In
December of that year, Arturo Alessandri returned to the presidency and carried out
a full six-year term through the end of 1938. Aburto and the Federación moved to
the left in the early 1930s following these national political trends, but by 1938 they
remained close enough to other Mapuche organizations to combine forces through
the Corporación.121
When Manuel Manquilef was not invited to the 1926 Congreso, Mapuche
leaders José Andrés and Luciano Huichalaf Alcapán complained, to which Aburto
replied, “Manuel Manquilef was not invited because he had declared, in the capital of
the Republic, in the Ministry of Agriculture, that he was not a deputy of the
Araucanian Race, rather he represented his party.”122 That statement illustrates the
importance of ethnic identity in the Mapuche movement, despite party alliances or
other political overtures to other groups. Subsequently, Aburto also referenced the
Ley Indígena that Manquilef had proposed before the Cámara, which did not reflect
his campaign promises to help settle landless Mapuche, but instead created a path
for the division of those communities already settled. On the second day of the
Congreso, a large delegation traveled by horseback to the train station in nearby
Ercilla to greet the Senators Artemio Gutierrez and Luis Enrique Concha, both
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members of the Partido Demócrata.123 Their visit was significant, as that party was
one of the first to begin fighting for social reforms. In fact, Luis Emilio Recabarren,
the founder of Chilean socialism had broken away from the party in 1912 to found
the Partido Obrero Socialista, which then became the Partido Comunista in 1922.
Close ties remained between the two parties in 1926, which necessitated Aburto’s
explicit rejection of “subversive, agitating or communist” activities, addressed to the
governor.124 His clarification suggests that those ties were already becoming a
concern, and he felt the need to distance himself from attempts at surveillance and
oppression by the state, and attacks from his enemies within the movement, from
Beck and the Unión Araucana for example.
In this period, Aburto and Huenchullán, as well as the organizations they led,
courted the left in order to oppose efforts to divide Mapuche lands. In December of
1926, in the same month that the sixth Congreso was held, Antonio Chihuailaf had
publicly criticized Huenchullán in a letter published in El Diario Austral on
December 15th, in which he charged him with holding communist sympathies and
called him a hypocrite for criticizing the government when he himself had benefited
from the government’s support of schools in which he had been educated and
employed as a teacher.125 Huenchullán replied with his own letter two days later in
which he denied being a communist. He maintained that he loved his country and
respected its authorities, but felt that it was his duty to fight for his people when he

Ibid. p. 77-78.
Ibid. p. 81.
125 Antonio Chihuailaf, letter to El Diario Austral, Dec. 15, 1926, “Ecos de una asamblea
araucana.” Published in Menard and Pavez 2005a, pp. 100-101.
123
124

66
observed their suffering.126 Considering the reflexive notions of authority previously
discussed, it must have been difficult for Mapuche leaders to navigate the rapidly
changing political landscape during this period of Chile’s history. The impulse to
align oneself with the party or leader in power was often in tension with the best
interests of the Mapuche people.

Surveillance, Repression and Connections with the Left
Between 1926 and 1936, Manuel Aburto Panguilef was the object of political
surveillance and persecution. His archives were confiscated and three times he was
sent into internal exile by Chilean authorities. Antonio Chihuailaf attributed that
attention from state agents to “his great popular influence among the Mapuche of
the era and a certain radicalness in his proposals.”127 The political attention Aburto
garnered from the state stemmed from his close ties to unions, worker’s
organizations and the Communist Party. Beginning in 1926, charges of communist
sympathizing, combined with Aburto’s persistent opposition to the subdivision of
Mapuche lands being carried out under the authority of the Ley Indígena 4.169 of
1927, led to the first of three periods in which Aburto was detained and exiled. From
December 1927 to March 1928, Aburto was arrested and sent to Santiago, where he
was detained. Then, following the 1929 confiscation of the Federación and Comité
archives, he was exiled to the northern port city of Caldera in 1930.128 Ibañez’s
surveillance of Aburto and censure of the Federación relates to two distinct types of
Arturo Huenchullán, reply to Antonio Chihuailaf, El Diario Austral, Dec. 17, 1926,
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information that were heavily monitored by the state in this period: those related to
property in the south, and political agitation.129
About 170 pages of documents relating to Ibañez’s surveillance of Aburto are
located in the Ministry of the Interior collection of the National Archives. Some of
those papers seem to have originated from the Federación archives that were seized
in 1929. Other documents include correspondence between the Intendente of
Cautín, the Minister of the Interior and various Carabineros who carried out the
surveillance and assessed the threat that Aburto posed. In February of 1929, the
Intendente of Cautín Province, Arturo Vidal Pizarro, wrote to the Minister of the
Interior to express his concern that a reporter for the Heraldo del Sur had
intercepted a telegram about the surveillance of Aburto, which had not been
encoded. He suggested that future communications related to ongoing surveillance
should be encrypted, to preserve the secrecy of the work.130 It is not clear whether
Aburto knew he was being watched, but on February 1, 1929 he wrote to the
Minister of the Interior to refute accusations that he was a subversive and political
agitator. Rather, he claimed to be a keeper of peace and order in the south, and said
he only defended the rights of his people by opposing large landowners who
cheated them as far as the law would allow.131 In November, Captain Alberto
Sotomayor Gonzalez wrote to his commander at the Prefecture of Cautín with a
summary of the documents he sent, which are included in this collection. His own
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assessment ends by saying, “I consider (Aburto) to be a danger to the peace of the
entire province, and above all the sector in which he lives – Loncoche.”132 A short
while later, Coronel Facundo Grismali Barrientos passed along his own assessment
to the Intendente, which indicated that while he did consider Aburto to be a danger
to the region and those who followed him, and he did think his statements seemed
to suggest the violation of various laws, that he did not find Aburto to be in violation
of the particular law that was the justification for his surveillance.133
After Alessandri returned to the presidency in 1932, Aburto, Huenchullán
and the Mapuche organizations maintained a working relationship with him for a
time. In May 1933, Aburto convened an Extraordinary Session of the Congreso
Araucano to debate several reforms proposed at previous Congresos. In his
announcement, Aburto mentioned that he had recently met with Alessandri, who
had asked them to debate the issues to more fully develop their proposals.134 The
following year he traveled to Santiago to meet with Alessandri again, this time also
with the Minister of Land and Colonization, to discuss their requests for changes to
the Ley Indígena. Upon his return, Aburto called a meeting to discuss the newly
created Caja Agrícola (Agricultural Fund), which was a major initiative of Coñuepán
and the Sociedad. In particular, Aburto asked the regional representatives to bring a
list of all Mapuche farmers who would request seed loans from that fund.135
Meanwhile, Aburto’s private correspondence to his son Cornelio during May and
Capitán y Comisario de Carabineros, Prefectura de Cautín, Alberto Sotomayor Gonzalez
to Minister of the Interior, Feb. 18, 1929. Ministerio del Interior, ARNAD, Libro 7321.
133 Coronel de Carabineros, Prefectura de Cautín Facundo Grismal Barrientos, report on
surveillance of Manuel Aburto, Nov. 21, 1929. Ministerio del Interior, ARNAD, Libro 7321.
134 Circular No. 161, May 7, 1933. Archivo Museo Municipal de Loncoche (AMML), Carpeta 1.
135 Circular No. 687, May 20, 1934. AMML, Carpeta 1.
132

69
July of 1934 sheds additional light on his interactions in Santiago, including
meetings with Huenchullán and other state officials, a lunch at the Palacio Moneda
(Chile’s presidential palace), a legal victory in the Supreme Court and a visit to the
Chamber of Deputies. He also referenced reports of threats made against
Marmaduke Grove, who had recently returned from exile to found the Chilean
Socialist Party and won a special election to the Senate two days later.136 In fact,
Grove had carried out that campaign from prison, where he had been detained for
conspiring against President Alessandri. Aburto’s comments suggest that he was
well aware of the fine line he was walking in trying to maintain alliances with more
radical elements on the left and at the same time remain in the good graces of the
President. Other simultaneous events in southern Chile reinforced the need for
caution.
In June 1934, several hundred Chilean and Mapuche peasants carried out an
armed rebellion against the owners and managers of the sprawling Ránquil and
Guayalí estates in the province of Lonquimay, near the headwaters of the Bío-Bío
River. After ten days of violence on the part of peasants armed mostly with farming
tools, the Carabineros brutally repressed the uprising, sending hundreds of
combatants and their families fleeing across the snow-covered Andes while they
rounded up hundreds more and marched them toward Temuco for a hastily
arranged trial. In the process, somewhere between 350 and 1,500 indigenous and
mestizo peasants died during the direct conflict, ensuing flight and subsequent
hardship. Many of the detainees were executed during the march from Lonquimay

136

Letters to Cornelio Aburto, May 7, May 8, May 9 and Jul. 14, 1934. AMML, Carpeta 1.

70
to Temuco, and their bodies were discarded into the river, not to be seen again. This
episode is known as the Ránquil Massacre, and has come to occupy a significant
place in the historical memory of southern Chile.137
Historians Thomas Klubock and Florencia Mallon have each analyzed the
Ránquil Massacre in recent essays and shown that the event contributed to
important political narratives both at the time and later in the century. Klubock
demonstrates that violence and disputes over land stemmed from the state’s
inability to establish and maintain administrative control over the frontier region
from the 1880s through the middle of the twentieth century, in contradistinction to
the relatively peaceful landowner-labor relations in the central valley.138 The
Ránquil uprising began at a meeting of a local union that had been organized with
the assistance of the FOCh, the most prominent workers’ organization in Chile
during the period, which was allied with the Chilean Communist Party. While both
the FOCh and the Communist Party had begun to organize peasants in the
countryside, they had little direct influence in the south and their efforts were not
being guided directly by the Comintern.139 Mallon, meanwhile, emphasizes
important ways that various actors have remembered the uprising. “For the Left, it
has served as a symbol of the Chilean people’s revolutionary spirit…For the right, it
became a symbol of state consolidation and the loss of popular innocence caused by
international communism. More recently for Mapuche intellectuals and activists,
For two valuable but different interpretations of the Ránquil Massacre, see Thomas
Miller Klubock (2010) and Florencia E. Mallon, “Victims into Emblems: Images of the
Ránquil Massacre in Chilean National Narratives, 1934-2004,” Labor: Studies in Working
Class History of the Americas, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2011, pp. 29-55.
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139 Ibid. pp. 144-145.
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Ránquil has served as a metaphor for the enduring usurpation and resistance of the
(Mapuche) people.”140
Manuel Aburto and the Federación were connected to the FOCh and his idea
for an autonomous indigenous republic was in line with the Comintern’s platform
that supported national liberation for ethnic minorities, but he was not directly
involved in the uprising. However, because Aburto had been branded a communist
for close to ten years by 1934, and had already drawn attention and repression from
the state, the Ránquil Uprising almost certainly made his position with Alessandri
more precarious. For a time, Aburto continued to maintain connections with both
Alessandri and the left. In October 1934 he invited Alessandri to attend the
fourteenth Congreso Araucano and on the 30th of that month he had a twentyminute phone call with the President.141 Alessndri did not attend the fourteenth
Congreso, but there Aburto established a formal alliance between the Congreso and
the FOCh. Accord No. 2 included the statement “that the problems that directly
concern the Araucanian race are completely analogous to those that affect the
proletariat in general.”142 In March and April of 1935, Aburto held additional special
sessions of the Congreso, to which he invited representatives from the FOCh, FECh,
the Federation of Railroad Workers, Confederación Generál de Trabajadores,
Associación de Profesores, and other workers’ organizations. There they formed a
“frente único” (united front) with the block of leftist organizations and formalized
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those alliances.143 Again at the fifteenth Congreso, held in December 1935, Aburto
invited President Alessandri, and extended invitations to all the organizations of the
leftist block. While some members of the left did attend, Alessandri again declined
the invitation.144
In February 1936, Aburto was again arrested. On behalf of her father and the
Federación, Manuel’s daughter Herminia called a special meeting to plan a response.
In a handwritten note to her brother Cornelio at the bottom of the announcement,
Herminia wrote, “They took papa, despite the fact that we told them he was not a
communist.”145 In the mid-1930s, Herminia served as Secretary of the Federación,
and in her father’s absence she took on the work of spearheading its ongoing
activities, as well as keeping her family apprised of his situation. On the 21st of
February, she wrote to Cornelio to inform him that in the morning their father was
to be exiled to the city of Quellón, on the island of Chiloé. She reported that Manuel
said he was ready to make whatever sacrifice was demanded of him.146 The
following month, Aburto himself wrote to Cornelio, expressing hope but also anger
and frustration at the injustice of his detention. He said he did not want to reach out
to President Alessandri for help, perhaps indicating that he saw him as in some way
responsible for the detention in the first place.147 In the meantime, Cornelio took up
a collection of funds from the membership of the Federación to help Aburto and
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Aurelio Ñanculeo (who was detained with him) to assist with their expenses while
in exile.148 Herminia organized a special session where members produced a series
of statements to send to Aburto, the press, and President Alessandri directly. They
asked all the longkos of the south to pray for those in exile, and requested the
contribution of funds to support the office of the Federación and the families of
those detained.149 On April 3rd, Herminia again wrote to Cornelio to say that Aburto
had lost his appeal. She said she was despondent and could not stop crying, and that
she prayed that God would take her life. She even thought of killing herself, but said
she was too afraid to follow through.150
Then on April 19th, Aburto was released. Upon his return from Quellón, the
Federación held a special session on May 16-17, in which they passed several
accords that signaled a continuation of their left-leaning alliances and a break from
President Alessandri. The very first accord asked God to remove his support from
Alessandri for not having addressed the problems of the Mapuche people. They
went on to express gratitude to the leaders and residents of Quellón for treating
Aburto so well during his time there. Accord No. 4 established the Federación as a
member of the Frente Popular de Temuco, with Aburto, Martín Painemal and
Avelino Melivilu as delegates to that organization. Finally, they expressed their
appreciation to the members of the Frente Popular de Temuco for their protests
against Aburto’s exile, and to several workers’ organizations for supporting his
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family financially during that time.151 The following month, Aburto sent a telegram
to the President and the press denouncing the application of the “corrupt Ley
Ibañez.” He also requested that the Frente Popular de Temuco petition the
government for an investigation into irregularities in the administration of justice
through the Juzgados de Indios.152
In the elections of 1937, the indígena José Andrés Huichalaf ran as a
Communist Party candidate for the Chamber of Deputies. However, the Federación
resolved not to put forward a candidate who officially represented the organization,
and made clear in a resolution at the sixteenth Congreso that Huichalaf was running
without the knowledge or consent of the Federación.153 They did at first formally
express their support for Marmaduke Grove as he formed and led the Popular Front
coalition that would bring Aguirre Cerda into power.154 It seems that the repressive
actions of the state in exiling Aburto for a third time pushed him and the Federación
further to the left in 1936 and 1937, but that was about to change.
The presidential elections of 1938 exacerbated a growing divide between
rural elders and urban youth, who were beginning to form their own organizations
in the capital.155 In February of 1938, Aburto planned a trip to Santiago where he
met with a delegation of members of the Confederación de Trabajadores and the
Sociedad Galvarino, both urban Mapuche organizations with leftist ties.156 But in the
end, Aburto would abandon the left in favor of a partnership with the Sociedad and
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Unión. In 1938, the three groups would come together to form the Corporación
Araucana, and Aburto’s impact on the Mapuche movement in the rural south would
begin to wane. The alliance between the Federación and the Corporación Araucana
would necessitate a measure of political moderation, which was somewhat
contradictory not only with the positions of his previous allies, but also with many
of the issues and proposals he had previously championed.

Explaining Aburto’s Political Philosophy
Dating back to the late nineteenth century, the Chilean state had crafted
legislation that applied only and specifically to the Araucanians of the south. In
1866, the process for settling Mapuche kin groups on specific parcels of land by
granting them titulos de merced was established. The 1874 law established a
process for contracting with firms to colonize large tracts of land with foreign
(European) settlers, and it specifically excluded Indians from acquiring those lands,
which were government-owned territories that were granted or sold by the state to
the privately-owned colonization companies.157 Because the Congreso Nacional
created these laws, and all laws for that matter, Aburto realized that it was in that
body that the sovereignty of the state rested. We can understand almost all the rest
of his work as a variety of attempts to reassert the sovereignty of the Mapuche
people. In that vein, “the Congreso Araucano functioned as a kind of reflexive
inverse of the Congreso Nacional,”158 and that is why Menard and Pavez consider
Aburto’s vast archival production to represent a kind of “written sovereignty,”
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created on paper when there was not a territory in which to establish it.159 The
sovereignty claimed by Aburto’s writing also correlates to earlier patterns of treatyand alliance-making, in which Aburto’s ancestors, role models and namesakes had
established their sovereignty over territory and people through the ritual
parlamentos in which Mapuche longkos and colonial or Chilean officials reflexively
legitimized one another’s claims to rule.160
Notions of race figured prominently in Aburto’s political philosophy. At the
same time he used the word raza (race) to define a biological category, Aburto was
also speaking of cultural features of Mapuche life, and there exists a degree of
slippage between his use of the two categories. Nevertheless, it is clear that Aburto
and just about everyone else in the era considered the Mapuche people to be a
biologically and culturally distinct population, even if their claims to political
sovereignty were questioned. In much of his writing, he referred to the “natural law
of the race.” That phrase indicates a familiarity with European political philosophy,
and also suggests that he understood certain features of Mapuche civilization to be
endemic to the group. The implication for politics was that those features should be
considered when governing or incorporating the Mapuche people into the Chilean
state. That was the basis for his original proposal to bring together Mapuche in the
first Congreso in 1921, and the subsequent evolution of the Federación Araucana,
which he described in his 1923 interview in El Mercurio.161 In thinking about race in
this way, Aburto drew from much of the predominant racial thinking of the era,
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which lent his arguments an “aura of scientific legitimacy” by adopting the same
basic framework that others used to argue for the inferiority of the Mapuche people
and justify the colonization of the south, for example. 162 Aburto was both describing
and constructing the Araucanian race in his writing, “through a process of continual
inscription, an entity in constant production between the alliances and treaties that
were recorded, the product of a body or of a judicial or political archive in which
they were manifesting their own natural law.”163
There is also an underlying political philosophy at play that can help us
understand Aburto’s seemingly enigmatic alliance-making strategy. By tracing
Aburto’s lineage and the ways in which his paternal forebears derived power
through their proximity to powerful figures, Menard has shown that the force of
one’s allies reflects upon oneself. That makes a strong figure a better ally, but also
means that a strong opponent implies one’s own strength. In the formative period of
the 1920s, Aburto’s political emergence coincided with the rise of the labor
movement and the populist politics during the first Alessandri administration. We
see that Aburto even patterned the name of his own organization after those of
some important leftist organizations of the era, like the FOCh and FECh. However, as
appealing as the left may have seemed as a collection of allies, Ibañez was a stronger
figure by the end of the decade, and according to Menard’s formulation he could
have been as valuable as an enemy as he would have been as an ally in terms of
constructing Aburto’s own political strength in the eyes of his constituents.
Furthermore, although the left made efforts to incorporate peasants into their class
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struggle in the early 1930s as Klubock and Mallon showed in their studies of the
Ranquil Massacre, the international communist movement was attempting to erase
racial barriers at the same time, which Aburto had relied upon to justify the unique
relationship of the Mapuche with the Chilean state and fight for their claims to
sovereignty. That made the left a somewhat incompatible set of political
allegiances.164 This is perhaps why Aburto would have supported Ibañez in the late
1930s, after he had surveilled and persecuted him in the 1920s.165
Finally, we cannot overlook the spiritual dimension of Aburto’s political
philosophy. His faith seems obviously prominent at the beginning and end of his
career, evidenced by his early religious training and pastoral work at the Anglican
mission at Quepe, and the increasingly spiritual tone of his later writings. But traces
of that spirituality are scattered across his work in the 1920s and 1930s also, in the
form of prayers spoken at Congresos, invocations of the name Dios Todopoderoso
(Almighty God) and petitions for God’s strength to be delivered to, or removed from,
his political allies and enemies. In April 1938, Aburto referred to information about
the upcoming presidential election as “spiritual news,” suggesting he used a
religious frame to understand that political contest.166 Following the election,
Aburto called on Federación members to maintain the “spiritual forces” they had
brought into play in the election as they continued to fight for Ibañez’s eventual
political triumph. “According to my revelation…I exhort each one of you, as well as
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all Evangelicals of our country…that we should keep praying until Sr. Ibañez is
carried to the Presidency of the Republic.”167
As he withdrew from active political life in the 1940s, Aburto’s emphasis on
the spiritual dimension of his personal life as well as the broader Mapuche struggle
became even more prominent. Writing to his sons Cornelio and Manuel Segundo
during a trip to Santiago in 1946, he wrote, “Each day I am more content with all
that I have done in this city,” in reference to the divine messages he had received.168
And he increasingly referred to the Mapuche movement as a “movement of faith” in
the official accords produced by the Federación, acts which he characterized as “of
divine origin and material aspects.”169
While a full exploration of the spiritual component of Aburto’s later writings
is not possible here, it will suffice to say that his religious worldview was deeply
syncretic. He drew from both the polytheistic ancestral traditions of his people, as
well as the monotheistic teachings of his Anglican mentor Charles Sadleir. Aburto
was a “bricoleur,” in Claude Levi-Strauss’ famous formulation.170 Aburto’s political
millenarianism reminds the observer of the Incaic tradition that foretold of the
return of an indigenous leader who would overthrow the colonial order. But he also
saw the creation of the state of Israel as a sign that the same could happen for the
Mapuche people in the Araucanía, which he noted in a 1948 journal entry.171 Aburto
was able to see parallels in vastly different circumstances and pull them together in
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service of his people’s political struggle. He acknowledged the hegemony of the
United States in the western hemisphere, and he prefigured many of the rights of
indigenous peoples, which fifty-five years after his death were codified in the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, especially the right to selfdetermination and political participation established in Articles 3-5.172

Summary
Mapuche organizations were founded in the 1910s and 1920s as the process
of radicación was drawing to a close. Settlement and the right to maintain
communally owned land was a central issue in that early period. The Ley Indígena
4.169, which facilitated the easy dissolution of Mapuche community land, provided a
flashpoint that enabled the organizations to mobilize large numbers of their
members and fellow Mapuche, ultimately expanding the capacity of the
organizations. The Federación and Sociedad Caupolicán, in particular, mobilized
thousands of Mapuche in defense of their lands. Additionally, the unstable and
rapidly evolving political context of the 1920s created a landscape that enabled the
organizations to stake out a range of positions on the issue of settlement and
division of Mapuche lands, as well as other issues like cultural preservation and
assimilation. The leadership of Manuel Aburto Panguilef is especially insightful into
those trends, because his lineage is well established, and his own positions tended
toward political extremes. Even though he recognized that his own authority
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derived from the proximity to power, he did not hesitate to forge alliances with
opposition parties, even when the establishment persecuted him for it.
More importantly, the example of Manuel Aburto Panguilef demonstrates
how fluid and flexible the reflexive strategies of alliance making could be. Aburto
attempted to navigate the complex terrain of national politics in Chile during a very
unstable period. While he was guided by the political expediency of certain
partnerships, he also was guided by his broader view of the world and political
principles that pre-date the era in question. His own spiritual beliefs, while certainly
influenced by his Anglican education and the indigenista partnership of Charles
Sadleir, did not preclude him from taking two wives and defending Mapuche
cultural practices that were considered antithetical to most Christian teaching.
Aburto, as an indigenous leader who was influenced by non-indigenous allies, and in
turn influenced the indigenista discourse in Chile, was most certainly a complex
figure who left an indelible mark on the politics of his own era and well beyond.
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Chapter 2: A Conservative Indigenismo

The Unión Araucana was also founded as a partnership between religious
educators and indigenous leaders, in this case between Bishop Guido Beck de
Ramberga and Antonio Chihuailaf. However, from its founding in 1926 until its
merger with other organizations in 1938, Beck retained a much firmer control over
the direction and efforts of the organization than either the Sociedad or Federación,
which were fully directed by the Mapuche leaders themselves. Beck was the leader
of the Catholic Church in Araucanía, and came from the Capuchin order of monks
who had first come to the region in the mid-nineteenth century. Chihauilaf,
meanwhile, was the mayor of the southern town of Cunco, and had founded the
organization Moderna Araucanía de Cunco in 1916. Although Moderna Araucanía
continued to operate throughout the 1920s, the Sociedad Caupolicán and
Federación Araucana had emerged as the two most influential groups, and the
founding of the Unión was a reaction to the leadership of those groups moving to the
left of the political spectrum under the influence of Manuel Aburto and Arturo
Huenchullán as they sought to oppose Manquilef’s Ley Indígena 1.469.
The Unión Araucana hosted its own regional parlamentos (parliaments, or
formal gatherings for decision making) in the late 1920s, where they advanced a
substantially different kind of indigenista influence over the Mapuche movement.
Their discourse prioritized branding and attacking the Sociedad and Federación and
their leaders as communists. They also took pains to “prohibit the practice of
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ancient pagan and superstitious indigenous customs, like the machitún, rehuetún,
guillatún and others that are celebrated with great excess.”173 As they worked to
convert Mapuche to Christianity, the Capuchins did offer mass in Mapudungun and
allow a measure of syncretism between Catholic and indigenous spirituality. Félix
José de Augusta, another Capuchin missionary, was instrumental in those efforts, as
he had studied Mapudungun and even published a Spanish-Mapudungun
dictionary.174 In response to claims that Mapuche children lacked adequate
education, Beck and the Unión publicly reminded critics that the Capuchins
operated more than thirty schools in the province, which were subsidized by the
national government. It is not surprising then, that the government was at times
more receptive to the Unión’s petitions and supported the organization more than
the other two. The Unión, after all, was the only of the major groups to support
Manquilef’s Ley 1.469, and they used their assemblies to actively support the law
and attack the other groups at the same time.175
The example of Beck and the Unión Araucana further demonstrates the
breadth and diversity of thought within Chilean indigenismo and Mapuche activism.
While most of the Mapuche organizations operated independently under indigenous
leadership, the Unión could only be described as autonomous at most. And if we are
to compare Beck and Lipschütz as indigenistas, we clearly see the two at opposite
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ends of an ideological spectrum. Beck was committed to the Conservative Party and
its candidates, and maintained few connections to the indigenista movement outside
of Chile. His firm commitment remained to the education and cultural assimilation
of Mapuche in the Araucanía. Nevertheless, many indigenous students benefited
from the education Beck’s schools provided, and he opened many doors to Chilean
society, which addressed one fundamental tenet of the indigenista movement.

Monsignor Guido Beck de Ramberga
Guido Beck de Ramberga was born in the town of Ramberg, Germany, on the
western edge of Bavaria, in 1885. He entered the Capuchin Order of Franciscan
friars and was ordained as a priest in 1910. Two years later, Beck traveled to
southern Chile to become a missionary and teacher. He taught in Padre Las Casas,
just outside the regional capital of Temuco, served as a parish priest in Cunco and as
a missionary in Coñaripe, all small communities in Cautín Province with large
indigenous populations. In 1925 he was appointed Apostolic Prefect of Araucanía,
and in 1928 his status was elevated to Apostolic Vicar and he was granted the title
of bishop as the Church’s work in the region advanced under his leadership.176 He
learned to speak Mapudungun as a missionary and operated more than thirty
schools in the region, many of which included Mapuche youth alongside white
Chilean students.
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Beck’s promotion as the central leader of the Catholic Church in Araucanía
coincided with the chaotic period of presidential politics in the nation’s capital
during the 1920s. At the same time, the radicación process was coming to end, and
Mapuche communities were increasingly struggling to hold onto their meager land
holdings and organizing to carry out that effort. It is not surprising then, that he
inserted himself into the Mapuche political movement at the time he did. By creating
the Unión Araucana, Beck carved out space within the movement for a more
conservative brand of indigenous politics, and through his schools he had the
organizational capacity to cultivate leaders loyal to him and his political priorities.
From 1926 onward, Beck and the Unión supported private ownership of land,
staunchly opposed traditional Mapuche cultural practices like polygamy and faith
healing, and allied the group with the Conservative Party and its candidates.
Beck was willing to blend elements of indigenous culture with the Catholic
rites of mass in order to attract Mapuche into the church. At the fourth Parlamento
of the Unión Araucana in 1928, Father Félix de Augusta celebrated a mass that
included prayers and songs recited in Mapudungun, and the bread and wine for
Holy Commnion were brought to the altar by an Indian.177 However, the rest of his
efforts were quite culturally conservative and required Mapuche to assimilate to the
values of western Christian culture. Foerster and Montecino illustrate how the
Unión Araucana’s vision of cultural development was an inherently gendered one.
Recognizing that Mapuche women were the keepers and purveyors of much
traditional wisdom and power, for example in the role of machi (shaman), the Unión

177

Foerster and Montecino, p. 63.

86
and the Church sought to subject women to more patriarchal western norms. “The
woman owes her husband obedience and subservience, and he owes her
compassion in return, he should rule her with moderation and good sense because
she is fragile and weak.”178
Boarding schools most fully carried out the goal of cultural integration, Beck
argued, because they brought Mapuche and Chilean children into sustained contact
and interaction through their living arrangements, thus assimilating their
customs.179 “What type of school does the Araucanian need? The boarding school.
Why? Because only there, watched and instructed daily, in contact with Chilean
children who already have a higher level of culture, does the Indian lose his savage
customs and acquire the true habits of a civilized person.” 180 In the same proposal,
Beck also asked for direct funding for the Unión Araucana and its official newspaper
El Araucano, for the purpose of carrying out an anti-alcoholism campaign. By
aligning the group’s efforts with the priorities of state actors, Beck was able to
increase the influence he had with the state, and extract resources to support his
programs. Statistics compiled by the Bishop indicate that since 1896 the Capuchin
missions had educated 83,692 students in the Araucanía.181 By 1930, the Capuchins
claimed 80 primary and secondary schools under their operation, in which they
were educating 5,920 students, 2,061 of whom they identified as indigenous. When
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they came under fire for doing a poor job of serving those indigenous charges, Beck
defended the work by arguing that teachers struggled with high rates of
absenteeism and a myriad of social and family problems that interrupted the
educational process for indigenous children.182
In addition to Guido Beck’s political strategy, his work with Mapuche was
also inherently personal. It is not entirely clear how or why Beck chose Antonio
Chihuailaf to lead the Unión Araucana, but before his appointment as Apostolic
Prefect he had been a parish priest in Cunco, where Chihuailaf had founded the
organization Moderna Araucanía and served as mayor of the town. In comparison to
the relationship that Beck maintained with Floriano Antilef as the second President
of the Unión Araucana, he and Chihuailaf remained rather distant. Antilef regularly
wrote to Beck to ask for assistance with his son’s education and to update the
Monsignor on Floriano Segundo’s progress.183 Beck helped Antilef get his son into a
secondary school in Temuco, and both father and son would regularly write to
express their gratitude.184 On the other hand, the correspondence between Beck and
Chihuailaf sometimes lapsed for months at a time, especially in the late 1920s as
tensions rose between the two.
Later in the organization’s history, the Unión would draw leaders from the
cohort of students that Beck’s missions had cultivated. In the late 1930s, Beck
supported Victor and Zenón Leñam as they came up through mission schools and
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went on to study in Santiago at the Universidad Católica.185 Victor would go on to
contribute to the Unión Araucana, first through the group’s youth branch “Juventud
Araucana.” In 1940 he gave a speech to the Youth Conference that was later
published as an article in the Juventud’s official bulletin Pelomtúe. There he argued
for the importance of developing and maintaining a strong organizational structure
for their movement.186 In early 1944, Beck helped Victor Leñam secure a job as an
agronomist, working on the estate of Senator Carlos Haverbeck.187 Later that year,
in October, Victor Leñam was elected president of the Unión Araucana.188 He would
continue to put his education and scientific training to work in the service of his
people and Guido Beck’s broader educational objectives. In 1949, when he toured a
group of Mapuche communities and compiled statistics, Leñam wrote to Beck,
commenting on their living conditions and offering to share some insights he
developed into the benefits of agricultural training for Mapuche smallholders.189
Other Union members would also go on to play influential roles outside of
that organization and develop connections to the broader indigenista network.
Domingo Curaqueo was a leader in the UA in the 1930s and 1940s190 and would
later become a professor in Santiago and a member of the Instituto Indigenista
Correspondence between Guido Beck and Victor and Zenón Leñam, Jan. 1937, Apr. 1941
and Dec. 1943. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
186 Pelomtúe, Issue 2, Feb./Mar. 1940. ADV, Carpeta UA 2. “Pelomtúe” is actually a
Mapudungun word meaning “genius.” It is curious that the Unión allowed its youth cohort
to embrace this linguistic aspect of their native culture as the title of their official
publication, and illustrates that although the UA was the most conservative of the major
Mapuche organizations and broadly supported assimilation into Chilean society, they did
also make concessions to indigenous culture.
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Chileno.191 Through the IIC, he became acquainted with the Alejandro Lipschütz, and
when the American anthropologist Louis Faron reached out to Lipschütz to ask for
help arranging a site for his fieldwork in the early 1950s, Lipschütz put Faron in
touch with Curaqueo, who helped him make arrangements for his study in the
Comunidad Alonqueo near Temuco in 1952-1953.192 But one of the most consistent
and salient features of Guido Beck’s role in the Mapuche movement was that he
maintained connections, both personal and professional, with a whole host of state
actors.
As the Apostolic Prefect of Araucanía, Beck was able to communicate directly
with high-ranking officials, obtain a personal meeting if he requested one, and was
often consulted when elites in Santiago had a question about how a particular policy
would affect the region. Some of those interactions were relatively minor and
mundane, such as when Floriano Antilef asked him for help getting livestock
imported from Argentina,193 but others were more significant to the Mapuche
movement, as when he asked the Minister of Land and Colonization to reject a
Radical Party proposal that would have ended restitution payments to Indians
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whose land had been usurped.194 In May of 1928, Beck requested and received from
the Ministry of Development a monthly salary from the state of $200 pesos for each
of the thirty-five missionaries working in the Araucanía. At about the same time,
Beck wrote to the Minister of Development to request his intervention in a land
dispute where Mapuche settlers were being evicted from their land.195 Through
exchanges like these, Beck was able to advocate for the Mapuches under his care
and state actors offered him privileged access and support.
Indígenas also utilized their relationships with the bishop to access his
connections within the state. In May 1932, Beck received a request for help from
Antonio Penchulef, when his property had been attacked. Beck passed his concern
along to the Juez de Indios (Indian Court Judge) in Pitrufquén, and assured Penchulef
that he if he was attacked again they would elevate the concern to the Governor of
Valdivia or the Minister of the Interior.196 Beck’s agents also advocated directly to
government officials, although presumably those direct petitions carried less
weight. In 1933, Floriano Antilef wrote to the Governor of La Unión to request that
he intervene to stop “various caudillos that have given themselves the title of
cacique” from making unreasonable demands of Indians in the province.197 In the
same year, he also asked the Minister of Land and Colonization to intervene with the
courts as they implemented provisions of the Ley Indígena, to help Indians who had
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been granted titulos de merced but not yet received restitution for lands that had
been stolen from them.198
It is also likely that Guido Beck’s connections with state actors played a role
in the desire of Coñuepán and the Sociedad Caupolicán to partner with them in the
creation of the Corporación Araucana. In a summary of the January 15, 1937 General
Assembly of the Unión, Antilef provided members with an account of a meeting that
he, Coñuepán and Esteban Romero had with President Alessandri, in which they
asked for his assistance in dealing with land issues, promoting agricultural
development, forming a consumer cooperative and other issues like combating
alcoholism.199 Two years later, after the Corporación had officially been formed and
Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s Frente Popular government came to power, Antilef asked
Beck his opinion about a proposal that he and the Corporación leaders had drafted
for the new President, especially because the plan called for enhanced educational
opportunities for Mapuche youth.200
Beck’s connections were also valuable in that he could get state actors to
intervene quickly in the event of an emergency or fast-moving situation. In May
1938, in the wake of a disastrous harvest in the south, Beck reached out to the
Minister of Agriculture, who provided 400 sacks of wheat to help eighty Mapuche
families ward off starvation as they headed into the winter.201 The Unión’s regional
centers provided a mechanism for assessing the needs of the suffering peasants, and
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tracking the amount of grain that they needed and were then awarded.202 And state
actors were sure to keep Beck in the loop when various proposals were being
considered. In 1943, when the Minister of Land and Colonization formed a
commission to study the “indigenous question,” he included Coñuepán, Aburto and
“a missionary from Araucanía” on the panel, and the Minister forwarded a summary
of the findings to Beck for his reference.203
Manuel Aburto and Guido Beck both served as leaders of Mapuche
organizations and intermediaries between individual Mapuche and the state. Many
of their efforts were even directed at solving similar problems, in particular those
pertaining to land claims. However, Aburto and Beck maintained very different
relationships with the state officials they interacted with, including political
appointees like ministers, elected officials like deputies, governors and even several
presidents. Because Aburto’s proposals were often more radically in support of
minority interests and therefore more difficult for politicians to support, he often
found himself in the role of provoking entrenched interests, as in his alignment with
the Socialist and Communist Parties in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In addition,
because he was much more flexible ideologically, the alliances Aburto crafted were
relationships of convenience and likely to change with the political winds, as he did
after 1938. Beck, on the other hand, consistently favored more conservative policy
positions on social, economic and political questions. His steadfast support of the
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status quo and the Conservative Party must have made him seem like a more
reliable partner.

Ley Indígena 4.169 and the Special Tribunal
The Unión Araucana was founded in 1926, in the same year that Manuel
Manquilef was elected to the Chamber of Deputies and began proposing the Ley
Indígena that would be passed the following year. Some Mapuche supported Ley
4.169 because the process included a historical review of legal titles and a survey of
lands to be divided, which Indians could use to recover usurped lands. However,
others were staunchly opposed because the process was relatively easy to set in
motion, beginning with the request of a single community member. Many viewed
that as a very low threshold and raised concerns that more Mapuche communities
would thus disintegrate.
The law created a Tribunal de División de Comunidades (Tribunal for the
Division of Indigenous Communities), which was charged with overseeing the
process of subdivision. The Tribunal consisted of three members, a president,
secretary and indigenous representative, and from the start Antonio Chihuailaf was
appointed as the sole Mapuche member of the Tribunal. In some instances, the
Tribunal had to reject requests because “the action of this Tribunal extends only to
those indigenous communities with a titulo de merced, and does not apply to land
rights of Indians derived from other ownership titles.”204 Títulos de merced were
the original legal titles to reducción lands that the Chilean state granted to Mapuche
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heads of household in the period of resettlement that began after the Pacification in
1883. However, over the years many Mapuche communities had lost portions of
their communal land through fraud, which in some cases happened when
neighboring landowners simply moved fencelines onto indigenous plots adjacent to
their own.
As early as 1927, the Unión leaders were connected with the Conservative
Party and sent their suggestions for the Ley Indígena 4.169 to their representatives
in Congress.205 The Unión also maintained alliances with some Mapuche leaders in
this era, but were among the few indigenous supporters of Manquilef in the
promotion of Ley 4.169. In July 1927, Antonio Chihuailaf traveled to Osorno to visit
with members of the Unión there, in which he encouraged them to support
Manquilef’s proposed law.206 In addition, from the start the Unión maintained a
cultural and political position distinctly separate from the more radical Manuel
Aburto Panguilef. In Chihuailaf’s invitation to the third Unión Parlamento in Boroa,
he mentioned that there would be no machi dances or nguillatún celebrated there.
Instead, Chihuailaf advocated for progress, cultural assimilation and substituted
Catholic Masses for the ancient pagan traditions embraced by Aburto and the
Federacion.207 It seems that for those reasons, as well as his respect and personal
relationship with Guido Beck, the new President Ibañez named Antonio Chihuailaf
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as the indigenous representative to the Special Tribunal that Ley 4.169 established
to carry out the subdivision of indigenous lands.208
Ley 4.169 did have some success in recovering usurped land and returning it
to communities. By February of 1929, the Tribunal had recovered 1653 hectares of
land. However, those from whom Mapuche lands had been recovered mounted a
challenge to those actions through the regional press, characterizing themselves as
the legitimate owners of the lands and the Tribunal and the state as those stealing it
unjustly. At the same time, other Mapuche leaders were challenging the law because
it made subdivision easier and organizations like the Caupolican Society and
Araucanian Federation swelled their ranks by organizing peasants in opposition.
Some challenged Chihuailaf’s appointment to the Tribunal, and in February 1929,
Diputado Hector Alvarez proposed legislation in the Cámara that would modify Ley
4.169 to stipulate that the President’s nominee for indigenous representative to the
Tribunal must first be nominated by the Minister of Education and be employed as a
teacher. Because that move would have disqualified Antonio Chihuailaf, he wrote to
Beck to ask him to contact his friends in Santiago and oppose the amendment. “This
would mean the achievement of the goals of many who have bothered us and sought
to stir things up,” he wrote.209
In May 1929, Chihuailaf wrote to Beck to explain that several options were
being discussed to reform the subdivision process. Diputados from the Democrat
and Radical Parties were proposing the creation of supervisory positions above the
Tribunal that would report to the Court of Appeals. Other rumors were circulating
208
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about a change of personnel on the Tribunal, including the possibility that Manuel
Aburto would replace Chihuailaf as the indigenous representative.210 The following
month, Beck sent a telegram directly to President Ibañez, lamenting the end of the
first project of subdivision. He expressed his opinion that new proposals were
problematic and might open the door to “pernicious ambitions” of “undesirable
elements that abound in this region.”211 Beck regularly utilized such defamatory
language as code when referring to Manuel Aburto and other left-leaning Mapuche
leaders like Arturo Huenchullán.
As proposals for the modification of Ley 1.469 were being developed in the
spring of 1929, Beck submitted to the Minister of Development Luis Schmidt a
broader plan for the incorporation of Araucanians into Chilean society. Beck
suggested the government should continue to expand and subsidize educational
opportunities for Mapuche youth and include them in the military draft. Regarding
education, he proposed more rural schools, grants for exceptional students and a
system of traveling agronomists who could teach modern agricultural techniques to
Mapuche farmers in the countryside.212 The following month, Beck expanded upon
his proposal with a request that the Ministry support his work by funding boarding
schools for both girls and boys.
Chihuailaf wrote to Beck again to suggest they employ some members of the
Unión to propagandize on behalf of their position, recommending Floriano Antilef
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and Antonio Cofian for the role.213 He also asked Beck to write to President Ibañez,
which he did a week later.214 In that communication, Beck suggested that instead of
adding five judges to the Tribunal, they should hire twenty-five surveyors. More
judges would mean more legal wrangling and competing interpretations, slowing
the process even further. He explained that a shortage of surveyors was the current
bottleneck in the process.215 Antilef and Cofian, representing the interests of the
Unión Araucana and La Moderna Araucanía, subsequently sent letters and telegrams
to Ibañez, the Minister of Development and several Diputados with a similar
proposal.216
In trying to carry out the division of indigenous communities, Chihuailaf and
the Tribunal faced many obstacles and great opposition from Mapuche constituents.
In July 1928, Antonio Trangulao Huentecura sent a complaint to Arturo Vidal, the
Intendente of Cautín Province. He protested the actions taken by Chihuailaf and the
Tribunal. He wrote that Chihuailaf was a tool of the other non-indigenous members
of the Tribunal, who had colluded with a wealthy landowner to evict him from his
land because they disputed his heredity. The Intendente forwarded the protest to
the Tribunal. Chihuailaf responded with information about the lineage of deceased
members of the community, and an official statement from the Tribunal said that
they believed alleged communist Martín Collío was the true author of the complaint.
As evidence, they pointed out that Collío had not been quiet about his opposition to

Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, Jun. 13, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, Jun. 25, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
215 Guido Beck to President Ibañez, Jul. 2, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
216 Floriano Antilef and Antonio Cofian to Cámara and Senado, Jun. 24, 1929. ADV, Carpeta
UA 1.
213
214

98
Chihuailaf, that the letter appeared to be written on the same typewriter as a
previous message sent by Collío, and that all the members of the community except
Collío disputed Trangulao’s claim. Chihauilaf wrote to Beck to affirm the Tribunal’s
response and told him not to worry about it. He claimed that other communist
agitators were behind Collío, and worried about connections between the Partido
Comunista and the current president of the Catholic center in Imperial.217 Fear of
communist infiltration was an important theme trumpeted by Beck and the Unión
leaders throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Even though he supported the Ley 4.169 and the Tribunal it established,
Beck was not completely satisfied with its progress either. He recognized it was an
enormous task that required more manpower, time and resources. In addition, there
was not enough land to settle all the Indians who were never settled in the first
place, and there was not enough time or manpower to divide the communities given
the level of conflict and confusion that the process produced. He also worried about
violence if ocupantes (squatters) were forcibly removed from state lands.218
Chihuailaf acknowledged those concerns even as he carried on with the project.219
The Tribunal and the process of subdivision also provided a means by which
Mapuche communities could recover land that had been stolen from them. Manuel
Aburto tried to use the process in that way, as in the case of Filipe Millahuala

Complaint by Antonio Trangulao Huentecura, Jul. 6, 1928. ADV, Carpeta UA 1. It is not
clear from the existing historical record who Martín Collío was or what his role he played in
this period of Mapuche history. Here an accusation is made that Collío is himself a
communist agitator. In other correspondence he levies similar charges against Aburto and
Huenchullán. See also, footnote 67.
218 Guido Beck, draft proposal for legal reforms, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
219 Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, Oct. 26, 1928. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
217

99
Caniulaf, who had been granted 42 hectares within the reducción of José Painequeo.
Aburto explained that the Comité Ejecutivo had studied his claim, confirmed
Millahuala’s assertion and requested that the government restore his property.220 In
some cases, the process did work to restore lost land to its rightful owners. In
November 1928, the Tribunal offered a lengthy explanation and resolution of a
dispute between Juan Millahuaiqui and Simón Puchi. Millahuaiqui claimed that
Puchi had colluded with others to push him off his land, and petitioned to have the
Comunidad Juan Manque divided in an effort to recover that land, which they
granted.221
It is difficult to establish conclusively what percentage of land disputes arose
within Mapuche communities and how many were between Mapuche and nonindigenous landholders. However, all of the major indigenous organizations were
involved in defending Mapuche lands from usurpation at one time or another,
suggesting that the latter was a much more prevalent injustice. As Manquilef’s Ley
1.469 was being applied, Beck, Chihuailaf and the Unión ardently supported the
subdivision of land that it prescribed, arguing that private property was in the best
interest of Indians seeking to advance in modern Chilean society, and at the same
time that the process contained valuable tools to recover lost land. However, by
1929 pressure from the other Mapuche organizations led to the modification of the
law, and the Tribunal was disbanded.222 Eventually, President Ibañez would modify
Ley 4.169 with Decree Law 4.111 in 1931. The latter raised the threshold by which a
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community could request subdivision from a single person to one-third of the group,
which did serve to dramatically slow the number of subdivisions requested by
Mapuche communities even though private ownership of land remained a strategy
for helping Indians develop economically and integrate socially.223

The Fracas of 1930: Internal Politics
Following the breakup of the Tribunal, several cracks appeared in the
partnership between Antonio Chihuailaf and Guido Beck, which nearly resulted in
the Unión’s demise. In early 1929, Chihuailaf began having personal problems, and
at the same time his relationship with Beck was becoming strained. In May of that
year, Unión member Floriano Antilef wrote to Monsignor Beck to inform him that
for some time he had been hearing disturbing rumors about Antonio’s wife. At first
he did not believe them, as he did not know the young men who were spreading the
stories. But it was later confirmed by people he trusted that Antonio’s wife had been
caught having relations with another man in the house of Antonio’s father. Antilef
suggested that Antonio ought to divorce his wife for that reason, but thought the
Bishop might be able to offer counsel on what he should do.224 It seems that Beck
already knew about the incident, because the day before two officers of the court in
Cunco had written to Beck, explaining the circumstances in even greater detail. On
March 22, 1929, Antonio Chihuailaf’s parents, Juan Antonio Chihuailaf and
Rudecinda Huenulaf, had come before the court to denounce Antonio’s wife, Camela
Morales, and request that their son’s marriage to her be annulled. It seems that the
223
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Carabineros in Cunco had investigated a claim that Antonio had murdered Camela,
but found her living at her grandmother’s house. Antonio’s parents claimed Camela
suffered from a serious mental illness, and that she was “a threat to Antonio’s
existence.” In fear of her, Antonio had moved back into their house.225 Antonio had
written to Beck only days before and asked for a personal meeting to discuss what
to do. He reassured Beck that even though “such incredible things” had occurred, his
“enthusiasm and discipline would not be withered.”226
Later that year, in November, Beck wrote to Antonio to say that he would be
in Santiago soon (where Antonio had been staying) and offered to meet up with him.
He mentioned that he had not received a reply to his most recent letter, and
wondered if Antonio had received it.227 It seems that as President of the Unión
Araucana, Antonio Chihuailaf operated with quite a bit of autonomy from Beck,
whose title was Director General. In some cases, Beck’s letters indicate that he had
not heard from Chihuailaf in months, or that Antonio had not responded to a
previous communication Beck had sent. Later on, Beck would maintain a closer
working relationship with Floriano Antilef after he became President. Chihuailaf’s
independence contributed to the strained relationship with Beck, and the distance
that grew between them led eventually to outright antagonism.
In January 1930, Beck wrote to Chihuailaf to express his concern that
Antonio had declared his candidacy for Diputado without consulting him. He was
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most disturbed that Antonio had claimed to stand as an official candidate of the
Unión, but had not received an endorsement from the group.
“My dear Antonio! This is bad for you, very bad. No one would be happier for you if
you became a Deputy than the one who writes these lines. But you have lost the
confidence of the one who has been like a father to you until this day, and that you
would not communicate matters of such importance like standing as a candidate for
Deputy is a bad sign. To announce your candidacy as a Deputy of the UA without an
official accord having been made, is not truthful, it is to deceive the public. You do
not know how much it has made me suffer and how much it has hurt me that you
did not answer my last letter and that you have shown me this mistrust.”228

It is clear that Beck saw Chihuailaf’s independence as more than just bad form. He
was concerned that it was dishonest and felt personally let down that this man
whom he had educated, mentored and promoted to lead the organization would
shut him out of such a major decision. The move not only hurt their relationship, it
also sowed discord and mistrust among the members of the Unión.
Unión member Juan Pichunlaf wrote to Beck in April 1930 to ask why he had
opposed Chihuailaf’s candidacy. He characterized Beck as the one who had betrayed
Antonio, and questioned whether he had done this because Antonio divorced his
wife, a choice that he thought was justified given the nature of her “crimes.”229 Beck
responded to Pichunlaf to refute the claim that he had opposed Chihuailaf’s
candidacy. “To the contrary, I recommended him directly in a letter to the Minister,”
he wrote, in spite of his concern that Antonio’s claim to represent the Unión
contradicted their own bylaws. He added that he preferred Chihuailaf to a dozen
other candidates, especially Manuel Aburto, because he knew Antonio to be a decent
and honorable man.230
Guido Beck to Antonio Chihuailaf, Jan. 16, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
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But Beck and Chihuailaf continued to drift apart, and the indígenas they
represented were caught in the middle. In April 1930, Chihuailaf wrote to Beck to
say that he heard from Pichunlaf and a friend of Antilef’s that their associates in
Loncoche had a distinctly bad impression of the Capuchins. Chihuailaf asked Beck
for a monthly salary of 800 pesos so he could begin again to travel there and work to
undo the damage that had been done by criticism of the mission schools.231 In Beck’s
reply, he answered that he could not accept his terms. “It is too much. Do not make,
Antonio, a business with the defense of your race. Another piece of advice for you:
Don’t allow yourself to be dominated by your friends. Guard well your
independence and your good sense, which will always guide you well.”232 It is not
clear who Beck thought was influencing Chihuailaf, but this reference suggests that
Chihuailaf maintained ties with other indigenous leaders who had different political
views and/or allegiances. Although Beck referred to Antonio’s independence as a
good thing, it was that very independent streak that seemed to have damaged their
relationship.
As the relationship between Beck and Chihuailaf broke down, Beck turned
increasingly to Floriano Antilef, who would eventually become the next President of
the Unión. However, Antilef was at first ambivalent about whether to follow
Chihuailaf as the President or Beck as the Director General. In April 1930, he wrote
to Beck, expressing his concern that Beck’s ties to the Conservative Party did not
seem to be in the best interest of the race. He referred to comments Conservative
candidates had made, disparaging Mapuche as culturally backward. He added that
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he never wanted to be in contradiction to the Church’s teachings or Beck personally,
but he viewed the brand of capitalism advanced by the Conservative Party as
exploitative. He acknowledged that Beck had not openly opposed Chihuailaf’s
candidacy, but also recognized that by not actively supporting him he dealt a fatal
blow to his chances for election.233 Ultimately, Antilef’s trust in Beck and his faith in
the Church overshadowed the misgivings he had about the politics of the
Conservative Party being best for the Mapuche people.
The following month, in a reply to Antilef, Beck suggested that the heart of
the matter lay in Chihuailaf’s criticism of mission schools, which centered around
the types of careers for which the mission schools prepared its indigenous students.
“To work against our schools, that produce such immense benefit for the race, is
true insanity, a thing that cannot be understood. I spoke extensively about this with
the President of the Republic. He was very indignant and willing to proceed against
these agitators. He said that an honorable and hardworking Indian who cultivates
the land is a greater tribute to his people than a lawyer, and contributes more to the
wealth of the nation than a lawyer.”234

It seems that Chihuailaf’s unforgiveable sin was to side with other Mapuche activists
in their criticism of Beck’s schools. By not separating himself from the other
Mapuche organizations on that point, Chihuailaf fatally distanced himself from the
Unión Araucana and had to embark on a new direction.
In the spring of 1930, Antonio Chihuailaf abandoned his role as leader of the
Unión Araucana, and attempted to dissolve the organization. In a battle waged on
the pages of the region’s newspapers, Chihuailaf challenged Beck’s self-proclaimed
status as a representative of the Mapuche people as he criticized the educational
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work carried out in the mission schools. On the first point, he questioned why the
Mapuche needed a German Catholic mission to represent them when they already
had multiple members of their own race elected to the Chilean Congress and several
other organizations fighting for their rights and well being. Regarding the Capuchin
schools, he claimed that Mapuche youth accounted for only a small percentage of the
students there, and that they had been unsuccessful in training them for careers as
teachers, lawyers and business leaders.
Guido Beck fired back, claiming he had dedicated his life’s work to helping
Mapuche peasants in Southern Chile, and that he had personally visited the homes
and communities of many of the students he had guided into and through the
mission schools. He characterized Chihuailaf’s statements as politically motivated
betrayals as the dispute played out publicly in the region’s newspapers. On April
25th, 1930, several members of the Unión Araucana published an article in the
Heraldo del Sur that defended the Capuchin mission and listed the good works the
fathers had done on behalf of Mapuche communities. On May 9th, the paper printed a
rebuttal, which characterized the Capuchins as businessmen, trying to make a buck
on the education of poor indigenous peasants. The authors echoed Chihuailaf’s
statement about the strength of the Mapuche movement, contending that they had
their own elected representatives and did not need the missionaries to fight their
battles for them.235 Charges of profiting from the business of representing poor
Mapuche peasants became ammunition for both sides.
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In the wake of such public discord, between organizations and even within
the Unión, statements were prepared and distributed through the organization’s
regional centros (centers). In those messages, Unión leaders apologized for the
attitude and actions of former president Antonio Chihuailaf, and rejected the
criticism levied against mission schools as unjust and unfounded. They clarified that
the Unión Araucana had not been disbanded, and that they were calling for
members to regroup and confirm their commitment to the Unión by flying their tricolored flag, on which were written the words “religion,” “family,” “education” and
“work.”236 Beck and several priests were instrumental in helping Floriano Antilef
coordinate this response, sketching out five points with which to respond.237 Antilef
and another Mapuche member of the Unión, Marcelino Ñanculeo, remained in close
correspondence with the Capuchin priest Father Sebastián, expressing their support
and ongoing loyalty.238 However, they did indicate that “the protest of Chihuailaf has
infected some members” of the Unión.239 In May 1930 they published an explanation
of Chihuailaf’s attempt to dissolve the Unión, indicating that it was invalid because
the meeting in which it was approved did not have a quorum.240 Then they called
the Unión leadership together in a special meeting on June 4th, 1930, to chart a path
forward.241
The priest Father Vicente wrote to the editor of the Heraldo del Sur to refute
several charges levied by Mapuche individuals identified as “R. Chuquelef” and “Fr.
Notes related to Antonio Chihuailaf, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
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Caniulaf” in a previous article. He clarified that the numbers of Mapuche students in
their schools were much higher than they had claimed, and that the cost of tuition
and fees were much lower. In fact, the schools’ fees were so low that the mission
could not possibly make a profit from their work, Vicente added. He also explained
that the school provided a range of instruction, including practical lessons in
agricultural techniques. 242
In May 1930, Antilef wrote to Father Remigio about the dispute between
Chihuailaf, Aburto and the Unión. He said he was sorry to see the fight playing out
publically, in the papers. “You said it well, that one (bad) potato can spoil a sack of
potatoes. We see the insertion of Pichunlaf among the Indians (like that) and
(wonder) why Chihuailaf allowed it. We are like crazy idiots fighting amongst
ourselves.”243 Antilef went on to mention that he was traveling to Temuco in the
morning to speak with Chihuailaf, and he planned to tell him that if he decided to
leave the Unión he would not try to convince him to stay.
From that point on, Beck and the Capuchin fathers embarked on a project of
damage control. Since much of the criticism against them had played out in the
region’s newspapers, they began a letter and article writing campaign to defend
their work. At the fifth Unión Parlamento, those who assembled passed an accord
and sent it to the editor of the Heraldo del Sur. The Unión’s membership established
an official stance that walked back the toughest talk of their former president. In
response to the criticism, the Unión proposed asking the government to fund more
Mapuche schools and students, and reiterated that they deeply valued the education
242
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that the Capuchins provided. They also argued that criticism of mission schools had
been overstated in the press.244
Beck was able to secure the endorsement of President Ibañez, who defended
the technical aspects of mission education, explained that cultures are uplifted little
by little, and that the Capuchins’ mission should not be to train a cadre of indigenous
lawyers. At the same time, Ibañez retreated from his previous advocacy for the carte
blanche subdivision of indigenous lands and credited Beck for changing his mind
rather than leaders who had been more vehemently and vocally opposed, in the
process agreeing with statements Beck had recently made on the subject.245
Following a meeting with the president on May 5, 1930, Beck’s secretary Tomás de
Augusta sent minutes from their meeting to newspapers, in which Ibañez confirmed
that he thought the mission schools were “very adequate” and that their practical
approach to indigenous education was very sensible.246 In a subsequent piece of
pro-Capuchin propaganda, they reported asking the President what he wanted them
to teach the Indians, to which he replied, “to read and write and cultivate their lands
effectively.”247 Finally, in a lengthy “call to the President,” Beck contrasted the
Catholic Church’s historical approach to indigenous affairs, and by extension that of
Chile and all of Latin America, with United States General William Sherman’s
infamous motto “the only good Indian is a dead Indian.”248 He coupled the Church’s

Letter to editor, Heraldo del Sur, Apr. 23, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
Draft statement, President Ibañez, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
246 Minutes from meeting with President Ibañez, May 5, 1930; Tomás de Augusta to
newpapers, May 10, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
247 Draft statement to newspapers, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
248 This reference to U.S. Indian policy is interesting in this moment, as federal policy was
being heavily criticized in the United States in the early 1930s. At that time, the critique was
244
245

109
enlightened historical defense of American aborigines with a defense of himself
against the “unreasonable” attacks against him and his schools that had been
circulating in the papers.249 Beck also advocated directly to other Mapuche leaders.
Writing to Antonio Cofian, president of Moderna Araucanía’s regional center in
Cunco, Beck refuted Chihuailaf’s claim that the mission had demanded land from
Indians in order to build a school in Quechurehue.250
Meanwhile, Antilef and other Unión members continued to distance
themselves from Chihuailaf. Writing to Beck in early May, Floriano claimed that his
name had been added to a letter published in the Heraldo del Sur without his
permission. He was indignant that a private conversation with Chihuailaf had been
made public in that way.251 Two weeks later, Emilio Baeza of Nueva Imperial wrote
to Beck to say that a recent article published in the Heraldo del Sur was falsely
attributed to him – he had not even been present at the meeting where it was
supposedly generated.252 At the same time, opponents of the Unión Valentin Morales
and Juan Pichunlaf attacked Beck, publishing a statement in the Heraldo del Sur on
May 27th in which they refuted his recent statements and suggested he was no
friend of the Mapuche – that he should stay out of their affairs.253 Beck denounced
the attacks against him to René Reyes, the Intendente of Cautín Province, and sent
being led by John Collier, among others, who would soon be appointed as Commissioner of
Indian Affairs in 1933 and reform U.S. policy through the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934.
It is not clear exactly how much Beck knew about this debate in 1930, but the dark history
of European/indigenous relations in the U.S. did provide a cultural point of reference and in
his mind a favorable comparison with the Catholic Church’s efforts in Latin America.
249 Draft statement, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
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him a list of names of those who were attacking him. He also clarified that
Chihuailaf’s attempt to disband the Unión was not legal, as he had met without the
full leadership of the organization present.254 At the end of the month, Beck sent a
circular to the regional presidents to call a special meeting to be held on June 4th to
discuss Chihuailaf’s “frankly hostile attitude toward the Unión Araucana” and
“clarify the situation produced by his disloyal conduct.”255 Finally, on June 17th he
sent a circular to the Capuchin fathers throughout the region, which explained the
current state of affairs.
Following that defense of the mission schools, Beck gave notice that Antonio
Chihuailaf and all the members of his reducción had been expelled from the Unión
Araucana, and that Floriano Antilef had been named Interim President.
Furthermore, he explained that the teacher and Deputy Arturo Huenchullán had
offered an explanation of his position on the mission schools, in which he clarified
that he had never sought to undermine the educational work of the Fathers in
particular, and that his criticism before the government was only addressed toward
the general state of indigenous education broadly. However, Beck had recently
received an anonymous letter full of insults from an Indian who claimed to be a
friend of Huenchullán’s. For that reason, he advised all the mission schools that
Huenchullán should not be provided any documents if he were to show up and
request them, and that the mission’s Provincial Director of Education was calling all
teachers together at a meeting in Valdivia to discuss the state of affairs.256
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In November of 1930 Beck organized a General Assembly of the Unión to
elect new leadership. But even as the 1930s progressed with the Unión Araucana
under new indigenous leadership, the organization struggled to stay relevant as the
political climate of the country rapidly evolved. Ibañez would be forced to resign the
presidency in 1931, and a short-lived Socialist Republic was established. The other
Mapuche organizations tried to come together to strengthen the Mapuche position
amid the political turmoil. In the early 1930s, Beck and his team rejected the
Sociedad Caupolicán’s call for a unification of Mapuche organizations, writing “this
idea is totally unfeasible because the true ties of union do not stem from sharing the
same race and blood, but rather the same ideas.”257 Beck’s view stood in contrast to
the view of most Mapuche leaders, who prioritized ethnic identity over allegiances
to ideas or political parties. He would eventually change that view, but not for
several more years, and not before the Unión continued to limp along with
realatively weak indigenous leadership and management.
In January 1935, Marcelino Ñanculeo, president of the UA center in Nueva
Imperial, wrote to Monsignor Beck to complain that he had not received
communication from Antilef as president and that the Unión seemed to be devolving
from its previous vibrancy and efficient function. He went so far as proposing to
renounce his position as Secretary General in protest.258 The following week he
wrote to Antilef directly to say that he finally received the announcement of their
upcoming meeting, but that it was too late for him to attend as he received word
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only the day before the event was scheduled.259 In the week following the Assembly,
Antilef sent a circular to the regional centers sanctioning members for not attending
the General Assembly, and followed that with a personal note to Ñanculeo asking
him to step down since he missed the meeting.260
In subsequent years, the Unión Araucana would go on to improve its
organizational efficiency and expand its capacity to help indigenous peasants by
offering more services to its members. Regarding a meeting scheduled in July 1937,
Antilef wrote to Beck suggesting they postpone, because he had consulted with
other regional presidents and they agreed that the agricultural work to prepare for
the planting season would make it difficult for many members to attend.261 In 1936
Beck had hired an attorney on retainer to provide legal services to Unión members
in Osorno, and by 1938 proposed hiring a second to offer the same services to
members in Valdivia.262 All Unión members received an identification card when
they paid regular dues, and Beck required the attorneys to ask for the card before
helping them. He also required a monthly summary of services be provided so he
could track the work of the attorneys.263
All of this led Victor Painemal, in his role as Secretary General, to opine
optimistically in June 1938, “I’m certain that with a little more work we will create
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an excellent organization.”264 Painemal continued to carry out that work in the late
1930s, arranging contracts for printing materials like ID cards, flyers for their
General Assemblies and coordinating the publication of the Unión newspaper, El
Araucano.265 But there were bumps in the road also, as when Painemal declined the
position of Director General in 1939 because of Antilef’s leadership, which he
characterized as oppositional in Unión meetings as he rejected proposals based on
his personal opinions while refusing to carry out the will of the regional centers.266
Beck asked him to continue working as before and try to reconcile with Antilef.267 In
1940, Painemal proposed to Beck that they create a new “Provincial President”
position to help administer the work of the Unión, and expressed his concern that
the partnership with the Sociedad Caupolicán through the Corporación was creating
confusion, as some Unión members were also organizing Sociedad centros, which he
thought created the danger that messages and priorities become mixed.268

Opposing Aburto: Communism & Indigenous Culture
It is important to acknowledge that from the very beginning, “the Sociedad
Unión Araucana was founded by the Capuchin missions for the purpose of
counteracting the subversive communist propaganda among the Araucanians to
whose civilization (the Capuchins) are sent.”269 When the Ley Indígena 1.469 was
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debated in the Cámara de Diputados in 1927, the delegation of the Communist Party
were the only representatives who opposed it. “The Communist representatives are
opposed to this project, and vote against it. We consider this project to be one that
not only will not protect the Araucanians, but on the contrary, one that covers a
system of theft and plunder that has made them victims for a long time with a cloak
of legality.” When Aburto’s Comité Ejecutivo immediately objected and sent a series
of demands to the President, the regional press in Cautín Province characterized
their objections as “communist agitation.”270
As a parallel goal, the leaders of the Unión made efforts to stamp out
traditional cultural practices that they perceived to be antithetical to the
development of Mapuche as practicing Catholic Christians. In his invitation to the
Unión’s third Parlamento, to be held in Boroa in January 1928, Unión president
Antonio Chihuailaf explained to the membership why this was important.
“But if we celebrate our Parlamentos with the dances of machis as was done
recently (by the Federación), if we recommend to our brothers the celebration of
nguillatún in its ancient forms, if we tell them to return to polygamy and to sell their
daughters, we shamefully degrade our sisters. Then, my compatriots, we do not
civilize our race, we degrade it, we throw it three centuries into the past, we are
criminals that do not deserve the name of educated and civilized men.”271

Although Chihuailaf did not mention Aburto by name in his exhortation, the
implication would have been clear to his audience, and he positioned the Unión as
relatively supportive of cultural assimilation, particularly as compared to the
Federación, which fought for cultural preservation. Both of those priorities put the
communication, dated Apr. 16, 1927, is found in the Diocesan archives, and is signed by
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UA in direct opposition to Manuel Aburto and the Federación Araucana, who
embraced political alliances on the left and fought to maintain polygamy and
celebrated the nguillatún at every Congreso Araucano that they organized.
Beck’s preoccupation with Manuel Aburto was sustained throughout the
period. In January 1930, Manuel Raiman wrote him to describe what he had
observed at the recent Congreso Araucano that Aburto had organized in Boroa. “My
beloved pastor, I was very sad to see the little civilized Mapuche dancing with the
machis and in that way the Araucanian race was insulted by a con man who is
deceiving the ignorant with his old ideas.” Enclosed with his letter, Raiman included
notes on the events he witnessed, in which he described an assembly of about 1,000
Mapuche dancing with machis and celebrating the nguillatún. In his address, Aburto
criticized Beck and belittled the size and activities of the Unión Araucana. He
mentioned that Arturo Huenchullán was also present, having recently completed his
studies in the United States.272
Beck took his objections to Mapuche cultural gatherings all the way to the
President of the Republic. In October 1929 he wrote to President Ibañez to express
his concerns about the celebration of nguillatún, which included assertions that they
were characterized by excessive drinking, thievery and vandalism. He also opposed
on religious grounds the “demonic possession” of the machi and the sacrifice of
cows and horses by removing their still-beating hearts during the ceremony.273 In
addition to Aburto’s efforts to corrupt the Indians by promoting communism and
ancient pagan practices, Beck complained that he was encouraging Mapuche to
272
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break the law and not pay their taxes. In doing so, Beck positioned the Unión on the
side of the direct interests of the state, while Aburto threatened those interests.274
The fight against Aburto was waged in the papers, as well as the personal
correspondence of Beck and other indígenas who wrote directly to state actors. In
response to Aburto’s open opposition to Ley 1.469 and his public protests through
the Federación’s assemblies, Beck prepared a press release in May 1930 in which he
characterized Aburto’s position as illegal, and in open opposition of the rule of law.
In contrast, the Unión was conservatively aligned with state policies and willing to
adhere to whatever laws it passed. “We believe that the only viable path is to obey
the Law; to not put any obstacles before it; to cooperate so that the judges, who are
all very honorable and competent people, may carry out their work.”275 On June 7th,
1930, Floriano Antilef mentioned to Beck that he heard from the Carabineros in
Loncoche that Aburto had been detained on the fifth, and driven to San Felipe de los
Andes, a town in the Valparaíso region north of Santiago.276 That would prove to be
the second of three times that Aburto was “relegated” by the state, or sent into
internal exile, for political stances that threatened the order and stability of the
state.
In response to Aburto’s criticism and that of other radical elements within
the Mapuche movement, Beck was on the defensive throughout the early 1930s. In
December 1930 Diputado Enrique Montero Cabrera277 wrote to Monsignor Beck to
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explain the status of subsidies delivered by the state. The Vicariate received twentyfive pesos per student, with an additional amount for indigenous students. Some
Diputados from the Democrat and Radical parties were trying to strip the subsidies,
perhaps to wrest control of indigenous education away from religious institutions,
but Montero was fighting to keep them in place. He indicated that he was hopeful for
success, and that the support of the President of the Cámara, and President Ibañez
would help him win.278 The dustup over Chihuailaf’s betrayal and subsequent
charges of mismanagement of the schools had threatened Beck’s access to those
state subsidies. Monsignor Beck fought back by attacking Aburto, whom he believed
to be behind the antagonism facing the Unión, and in February 1931 wrote to Pedro
Opazo Letelier, the President of the Senate, to request his support in opposing
Aburto’s organization of nguillatúnes through the annual Congresos.279
Members of the Unión directly opposed and denounced Aburto and other
more radical elements of the movement to state actors. In September of 1930,
Marcelino Ñanculeo and Floriano Antilef wrote a series of short notes to the
Intendente of Araucanía, the Minister of Development and President Ibañez himself,
to “protest corrupters of the race who would return us to ancient, barbaric
customs.”280 Antilef also opposed Aburto publicly in an attempt to win over
Mapuche who might favor his ideas. Writing to Father Sebastián in January of 1932,
Antilef said that he was inclined to write a statement for El Diario Austral opposing
Aburto’s idea for an autonomous indigenous republic, saying he was willing to face
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whatever consequences came from opposing him and his supporters.281 Antilef’s
statement sketched his opposition in very broad terms. He argued that Aburto was
attempting to enrich himself and his associates at the expense of poor Mapuche
peasants. In addition to the familiar defense of Capuchin mission schools and
assaults on the backwardness of indigenous ceremonies that Aburto promoted, he
also criticized the leftist political position of the Federación. He called the idea for an
indigenous republic “communism in its most revolutionary form,” and branded
Aburto’s proposals as class warfare. “Russia has shown us clearly. There, millions of
peasants were killed, only because they were not in agreement with the tyrants of
the Soviet government.”282 That position of the Unión was communicated internally
through circulars sent to the regional centers. In May of 1932 Antilef promised to
begin sending monthly updates on the challenges faced by Araucanians in the
region. In particular, he implied connections between Aburto’s utopian pipedreams
and the worst aspects of communism in Europe, in the process appealing to a sense
of loyalty to their homeland. “My fellow Araucanians: let us not lose the momentum
we have gained. The fatherland does not want the death of your children, the
fatherland does not kill your children, the fatherland does not see its own children
as slaves, as the Russian communists do, and as will happen in Chile if we embrace
communism.”283
Throughout this period, not only Mapuche leaders, but also ordinary
peasants in the countryside were navigating a shifting set of political alliances. It is
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important to remember that on one level the leaders of organizations tried to
navigate political alliances strategically, in the interests of their members and their
view of what was best for all Mapuche. In the spring of 1931, Antilef wrote to Beck
asking if he should support Juan Esteban Montero, representing the Radical Party, in
the upcoming presidential election. He wanted to make sure Montero was a good
supporter of Catholicism, and proposed to send a circular to the regional presidents
advising them to counsel their members to vote for Montero also.284 He wrote again
following the election to say that all the Unión members in Loncoche voted for
Montero, and asked Beck to pass along their best wishes to the President-elect.285
But Montero’s time in office was to prove short-lived, and he was deposed in June
1932. In September, Antilef sent another circular in which he reinforced the
importance of voting, not only for the candidate who represents the material best
interests of Mapuche, but also who shares their values. In this case, Antilef wrote
that the Conservative Party best represents Catholic ideals, and he listed their
candidates for office.286
On a more grassroots level, individual Mapuche were targeted for political
support. In October of 1932, the president of the UA centro in La Unión wrote to
Monsignor Beck to complain about the attacks of Aburto and his associates on the
Unión. He also mentioned that two men in La Unión who demanded to know for
whom he had voted in the recent election had confronted him. One was an official
with the Socialist Party and the other a member of the Democrat Party.

Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Sep. 15, 1931. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Oct. 15, 1931. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
286 Circular No. 3, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
284
285

120
“He got a curious look on his face when he asked me which party I supported and I
told him I did not trust or belong to any political party. Well, said the Socialist, I am a
furniture maker and I can give you work, but if you accept the post of secretary of
the Party I can give you a government job in Valdivia; they made me many promises,
but ultimately the Democrat spoke badly of the clergy. ‘Enough,’ I said, these people
are bad influences.”287

For some Mapuche peasants, their Catholic faith alone was enough to draw a line in
the political sands.
Aburto, meanwhile, engaged the Monsignor on his own terms. In January of
1930 he wrote to Beck to share with him a resolution from the Federación’s most
recent (9th) Congreso, celebrated the previous month in Boroa. The resolution
expressed that fifty years before, the Mapuche leaders had donated land to the
founders of the Capuchin mission in Boroa, and that in exchange they had been
promised that the fathers would look after the education and well being of their
children. They now, therefore, respectfully asked that the mission school provide
free education for Mapuche youth. “If it is not possible for you to provide these
services free of charge, we ask that you provide a reasonable discounted rate for
children of both sexes, without denying entry to the children of the chiefs or other
Indians that belong to the Federación Araucana, as it follows that this Federación
coordinates the activities in Araucanía in defense of their moral and material
interests.”288 In making the claim in this way, Aburto claimed legitimacy and
hegemony for the Federación in indigenous affairs. He made no mention or
reference to the Unión Araucana or Sociedad Caupolicán.
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Beck stayed informed about Aburto’s claims to authority over the Mapuche
movement. The Unión Araucana papers housed at the Diocesan archives in Villarrica
contain news clippings of material published by a number of organizations,
especially those that referenced Aburto and the Federación. In March of 1935, El
Correo de Valdivia published a story about a letter Aburto sent to the Intendente of
Araucanía, in which he claimed that the Mapuche were not consulted in the reform
of the Ley Indígena.289 The following year, Beck clipped an article about “Communist
Agitation in Araucanía,” which claimed that the resolutions of the Congreso
Araucano “clearly show the communist infiltration (of the Federación) and the
terrible results that uncontrolled infiltration is producing in the indigenous
communities and their populations.”290 Responding to the Congreso’s accords
published in the newspaper La Frontera, Antilef wrote an editorial in which he
referred to the Congreso as a “Soviet.” In an increasingly direct confrontation
between the two groups, Antilef drew particular opposition to the Federación’s
claim to represent all Mapuche and their call to eliminate the Bishop of Araucanía.291
Writing to Beck to say that El Diario Austral had agreed to publish his protest, he
added that “the Sociedad Caupolicán has not protested the accords of Panguilef; I’ve
been deceived!”292 While the groups sometimes saw one another as necessary allies,
the Sociedad seemed more willing to walk a centrist position between the Unión and
Federación, especially after 1931 under Coñuepán’s leadership.
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Although Beck, Antilef and the Unión Araucano remained staunch
adversaries of Aburto, with one of their most strident objections being his
association with communist ideas, party activists and projects, some of their own
initiatives approached communalism. In their June 1936 General Assembly, the UA
discussed creating a consumer cooperative, a project they later undertook and
which was well received.293 In January of 1936, Aburto wrote to Monsignor Beck
and Father Gúndecar, requesting that they return the house they were occupying
within the reducción of Juan Chihuailaf in Cunco.294 It seems that the Capuchins had
plans to convert the property into a school that would be located within the
reducción, but as the Capuchins and Aburto squared off over the project, the
Chihuailafs were caught in the middle. In December of that year, Venancio Manquel,
a Unión member who was involved in the project, wrote to Monsignor Beck to
suggest that Father Sebastián speak directly to Chihuailaf to try to resolve the
dispute. Otherwise, he feared, the disagreement would escalate if the two sides dug
in their heels.295
Projects like these show how the diversity of political thought among the
organizations at times led to infighting and fragmented the movement. It also shows
just how tenuous it would become for the Corporación to hold together an alliance
between the three main groups. However, in contrast to Manuel Aburto, Guido Beck
saw Venancio Coñuepán and the Sociedad Caupolicán as better allies against the
more radical Socialist and Democrat political influences in the region. In a 1933
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letter to Alfredo Rodríguez Mac Iver, Governor of Cautín Province, Beck indicated
that Coñuepán and the Sociedad provided an important counterweight to Aburto
and Huenchullán. He expressed his support for the Sociedad’s efforts to stimulate
the development of agriculture in the region, and also included a statement about
the need to curb the abuse of alcohol among the Mapuche.296
As the 1937 elections approached, several Mapuche leaders and their
organizations stepped forward to support candidates for Diputado. In December
1936, Coñuepán wrote to Guido Beck to say that the Sociedad wanted to put
forward a candidate, but they were unsure about which party to approach.
Acknowledging that the Mapuche were themselves “still divided,” and that no
political party had uniformly supported indigenous issues, nor did any one “inspire
much confidence,” he asked Beck for his support and a recommendation.297 Beck
replied that in his estimation it was impossible for them to unite when Aburto and
his supporters had “publicly declared war on the Capuchin fathers,” and when their
positions were so diametrically opposed. He referred to the Federación’s
propaganda as a “frenzy of Chilean Nazism.” For his part, Beck favored an alliance
with the Conservative Party.298
In 1937, as the Sociedad Caupolicán was working to bring the major
Mapuche organizations together under the auspices of the Corporación Araucana,
Venancio Coñuepán and several other Mapuche leaders considered running for
election as Diputados representing various districts in the Araucanía. As they made
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plans, Coñuepán reached out to Beck to ask for his advice and counsel.299 Beck
replied that he did not “desire to get mixed up in political issues,” but agreed to the
meeting because he did “not want to neglect to give my opinion.”300 Antilef later
wrote to Beck saying that he was sorry to hear that Coñuepán was not accepted as a
candidate by the Conservative Party, and that he feared he would be unsuccessful if
he did decide to go ahead with his candidacy.301 He then wrote to Fernando Varas, of
the Conservative Party, to say that the Unión Araucana’s values aligned with
Conservative Party principles, and asked if they might consider one of the Unión
members as a candidate instead.302 In the end, Venancio Coñuepán, Floriano Antilef
and José Cayupi all ran as independents, but were unsuccessful in their bids for
office.303
The Federación, meanwhile, decided not to put forward their own candidate
for Diputado, but rather endorsed José Huichalaf Alcapan who was running on the
Communist Party ticket.304 The following summer, at the Unión’s meeting of the
executive committee, they held several sessions about the dangers that communism
posed to the Araucanian race.305 Even within the conservatively aligned Unión
Araucana, the threat of communism had penetrated. In October 1938, José
Neculmán wrote to Beck as the president of the Boroa centro to inform him that
Bartolo Neculmán (relation unknown) had been spreading propaganda in support of
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leftist candidates within the centro.306 All of this shows how remarkable it was that
within two years Coñuepán was able to bring both the Federación and Unión under
the umbrella of the Corporación, and the savvy of his political alliance-making both
within the Mapuche movement and also with the entrenched powers of Chilean
politics.
Indeed, throughout the period, the fight against communism was perhaps the
most consistent thread running through the Unión’s goals and strategies. As early as
1929, before succeeding Chihuailaf as president of the Unión, Floriano Antilef had
written Father Sebastián to affirm the idea that education was one of the most
effective ways to counter the communist threat.307 In a letter dated May 21, 1936,
Antilef wrote that he had read in the papers that Aburto had been deported to the
Juan Fernandez Islands, and he asked Beck if it was true.308 In fact, Aburto had been
exiled to the island of Chiloé, for what would turn out to be the third and final
detention by the state of his political career. The repeated harassment by the
authorities illustrates that Aburto was a potential liability as a partner to the other
organizations, and also that ties to leftist political parties were dangerous.

Forming the Corporación Araucana
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Unión Araucana operated without
much collaboration from other Mapuche organizations. In fact, from their founding,
the Unión took as its priority to combat other Mapuche organizations, especially
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Manuel Aburto and the Federación Araucana, but also the Sociedad Caupolicán
during the late 1920s when it was led by Arturo Huenchullán and oriented toward
the left in opposition to the Ley Indígena 1.469. Most of the correspondence in their
archives from this period is internal, with the exception of Beck’s deep connections
with the state. However, as the 1930s wore on, more ties to other organizations
developed. By 1938, the Unión joined with the Sociedad Caupolicán and even
Aburto’s Federación to form the Corporación Araucana. The Unión archives reveal
that Venancio Coñuepán worked to cultivate a relationship with Beck for several
years leading up to that critical juncture. But it was a long road from the fracas of
1930 to the founding of the Corporación.
Although the Unión was probably the most distinct and least collaborative of
the Mapuche organizations, they were not entirely without allies within the
movement. In the midst of the turmoil of 1930, Francisco Catrileo, president of a
newly founded Mapuche organization (the Sociedad Araucana), reached out to Beck
to express that group’s official regret for the “unjust attacks that have been launched
by some young brothers of the race who are misguided.” Catrileo went on to say
thank you for all the efforts the Capuchins had made to benefit and improve the lives
of Mapuche in southern Chile.309 In December 1931, the Sociedad Caupolicán
invited Floriano Antilef to a meeting where they planned to discuss the creation of
indigenous schools and a credit fund for Mapuche farmers. Antilef wrote to Beck,
saying he thought their plans for schools were not serious because they did not have
access to resources or teachers. About the credit fund, though, he said he thought it
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was a good idea, but was careful to ask Beck for his opinion and his blessing to
attend the meeting to learn more.310
Soon the Sociedad Caupolicán would begin to court the Unión also, but Beck
was initially resistant to their proposals. He sent a circular to the Unión’s
membership in October that acknowledged he had heard that the Sociedad had
begun to invite young Mapuche to meetings with the purpose of uniting the various
organizations. In principle, he wrote, “this idea of a merger is not bad, it is good.” But
he recognized the vast differences between the Unión and other Mapuche
organizations, and ultimately said that a partnership between groups with such
vastly different goals would not work. The Unión Araucana was first and foremost a
Catholic organization, in Beck’s mind. “The society they hope to found, composed of
people so different, cannot survive. It carries within it the germ of dissolution. We
are Catholics, and before all else Catholics.”311 This early pronouncement illustrates
two important things. First, the effort to bring the organizations together under one
umbrella was a long process, taking place over a span of almost ten years. Second,
the process of unification was a component of a larger process, under which
Mapuche organizations transitioned from partnerships founded with Euro-Chilean
allies to self-sufficient groups led by Mapuche politicians and activists. In addition,
the transition from reliance on white allies to a more unified and self-sufficient
Mapuche movement represents an eclipse of racial and ethnic identity politics over
simple political alliances and short-term expedience. But that transition took place
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at different times and in reaction to vastly different circumstances in the three
major organizations.
Venancio Coñuepán continued to court Beck directly as a collaborator in his
efforts to create a unified Mapuche organization. In the fall of 1932, he wrote to
Beck several times. The main subject of those letters was his effort to gain Beck’s
support for Mapuche candidates for the Congress, and include him and the Unión
leaders in the process by which they were selected. But more broadly, Coñuepán’s
outreach signified his desire to unify the organizations around the racial and ethnic
identity of his people and across religious, cultural and political divides.312 In June
1933, Coñuepán wrote again to share with the Bishop information about an
Assembly of Indigenous Farmers that the Sociedad was organizing, at which they
planned to discuss solutions to their problems and petition the government for help
in solving them. In the text of the circular, Beck underlined the phrase, “we are
powerful when organized collectively and in that way we have the best defense.” It
is likely that such a statement of ethnic collectivism made Beck uncomfortable as it
had the potential to eclipse his promotion of Catholicism, but nevertheless he wrote
back to express his support. He did ask, however, that they work to suppress
alcoholism and pagan rituals – that they could count on his support as long as they
did not directly or indirectly oppose his religious convictions.313
Throughout that winter and into the spring, Coñuepán stayed in contact with
Beck about their projects. He forwarded letters that the Sociedad had solicited or
drafted in support of their agricultural efforts. They had secured the support of the
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Junta Provincial de Agricultura de Cautín (Provincial Agricultural Council of Cautín)
for their proposals, and the leaders of that group advocated on their behalf to the
Minister of Agriculture.314 But in September the Sociedad wrote to the Minister
directly to express their disappointment that he did not see the necessity of their
proposals, including the idea of a traveling agronomist to offer technical advice to
Mapuche farmers. That suggested he did not understand the needs of their
constituents, they wrote, and asked him to reconsider.315
In July 1933, Coñuepán again brought up the idea of combining the
organizations to put forward a “united front” and asked about Antilef’s opinion of
the proposal.316 By September the two organizations agreed to publicly announce
their accord. In that communication, they highlighted the fact that the two groups
that had done the most to advance the cause of Indian education in the region were
the Anglican and Capuchin missions, which were the same two groups that helped
to found the Sociedad and Unión, respectively. Mapuche leaders like Coñuepán and
Antilef had been trained in the very schools that the two missions operated.317 This
religious and educational connection was therefore a lasting and important feature
of Chilean indigenismo.
In November 1933, Antilef’s circular to the regional presidents announced
that at their upcoming General Assembly they would elect three delegates to
participate in the United Front with the Sociedad Caupolicán, because the time had
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come for all Mapuche to confront their common problems together.318 But Antilef
remained ambivalent about the project. The following July he wrote to Beck to say
that he had not heard much from the Sociedad Caupolicán with respect to their
partnership, and that he was having doubts about the utility, effectiveness and
durability of an alliance with a group that had such different values.319 At about the
same time, in the mid-1930s, Unión Araucana leaders were attempting to develop
greater self-sufficiency from Beck’s patronage, and also more substantive and
effective organizational structure. In his May 1934 circular to the presidents of the
regional Unión centers, Antilef announced that they would be instituting annual
dues of one peso per member, in order to cover the cost of correspondence and
publicity, an expense that Beck had covered up until that point.320 It is important to
recognize that in the institutional history of the Unión Araucana, efforts to develop
greater organizational efficiency and independence from the Capuchin fathers came
at the same time their alliances with other Mapuche organizations grew stronger
and more formal.
Antilef’s loyalty to Beck and uneasy feelings about the partnership with the
Sociedad Caupolicán persisted for some time. By July 1936, the Sociedad had
achieved their goal of creating a centralized Mapuche agricultural fund called the
Caja Central321 to lend money to Mapuche peasants. Writing to Beck about the
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celebration of this event, Antilef lamented the fact that Beck had not been invited to
the ceremony, and seemed offended by the snub. Nevertheless, Beck suggested to
Antilef that if he had occasion to deliver remarks, he might emphasize the
importance of saving money for the Mapuche small farmer, the lack of which he
blamed for the poverty of many Indians.322 But the groups did stay together, and on
the 12th of November, 1938, the Sociedad Caupolicán, Federación Araucana and
Unión Araucana formally came together as the Corporación Araucana. One of their
first official acts was to send a telegram to the President of the Republic announcing
their union, and claim to be the official political voice of the Mapuche people.323 For
Antilef and Guido Beck a sense of ambivalence surely remained, as the following
month the Caja Central (under Coñuepán’s leadership) celebrated its anniversary by
bringing together 2,000 Mapuche to host a nguillatún.324 However, in 1938 Pedro
Aguirre Cerda won the presidency representing the Popular Front coalition of leftleaning political parties, which dealt a blow to Beck in his steadfast support for the
Conservative Party.
But the combined efforts to represent the Mapuche people continued and
advanced to the highest levels of government. In October 1939, Antilef wrote to
Beck to inform him about a proposal that the Corporación was about to make to
President Pedro Aguirre Cerda, taking care to point out there was no danger of
undermining the Capuchin schools.325 In a six-page document, the Corporación
proposed the creation of a sub-cabinet-level position within the government to
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oversee indigenous affairs. This “Subsecretariat Indígena” would supervise three
initiatives toward improving land tenure, economic development and education for
Mapuche communities.326 While it took some time for this proposal to gain traction,
this seems to be the first incarnation of the idea for what would later come to be the
Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas that Ibañez created in 1953, and which Coñuepán
would lead for much of the 1950s. It is also worth recognizing that this initial
proposal predates Coñuepán’s visit to the Patzcuaro Conference in 1940 where the
Instituto Indigenista Interamericano was founded, and shows that the organization
and formalization of the Mapuche political movement was well underway in the
1930s. At that time, proposals made by Mapuche leaders were on pace with similar
developments that had already begun in Mexico, Peru and Bolivia.
As the 1930s gave way to the 1940s, Coñuepán stayed in contact with Guido
Beck, and the two remained cordial, although they were not always in agreement on
the material aspects of the Mapuche movement. In December 1943, Beck wrote to
Eulogio Robles as Minister of the Courts, to share his thoughts on “the indigenous
question,” but at the same time to reject Coñuepán’s proposal for the subsecretariat, which he thought “would create a state within a state.”327 He did write to
congratulate Coñuepán when he was elected as a Deputy in August 1945
representing the right wing party, Alianza Popular Libertadora (Popular Freedom
Alliance). Coñuepán wrote back to thank him and to affirm their alliance, but he also
acknowledged that some of the younger Mapuche who worked for Beck in Padre Las
Casas supported another candidate “whose party was not on the right and who are
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actually enemies of those who support the subsidies” that supported the Capuchin
mission schools.328 Throughout the 1940s, their relationship remained strained by
various political issues, as when Beck wrote to Coñuepán in 1948 to complain that
he had criticized the mission schools.329 Coñuepán replied that he had not said those
things, that his enemies within the movement, and other politicians, had attributed
the comments to him.330

Summary
While the Unión Araucana was not able to mobilize large numbers of
indigenous peasants in public gatherings like the great congresos organized by
Manuel Aburto, they did exert significant influence over the Mapuche movement.
Monsignor Guido Beck de Ramberga was well connected with high-level state
actors, which made him an important ally and a difficult adversary for other leaders
within the movement. Although Manuel Aburto courted and was supported by leftleaning political parties, including the Communist and Socialist Parties, at the same
moment the left triumphed with the election Popular Front presidential candidate
Pedro Aguirre Cerda, he and other major Mapuche organizations joined forces
under the auspices of the Corporación Araucana with a decidedly more moderate
political orientation. That enabled Venancio Coñuepán to become the de facto leader
of the Mapuche movement, and later win a second election to the to Chamber of
Deputies as a candidate of the Conservative Party in 1949.
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While it would be a stretch to credit Guido Beck’s influence as the sole cause
of the Mapuche movement trending toward the center of the political spectrum in
this period, his connections to state actors enabled him to influence ways that the
state received and reacted to Mapuche political demands and advance a more
conservative indigenista agenda. Again, we see that Mapuche and other indigenista
leaders were guided by factors outside the locus of their control. The case of Guido
Beck and the Unión Araucana represents both a response to the leftist provocations
of Manuel Aburto and others, and a distinct effort to proactively influence the
movement toward preferred outcomes. Beck and the Mapuche leaders of the Unión
Araucana built their following from among the many indigenous youth that Catholic
schools educated, and expanded the tradition of organizing in the rural south. They
too were operating within a sphere of influences created by national and
international political events, as well as the goals of their allies and opponents. What
is more, although Beck retained more direct control of the organization he founded
than Guevara and Sadleir did with the Sociedad, even in the Unión the indigenous
leaders had room to maneuver, advocate and express their individual and collective
agency as Indians.
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Chapter 3: Indigenismo in Chile and the Americas

At this juncture, we shift our lens of inquiry from the organizational work of
Mapuche activists and their Chilean allies, to consider the broader influence of
transnational indigenismo on the Mapuche movement. One central argument of this
dissertation is that the categories of Indian and indigenista were much more flexible
and dynamic than most scholarship on indigenismo and indigenous activism has
traditionally accounted for. However, I maintain the use of such categories in the
effort to illustrate the fluidity between them, and to show how ideas were shared
between actors.
In order to demonstrate that intellectual flow in the case of the Mapuche in
Chile, chapter three first examines the origins of formal transnational indigenismo
and the creation of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano. I lay out some key
aspects of the global context in which the indigenista discourse developed,
explaining the significance of World War II and the Cold War on indigenista
initiatives. I then show how the transnational network of indigenistas formed and
developed through travel, joint projects and the exchange of scholars across
national contexts during the 1940s. The second part of chapter four turns to look at
the contributions of Chilean indigenistas to the pan-American discourse in the
1950s, with particular attention paid to news items reported through III
publications. That work shows that although the Instituto Indigenista Chileno
operated as a private organization from 1949-1961 and the Chilean state did not
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formally support its initiatives, members did actively participate in the indigenista
discourse. They sent delegations to several international conferences and
contributed scholarly and journalistic articles to its publications.

Indigenismo across the Americas
Gathering force in the 1920s, the broad goal of indigenismo as a movement
was to incorporate indígenas into national states as citizens, retaining only the
“least offensive” features of their native cultures as their life ways and living
conditions were modernized.331 The vanguard of this movement broke out in
Mexico during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas during the 1930s, where the
incorporation of indígenas into the national political system was a major goal of the
populist revolutionary government.332 In Mexico, the official status of indigenismo
led to broad funding and support from the government, which in turn created an
indigenous school system, public health projects and economic development
schemes.333 In other countries, the goals of indigenistas varied widely based on the
degree of support they received from political institutions and the various
ideological orientations of proponents.
In the United States, indigenista projects found support during the
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt as the Indian Reorganization Act (also known as
the “Indian New Deal”) aligned with other policies geared toward social reform,
economic stimulus and modernization in the 1930s and early 1940s. John Collier, as
Berdichewsky, p. 16.
Giraudo and Lewis, p. 3.
333 See Alexander Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico, Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 2004.
331
332

137
Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs from 1933-1945, was responsible for
many of the advances in U.S. Indian policy in those years, and is generally viewed as
the architect of the Indian Reorganization Act. Collier is also credited with closing
the federal Indian boarding schools that had served a critical role in the assimilation
of Indian youth into the national culture since the late nineteenth century. But
following World War II, the emergence of the Cold War dramatically shifted the
priorities of the U.S. federal government and indigenismo lost its official
prioritization and support. In the post-War era, a new cadre of reformers sought to
“terminate” the special relationship that Indian nations had with the United States,
which unraveled many of the gains indigenistas had made in that country.
In Peru, the impact of indigenismo also fluctuated as the nation’s political
winds shifted. Peruvian sociologist Osmar Gonzales describes that country’s
indigenista movement as composed of two distinct branches. One school of thought,
epitomized by the work of radicals inspired by Marxism in the 1920s like José Carlos
Mariátegui, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and a young Luis Valcárcel, held that the
indigenous question stemmed from fundamental flaws in the Peruvian state. As a
result, they favored the overthrow of the state and its reconstruction along very
different lines, i.e. socialism. The other line of analysis saw indigenous problems as
flaws within a project of state formation that was incorrect or incomplete, but which
could be fixed through reforms. After repressive political regimes effectively
crushed leftist politics in the 1930s, a more reform-minded indigenismo emerged in
Peru at the same time the III was forming in the 1940s. Luis Valcárcel, who had
previously advocated for a more strident, revolutionary brand of indigenismo,
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became one of the most prominent Peruvian indigenistas, eventually leading the
Peruvian Indigenista Institute from 1946-1949. By that time, through his association
with the III and captivation with the more scientific approach of North American
anthropology, Valcárcel had tempered his views. His career trajectory mirrors the
incorporation of indigenismo into official state policies and projects in Peru, and
elsewhere in the Americas.334
Historical memory reflects the fluctuations and ambivalence of national
Indian policy. Historian Alexander Dawson has compared indigenista education
projects in Canada, the United States and Mexico. In all three national contexts,
indigenistas operated boarding schools that removed indigenous children from
their home communities in efforts to improve the lives of the students and their
communities. But while the Mexican schools were part of a broad strategy to honor
and recognize indigenous contributions to the Mexican nation, other North
American schools were part of a strategy to assimilate Indians into white culture by
stripping them of their native language and customs. In the U.S., federal Indian
boarding schools are remembered as violent places where indigenous children were
deprived of food and subjected to harsh punishment when they ran away or refused
to speak English. In Canada, owing to a handful of high-profile lawsuits seeking
damages stemming from sexual abuse in church-run schools, the legacy of First
Nations schools has been tainted and is remembered as one more chapter in a sad
history of ethnocide. Dawson’s work shows that broad similarities in the projects
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themselves contrast with the very different ways in which the projects were
remembered, owing to the unique national contexts in which they were
produced.335

Origins of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano
“After the first World War, persons working on behalf of Indians…gradually
became aware of each other and, realizing they had a great deal to learn from each
other, began working together.”336 Some years later in 1933, at their Seventh
International Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, the Organization of American
States (OAS) identified the need to bring together various individuals and agencies
working to improve the living conditions of indigenous peoples across the Americas
in a more formal way. Then in 1938 at the Eighth International Conference in Lima,
Peru, the OAS announced that the first Congreso Indigenista Interamericano (InterAmerican Indianist Conference) would be held in 1940 in Patzcuaro, Mexico. Among
the resolutions adopted in Patzcuaro was the formal establishment of the Instituto
Indigenista Interamericano.337 John Collier, Commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), was appointed president of the conference and eventually the
president of the III Board of Directors, and Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas
attended the opening ceremonies and delivered an impassioned speech extolling the
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legacy of Mexico’s indigenous cultures. Mexican educator, politician and diplomat
Moisés Sáenz was selected as the first Director of the III, although his sudden and
untimely death in 1941 got the new institute off to an unstable start.338 Soon
afterward, Manuel Gamio, an anthropologist trained by Franz Boas at Columbia
University, was appointed as the Institute’s next director. Two years into his
leadership, Gamio wrote of the Institute’s mission:
“…we are not attempting to reconstruct for the Indian an existence like the one his
ancestors led before the Conquest… Nor are we trying forcibly to impose upon him a
ridiculous process of complete Europeanization, uprooting him from his traditional
and natural environment. We simply wish to elaborate and offer him an harmonious
combination of the best of his pre-Hispanic and colonial legacy, the best
autochthonous material he possesses today, and the best elements in western
culture which may be adaptable to the nature of his particular needs and
aspirations.”339

That mission would later be scrutinized and criticized by historians of indigenismo,
but does represent a valuable lens through which I analyze its many projects.
Delegates attending the first Congreso Indigenista Interamericano in the
Mexican city of Patzcuaro created the III in 1940 and required each member state
also create its own national indigenista institute.340 The purpose of that broader
structure was to support collaboration and coordination between the III, its
affiliated national institutes, social scientists and indigenous organizations in each
country. Results produced by social science research would be coordinated and
disseminated by the III. That research would then inform policy decisions made by

Editorial, “Sadness in the Home of Indianists,” Boletín Indigenista, 1941 Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.
1-3.
339 Manuel Gamio, “Static and Dynamic Values of the Indigenous Past of America,” The
Spanish American Historical Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Aug. 1943), pp. 392-392. Cited in Boletín
Indigenista, 1943 Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 267.
340 “El Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano,” Boletín Bibliográfico de Antropología
Americana (1937-1948), Vol. 4, No. 1 (Enero-Abril 1940), pp. 1-36.
338

141
the state, which could also consult indigenous organizations through the national
institutes as policies were adopted and implemented.341 Although member states
were expected to contribute funds to the III and to support national institutes within
their countries, in many countries indigenistas had difficulty building political
support for their projects at the national level, which slowed the III’s progress
toward its goals. The Institute had no means to enforce its requirements, so many
member states simply refused to create national institutes or pay their annual dues.
That was precisely what happened in Chile. The country did send an official
delegation to the Patzcuaro conference that included the Mapuche leaders Venancio
Coñuepán and César Colima. But while the Instituto Indigenista Chileno (IIC) was
created in 1949, it was not recognized by, and did not receive funding from, the
Chilean government until 1961, and was only inconsistently consulted on
indigenous questions. However, Alejandro Lipschütz was a major contributor to the
IIC and attempted to prompt state actors to comply with III policies and requests for
information throughout the period.342
Writing in a 1942 editorial in the Boletín Indigenista, Manuel Gamio further
elaborated the scientific mission of the III. In order to identify populations with
which to work, Gamio categorized Indians in four groups: those whose
characteristics and needs are unknown because they had never been studied, those
whose characteristics and needs were known generally but had yet to be prioritized,
those who had been studied scientifically but not yet targeted for social
improvement, and those who had been studied and subsequently benefitted from
341
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social or political intervention. By placing indigenous populations in categories
along a continuum in this way, Gamio made clear that the goal of the III was to
facilitate the transition from the first to the fourth categories. Although the
consequences of that approach were inherently political, often requiring the direct
intervention of the state, Gamio strove to maintain an apolitical stance for the III.
But as we shall see, such independence proved impossible to maintain.343
While the III would make progress on those initiatives and others in the
coming years, their advancement was sometimes slow and plodding, and at other
times inconsistent. The III was founded at the beginning of American involvement in
World War II, which instantly became the priority of the United States, the largest
and most internationally powerful of the member states. As a result, interest in
Native American issues waned at the level of national political debate in the United
States. Native Americans did play key roles in the U.S. war effort, most famously the
Navajo “code talkers.” For his part, Collier also contributed to the war effort, using
the BIA to create and manage a Japanese internment camp at the Colorado River
Indian Reservation, where interned Japanese-Americans were put to work on an
irrigation project intended to ultimately benefit Native Americans in the southwest
by bringing irrigation waters to 90,000 acres of previously unproductive soil.344 In
reality, Collier’s experiment was more complicated as he sought not only to benefit
Native Americans under his charge, but also minimize the trauma of what he
believed to be the injustice of internment in the first place, while simultaneously
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conducting social experiments to understand how the interned Japanese-Americans
themselves managed life in the camp.345 Collier and his wife, anthropologist Laura
Thompson, saw in their experiment a model for self-sufficient indigenous
communities in the U.S. and Latin America, and also for the administration of U.S.
dependencies in the Pacific in the post-war era. John Collier, as a major architect of
both the III and United States Indian policy reform, would resign as commissioner of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1945 as the war was drawing to a close, in large part
because the priorities of federal Indian policy shifted significantly in the post-War
administration of President Harry S. Truman to favor efforts to “terminate” the
special relationship sovereign native nations had with the United States
government.346
During the war, the III attempted to link Latin American indigenous peoples
to the war effort.
“While it is physically impossible for the countries extending from Mexico’s
northern frontier to Patagonia to carry out a job of such magnitude, they will in
general gladly cooperate to the limit of their respective capacities…If the totalitarian
aggressors later attempt to invade the continent, or it becomes really urgent to fill
the decimated ranks of the Allies, in which Indians of the United States and Canada
already fight, the companies, battalions and armies will come from those southern
countries.”347

Of course, no such invasion would come to pass, and ultimately no major
contribution of troops to Allied armies was made. Then after the war, as U.S. foreign
policy became increasingly preoccupied with containing the spread of communism,
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indigenous populations in Latin America gradually presented a different sort of
concern as they were alternately targeted by or recruited into Marxist uprisings
across the region.
Although Indians in Latin America did not participate in direct combat during
World War II, several indirect hardships fell upon them, which the III tried to
mitigate. In 1943, the editors of the Boletín Indigenista pointed out that the costs of
basic raw materials used by Indians across Latin America were climbing out of their
reach. Wool, leather and even rubber dedicated to the production of wartime
supplies created shortages and therefore inflationary costs for those materials that
were fundamental to the indigenous production of handcrafts and utilitarian items
like blankets, sarapes and sandals. The situation was so bad, the editors pointed out,
that rubber from discarded tires could not even be substituted for leather in the
construction of sandals, as the value of the latter had become even greater than
leather. In proposing solutions, the III called upon the governments of the
hemisphere to intervene, or at least remember, the plights of their indigenous
inhabitants. In doing so, the editors fell into the paternalistic tone that later led to
the sustained criticism of the movement, writing that “The Indian can do nothing
himself, and if the governments do not assist in this extremely difficult situation, he
must remain silent, continuing to suffer perhaps more acutely than before.”348

Transnational Connections
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The III offered opportunities for indigenistas to collaborate and learn from
one another. In 1941, Ernest Maes, at the time working as a Field Representative for
the U.S. BIA, traveled throughout South America, “seeking to glean from the
administrative experiences of these countries in dealing with their Indian
populations, information which might be of use to the U.S. Indian Service.” News of
his travels was reported in the Boletín Indigenista, which indicated he spent one
month in Venezuela before moving on to Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil.349 Maes
later spent time in Chile, where in 1942 his visit resulted in the creation of a
“provisional commission” in Temuco. The commission had three primary objectives:
1) to convince the Chilean government to sign the Patzcuaro Convention, 2) to bring
information from the III to Chilean indigenistas broadly, and Chilean government
officials in particular, and 3) for the provisional commission to be officially
recognized by the III and Chilean government, laying the groundwork for the
establishment of a National Indigenista Institute in Chile.350 However, in order to
establish the provisional commission quickly, Maes drew upon members of the
Corporación, which shifted the orientation of the group. Whereas in other countries
indigenista efforts were led by white indigenistas trained in the social sciences,
these first III efforts in Chile were reliant upon indigenous leaders whose primary
objectives lay with their own political activities and direct engagement with the
state.351
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In 1942, there were only four official national indigenista institutes among
the countries of the two continents: the United States, El Salvador, Ecuador and
Nicaragua. Even Mexico, the official seat of the III, had failed to obtain official
approval for its national institute, illustrating the difficulties that indigenistas
encountered in obtaining political and financial support from their governments. As
Secretary of the National Indian Institute in Washington, D.C., and acting as a
representative of the III, Ernest Maes again traveled to member countries in 1942 to
encourage the creation of national institutes. He eventually worked his way through
Central America, visiting Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica
and Panama.352 Following his two-month trip to all the countries of Central America,
Maes summarized the insight he had gathered for readers in other places in a letter
published in the Boletín. He identified a method by which national institutes could
start small and grow their operations, providing examples of micro-projects
undertaken by the affiliates in El Salvador and Honduras. National institutes
represented the only way to ensure that the III would be effective at producing
tangible results for indigenous groups, and not just function as a distributor of
research findings.353
Maes offered the insight that they should function not only as a “friend in
court” for disenfranchised indigenous peoples, but also set an example of scientific
approaches to social problem solving, both for native peoples and for their
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governments.354 For their part, the editors of the Boletín Indigenista reminded those
trying to get national institutes off the ground that:
“It is essential that these National Institutes avoid becoming what so many Indianist
groups have become in the past, a debating society where well intentioned but
largely futile Indianists gather together to make discourses with revolutionary
implications on the situation of the Indian, instead of pointing out specific Indian
problems by demonstrations of constructive suggestions on how to deal with them.
These suggestions must be practical within the resources of the governments
concerned. The organization of these Institutes need not be at all elaborate, much
less bureaucratic.”355

An example of just such a simple, straightforward solution was the III’s proposal to
broadcast technical, cultural and administrative information via radio, directly into
indigenous regions and in native languages.356
Maes’ travels were productive, and by 1943 Ecuador, El Salvador and
Nicaragua had created national institutes. More significantly he was able to
exchange ideas with indigenistas working in different contexts and populations with
distinct needs. He reported that the first projects undertaken varied significantly, as
El Salvador’s national indigenista institute began a project to encourage soy
production among Indians, Honduras undertook a pottery project and Panama and
Guatemala were working on health initiatives. He suggested that although national
institutes were created within various branches of government or the educational
system in each country, it was important for them to be connected to key decision
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makers and leverage their successes in early projects toward gradually larger
efforts.357
In his role as Director of the III, Gamio was perhaps the single most widely
traveled and well-connected indigenista. In 1944 he visited Colombia, Venezuela
and Brazil, meeting with Presidents Isaías Medina and Getulio Vargas, as well as
ministers of foreign relations, education and economy. Among other issues
addressed, Gamio encouraged Colombia to pay the dues they owed to the III under
the Patzcuaro Convention and secured a promise from Vargas that Brazil would
soon sign the agreement as well. Recognizing that Brazil had been working for the
advancement of indigenous peoples for more than thirty years through their Indian
Protective Service and Council for Indian Protection, he proposed the creation of
scholarships to support the exchange of students between those three South
American countries and Mexico and the United States, so that “once they have a
scientific training, (students) would visit Brazil in order to study the systems used
there…then…return to their respective countries in order to work among the
various jungle Indian groups.” In the following months, Gamio planned to visit the
United States as a complement to his trip to South America.358
The professional networks built through the indigenista movement
facilitated advanced study at U.S. universities for scholars across Latin America.
Manuel Gamio and Moisés Saénz had both studied at Columbia University in the
1910s, under Franz Boas and John Dewey respectively, and by the early 1940s news
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of scholarships and the progress of anthropology students regularly made the pages
of Boletín Indigenista. In 1941, anthropologist Robert Redfield provided such an
update informing readers that Guatemalans Antonio Goubaud Carrera and Juan
Rosales were pursuing doctoral study in his department at the University of
Chicago.359 Those networks also provided field research opportunities to North
American academics, such as the work completed by professors John Gillin and
Melvin Tumin, who spent part of 1941 conducting research in eastern Guatemala.360
In other instances, North American anthropologists spent time at Latin American
universities offering courses as visiting professors. In 1942, anthropologist Sol Tax
offered a seminar on Maya ethnography at the National School of Anthropology in
Mexico City, and later offered a field methods class in Chiapas.361 In 1943, Alfred
Métraux of the Smithsonian’s Bureau of American Ethnology taught a course on the
Ethnology of South America at the National School of Anthropology in Mexico City,
and Alfonso Caso of Mexico’s National Institute of Anthropology taught a course on
Mexican archaeology at the University of Chicago.362
The III also directly supported Indians in efforts to travel and learn from
indigenous communities in other American contexts. In August of 1940, five
indigenous Mexicans accepted the invitation of the U.S. BIA to travel to the north,
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where they visited several American Indian communities.363 At times, III work was
supported by direct contributions of personnel from member states, rather than
consistent funding. For the first two years following the Patzcuaro Convention, the
U.S. BIA stationed Emil Sady in Mexico City to support the growth of the III until he
was recalled to the United States for service to the war effort.364 For other
initiatives, funding originated both from the coffers of member states, and later on
from supranational entities like the United Nations.
For the U.S. Coordinator of the Office of Inter-American Affairs (COIAA),
Nelson Rockefeller, the III’s onchocerciasis project, which was identified as a
priority at Patzcuaro, fit with the goals of the COIAA’s broader campaign to raise
standards of living across the Americas. Beginning in 1945, the Institute of InterAmerican Affairs at the U.S. State Department began experimental projects under
the name Servicio Cooperativo (Cooperative Service), which operated as “an organic,
permanent part of the government where it works. Its Director is both a functionary
of the Insititute of Inter-American Affairs and an officer of the Latin American
government.”365 In addition to projects like the eradication of onchocerciasis,
indigenismo also sustained transnational engagement with theories and intellectual
trends. One such body of thought is the theme of race and its relationship to the
place and role of Indians within modern society. We now turn our attention to that
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important concept to understand how scientific theories that impacted indigenous
issues circulated through and were shaped by the indigenista discourse.

Indigenismo and the Concept of Race
Indigenismo contained a continuous thread of anti-racism, which cut across
and through the periodic shifts in the policy goals of the III and national
governments. On the occasion of the Indian Day celebration on April 19, 1945,
Manuel Gamio broadcast a radio address tackling the issue of racial prejudices and
the perceived psychological inferiority of indigenous persons. Those issues linked
together several important themes in the history and legacy of indigenismo as an
ideology. “In certain countries…where although race prejudices are practically
unknown, there exist culture prejudices. These prejudices are not common only to
the social elements of European origin, but are frequently shared by Indians of
favored economic position who are incorporated into Western culture.” Gamio built
his argument on the foundational understanding that race is a social construct, not a
biological one, thus connecting his work to that of racial thinkers like his mentor
Franz Boas and his longtime friend Alejandro Lipschütz.366 He also linked that
insight to the emerging anthropological interest in the North American academy in
personality studies.367 Finally, and most significantly for the overall agenda of the III
and indigenismo as a movement, Gamio made clear that the goals of social and
economic advancement for Indians were threefold: first, to improve living
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conditions broadly; second, to help indigenous leaders emerge into the upper
echelons of society; and third, that the success of individuals would serve to offer
hope and inspiration to all members of the indigenous classes.368
Indigenistas realized that they were working to overcome social prejudices
of many types in their efforts to improve the lives of Indians. They viewed those
prejudices through broad lenses informed by history, culture and comparison with
other contexts. In 1957, for example, in the wake of efforts to desegregate schools in
the United States, a comparison of racism in North American and Latin American
contexts was framed on the pages of the Boletín. The editor, like many later
historians have done, characterized racism in the United States as grounded in
biology and genetics, while the prejudices of Latin America were fundamentally
more socially and culturally constructed.
“If in Mexico, Bolivia or Guatemala an individual with dark skin and other Indian
racial characteristics appears in a first-class hotel or restaurant, who, however, is
dressed the same as the other customers, no one would take notice of him. But if this
same person appears in these places wearing Hauraches or sandals, white cotton
trousers and a straw or reed hat, he would probably not be admitted, or else he
would be an object of contempt. On the other hand, if a Negro, no matter how
elegantly he might be dressed, appears in a first-class hotel or restaurant in the
above mentioned North American regions, he would certainly not be admitted and
he would be refused admission even more certainly if he should be more modestly
dressed.”369

The author explained that foundational difference on the legacy of racial mixing in
Spain, where “for approximately eight centuries they had maintained racial contacts
with the Moors.” In reality, the Spaniards who colonized Latin America “were
themselves mestizos,” he wrote, and therefore viewed racial origins as less
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significant that social adaptations. In some ways this feature made indigenista
projects easier in Latin America, but in other more ideological ways they were
profoundly complicated and contradictory.
At times, indigenista arguments over-simplified the differences between
social sectors. Given the complexity of indigenous social realities, it was tempting to
reduce a diverse population into categories of traditional and acculturated – those
who were succeeding at bridging a divide and those being left behind. Similarly, it
was often expedient to classify those cultural traits that were “favorable and
valuable” into the aesthetic realm of the arts, and to characterize all others as
obstacles to progress.370 Over-reliance upon corn as a staple food, inferior tools and
inefficient methods of production, and especially the persistence of native healing,
were all construed as obstacles by some indigenistas.371 But the persistence of
indigenous people hanging on to those traditions suggested that the Indians
themselves valued them in ways that indigenistas either ignored or could not
understand. Furthermore, although it was tempting to point to basic demographic
observations like population growth as signs of progress, indigenistas were quick to
point out that a larger population did not necessarily mean improvement in their
standards of living. In fact, more individuals in a given community that lacked the
resources to supply health care, education and economic opportunity could often
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overtax traditional cultural patterns, leading to a greater breakdown of the social
system.372
As the 1950s progressed and relatively little was done by national
governments to address these problems, the tone of the indigenista discourse
became increasingly frustrated and pessimistic. Observers could see social
programs created to benefit other ethnic minorities, while indigenous sectors of
society were increasingly left behind.
“These monolingual Indians, who have no idea of what nationality is, are more
foreign to their own country than the foreigners themselves. They can do nothing
for themselves in raising their standard of living, and, since no one helps them, they
continue to exist as they did many centuries ago. In the meantime, the social
minorities of their countries and, above all, of the Indo-Hispanic ones, are making
progress in every field. Is this just, at a time when so much is said about democracy,
equality of rights, humanity, etc.?”373

By the end of the decade, it seemed as if the indigenista argument that national
progress depended upon progress for Indians in Latin America had gone unheeded.
Although they continued to advocate for improvements in education, infrastructure,
public health and agricultural production, few resources generated by the
increasingly prosperous post-war economy were being allocated for the benefit of
indigenous sectors of society.374 Nevertheless, indigenistas continued to advocate
for projects like the Pan-American Highway, which had the potential to link
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indigenous sectors to the national electorate, connect Indians across national
boundaries and integrate them into national and international markets.375
When the fourth Inter-American Indigenista Conference was held in
Guatemala City in 1959, the only Chilean delegate to attend was the ambassador to
Guatemala, Edmundo Fuenzalida Espinosa.376 The United States, for its part,
included a special disclaimer written into the end of the proceedings stating that
even though the delegation agreed to sign the final act, the U.S. would not comply
with all the recommendations because some of them were not applicable due to
assumptions about organizational framework and capacity. Furthermore, “any of
these resolutions having financial implications for the Government is subject to
review and approval by the authorized agencies of the Executive Department, as
well as by the President and Congress.”377
By 1960, the indigenista movement was losing steam. Committed
anthropologists and social reformers would continue to labor on behalf of the cause,
but governments were less motivated to allocate resources to produce meaningful
change for their indigenous populations. Coinciding with the waning of indigenismo
was the rise of social movements led by Indians themselves, which sometimes took
a more antagonistic stance toward national governments. In the United States, the
gradual application of termination policies during the 1950s led to the rise of the
American Indian Movement in the late 1960s. In Chile, all the Mapuche deputies lost
Editorial, The Indian Population and the Pan-American Highway,” Boletín Indigenista,
1959 Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 182-183.
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their re-election bids to the Camara de Diputados in 1958, and DASIN was
increasingly marginalized within the Ministry of Land and Colonization until
Venancio Coñuepán was replaced as the agency’s Director during the Alessandri
administration. For its part, the III would continue to function, but its efficacy was
clearly waning.
In July of 1960, Manuel Gamio died following several months of poor health.
His passing marked the end of an era and the dawn of another. The leadership of the
III passed to the renowned Mexican anthropologist and historian Miguel LeónPortilla, and the Institute would continue to carry out research and projects for
social improvement.378 Under Leon-Portilla’s leadership, the III continued the basic
tenets and trajectory of indigenismo, supporting efforts to improve the lives of
Indians by blending elements of indigenous culture with modern technical and
economic improvement. But the era in which it seemed possible for governments to
provide support for indigenista projects was rapidly vanishing.

Indigenismo in Chile
By tracing Chile’s participation in the III from 1940-1993, Chilean historians
Jorge Vergara and Hans Gundermann have shown that state actors hesitated to sign
on to the Patzcuaro Convention, and although they sent delegations to the periodic
conferences, the work of the III did not have a significant impact on Chilean
indigenous policy through much of this period. Vergara and Gundermann raise (but
leave unanswered) the question of whether the unenthusiastic engagement with the
Editorial, “The Initiator of Inter-American Indianism has Died,” Boletín Indigenista, 1960
Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 166-169.
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III was a reflection of the ambivalence of internal Chilean indigenous politics, or had
more to do with Chile’s foreign policy priorities during the period. They do suggest,
however, that the passage of a new indigenous law in 1961 served as a primary
impetus for Chile to become more formally involved with the III.379 But in order to
understand when, how and why the Chilean state finally did embrace the III as an
institution, we must first examine what forms of interaction non-state actors had
with the III and how those changed during the 1940-1961 period.
During the 1940s and 1950s, Chilean participation in the transnational
indigenista movement was continuous, but the official involvement of the Chilean
state was minimal. Chile fell into the class of countries with minority indigenous
populations that promulgated laws specific to their concerns, even though they had
technically been considered citizens of the Republic of Chile since independence in
the early nineteenth century. Changes and proposed changes to the indigenous laws
that regulated landholding were a perennial concern for both indigenous activists
and indigenistas in Chile, and news of those events was regularly sent to the III for
publication in the Noticias section of the Boletín Indigenista.
When the first International Indigenista Conference was held in Patzcuaro,
Mexico in 1940, Venancio Coñuepán and César Colima, Mapuche leaders of the
Corporación Araucana, attended as official members of the Chilean delegation. At
the conference, Coñuepán and Colima gave a paper on the indigenous problem in
Chile.380 Their essay argued for the state’s support in solving indigenous problems,
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and suggested that support should focus on three areas: education, landholding, and
economic development. Although they demanded the state’s support for those
projects, they wanted to retain the participation of indigenous leaders in the
process. Finally, Coñuepán and Colima recommended the state create an “Undersecretary of Indigenous Affairs,” – a sub-cabinet level position working across four
separate ministries (Land and Colonization, Treasury, Education, and Agriculture) –
that would work with indigenous leaders appointed to a Council of Indigenous
Affairs.381
At Patzcuaro, Manuel Hidalgo, the Chilean ambassador to Mexico,
accompanied Coñuepán and Colima. At the conclusion of the conference, the two
Mapuche leaders were unable to immediately return to Chile because they were not
provided with funds to purchase return tickets. Hidalgo sent an urgent telegram to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting those funds, which had been promised by
the Ministry of Education.382 That the state would include the two Corporación
leaders as members of the official delegation but not fully support their travel needs
can perhaps be viewed as symbolic of the state’s indifference or ambivalence
toward including indigenous leaders in official state projects and affairs.
Nevertheless, engagement with the broader indigenista movement clearly had an
effect on Coñuepán. It provided him a comparative lens from which to draw ideas
for the Mapuche movement and legitimize demands for state support for indigenous
advancement within Chile. For example, in a 1947 address to the Chilean Congress,
claiming to have written the paper that Coñuepán delivered, or if there was a second paper.
See notes 458-460.
381 Vergara and Gundermann, p. 4.
382 Ibid, pp. 3-4.
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Coñuepán made reference to the successes in Mexico and the US, while criticizing
“our enemies” in Chile, who failed to elevate indigenous issues to the level of
concern held in other American countries.383
Even though, as Vergara and Gundermann illustrate, Chile’s acceptance of the
Patzcuaro Convention and more formal participation in the III did not commence
until the early 1960s, for two decades the III facilitated an exchange of ideas
between indigenistas working in Chile and their counterparts in other countries. In
early 1942, notice of a new publication by the famed Chilean archaeologist and
folklorist Ricardo E. Latcham appeared on the pages of the Boletín Indigenista.
Latcham’s article, which was about the correlations between popular and
indigenous art forms in Chile, came near the end of his long career studying
Mapuche language, art and archeology.384 Those interests stemmed from his early
excursions to southern Chile as an engineer working to develop railroad lines
through the region, and mirrored those of other early Mapuche ethnologists like
Tomás Guevara and Carlos Sadleir, who both assisted with the founding of the first
Mapuche political organization, the Sociedad Caupolicán, as described in the
opening chapter.
As chapter one also makes clear, the founding of the first Mapuche
organizations in the 1910s and 1920s came as direct responses to the ongoing loss
of land experienced by Mapuche communities. Similarly, Chilean contributions to
the Boletín Indigenista in the early 1940s illustrated the ongoing centrality of the
issue of land loss. In June of 1942, the Boletín reported that Minister of Land and
383
384
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Colonization Rolando Merino Reyes had proposed a bill to exempt Mapuche
communities from paying tax on their land. According to Merino Reyes, although no
formal exemption existed, Mapuche landholders had by custom not paid such taxes,
and that unless the law was amended he would be required to begin proceedings to
seize land and auction it off to pay back taxes.385 In the following issue, another
proposed legislative project was mentioned, one that would enable absentee
members of the community, presumably those who migrated to cities in search of
work, to establish legal recognition of their land rights and provide other restraints
to the further subdivision and sale of communal landholdings.386
In other less formal ways, Chilean state actors did sometimes contribute to
the indigenista discourse even though the state had not formally accepted the
Patzcuaro Convention. In 1943, the Ministry of Education submitted a report for
publication in the Boletín Indigenista. That report, written by Inspector of Indian
Education Andrés Aguayo Paillalef, made recommendations on land tenure,
economic development and the approval of the Patzcuaro Convention and founding
of a national indigenista institute.387 In light of contributions like that one, we
should remember that the state did not act as a monolithic entity, and that some
state actors, working on behalf of indigenous interests, did attempt to engage the
broader indigenista project when they perceived it could advance their efforts.
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At other times, the III became a foil for non-state actors attempting to
influence the state. In 1944, someone sent a newspaper story to the III that reported
on a telegram that the Corporación Araucana had sent to Minister of Land and
Colonization Osvaldo Vial, in which they simultaneously thanked him for his work
on behalf of the Mapuche people and requested that the Minister grant an audience
to the Corporación’s representative, Venancio Coñuepán. They claimed that Indian
Courts had allowed the illegal usurpation of Mapuche lands for years, and that was
the cause of indigenous poverty. For his part, Vial refused Coñuepán an audience,
replying that “the Government was engaged in making a complete study of the
Indian problem; that it was considering the good of the whole, and hence would not
receive suggestions from interested groups, since such suggestions could only be
detrimental to the carrying out of the Government’s plan.”388 In that way the
Mapuche struggle for land and rights played out not only in the pages of the Chilean
press, but also through the transnational medium of the III and therefore became
identifiable within the indigenista movement.
Rather than undertake difficult projects to uplift indigenous populations,
leaders seeking pure economic development often preferred to encourage
immigration to indigenous zones. That was certainly the case in Chile, where
European immigration was encouraged and the state actively resettled German and
Italian immigrants throughout the southern region and interspersed them between
Mapuche reducciones. That practice had a long history throughout the Americas,
which Manuel Gamio drew attention to in his 1956 Day of the Indian address. He
Noticias: Chile, “Improvement of the Indian,” Boletín Indigenista, 1944 Vol. 4, No. 2, pp.
114-117.

388

162
pointed out that the most prosperous countries in the Americas were the ones that
had drawn the most extensive flow of migrants from Europe, and which also
contained the smallest percentages of indigenous peoples, notably the United States
and Argentina. On the other hand, nations in the tropical region with larger
indigenous populations, i.e. Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, had
stagnated economically. For those countries, he argued, “there is no need then to
resort today to extended immigration in order to stimulate the progress of the
republics under discussion; the most necessary and urgent step to achieve such an
end is to raise by all possible means the inferior standards against which great
masses of Indomestizos struggle.”389 Chilean indigenistas could surely relate to that
line of reasoning, as state policies had encouraged Euro-Chilean migration to the
southern region since the mid-nineteenth century.
For his part, Alejandro Lipschütz saw the events of World War II as heralding
a new epoch in the socio-political experience of humankind, which he termed “the
great social world reform.” He viewed that as a positive development and his
optimism drew broadly from his experience working out problems associated with
race relations in the Americas as he wrote his first indigenista treatise,
Indoamericanismo y Raza India, and also his experience as a child in Eastern Europe.
In a 1944 speech delivered in Santiago and reprinted in the Boletín Indigenista,
Lipschütz argued that “upon the basis of the sociological experience among uncultured or primitive peoples and the experiments realized on other groups…the
American Indian will proceed upwards, incorporating the values of European
Manuel Gamio, Editorial, “Immigration in America,” Boletín Indigenista, 1956 Vol. 16,
Nos. 2 and 3, pp. 106-109.
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culture, however, preserving his own traditional values (emphasis in original).” The
experiences and experiments he referenced included those in the Baltic region,
where in previous centuries German feudal lords subjugated Estonians and
Lithuanians, but who later re-emerged as culturally distinct groups within the Soviet
Union. Additionally, Lipschütz referred to the work accomplished by John Collier in
the United States, where the Indian New Deal had reformed education and stemmed
the tide of land loss through legal reform. Lipschütz’s optimistic analysis represents
a truly global network of ideas and contributed to the transnational flow of ideas
about indigenous development.390
In 1946, following Lipschütz’s anthropological fieldwork in Tierra del Fuego
(which is examined more fully in chapter four), reports of his mission were included
in the Boletín Indigenista. They included a brief summary of their findings, and
mentioned the members of the international team of scientists who participated in
the effort. That work established Lipschütz as a bona fide anthropologist, and
cemented what was perhaps the strongest individual connection between Chile and
the III in the period.391 Other, more general, reports ensued, for example an update
on the work of staff at the Chilean National History Museum, who offered courses on
indigenous history and culture to elementary school students in Chile, which
worked to “break down prejudices and to implant ideas favorable to the Indian and
his culture.” Capuchin missionaries also received favorable mention, in part for
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supporting indigenous youth as they pursued university studies that “enable them
to help their Indian brothers and contribute to the advancement of their country.”392
In September of 1949, indigenistas in Chile finally formed a national institute,
although they did so without official support from the Chilean government. The
group included both whites and Mapuche among its leadership, with important
indigenistas like Alejandro Lipschütz and Bishop Guido Beck de Ramberga as
honorary members. In the notice printed in the Boletín Indigenista, the editors
wrote that although the IIC “does not have an official character, it is expected…that
the Chilean government…will not delay in recognizing and aiding the institution.”
They went on to speculate that pending legislation intended to reform the Ley
Indígena might include the recognition and support of the state.393 However, it
would be another twelve years before Chile officially signed onto the Patzcuaro
Convention, coinciding with yet another round of legislative reforms to the Ley
Indígena in 1961.
The year after it was formed, in 1950, the Instituto Indigenista Chileno
organized a series of lectures and a photographic exhibition to celebrate the Day of
the Indian. Lt. Col. Gregorio Rodríguez, vice-president of the institute gave an
overview of the indigenous presence in Chile, while Lipschütz and Grete Mostny
presented on groups inhabiting the extreme latitudes of the country, Tierra del
Fuego and the Atacama Desert, respectively. Although much indigenista work, and
certainly indigenous politics, in Chile centered on the Mapuche, the IIC attempted to
Noticias: Chile, “Labors in Benefit of th Indian,” Boletín Indigenista, 1947 Vol. 7, No. 2, p.
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broaden the scope of their work.394 It is also interesting to note the participation
and support of the armed forces within Chilean indigenismo. Air Force General
Ramón Cañas Montalva had previously provided support for Lipschütz’s mission to
Tierra del Fuego, and Lt. Col. Gregorio Rodríguez served as the founding VicePresident of the IIC. In 1951, the Boletín Indigenista recognized the Air Force for its
efforts to protect and provide for Alcalufe Indians near its southernmost bases.
Since 1937, commanders stationed there provided protection from unscrupulous
merchants who sought to defraud the Indians, and basic education for their children
by founding a small school.395
By 1952, Augusto Iglesias and Grete Mostny had resigned as the founding
President and Secretary of the IIC and the group elected new leadership. At the
same time Gregorio Rodríguez took over as President, the IIC’s voice in Chilean
indigenous affairs was increasing. They again led the Day of the Indian celebrations
in 1952, and expanded the scope of their work to include public statements on
proposed legislation, such as a plan put forth by the Department of Urbanization to
redistribute Mapuche land around Temuco to German and Italian immigrants.396
The IIC also made plans to compile a report on the history of indigenous legislation
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in Chile, to contribute to the III’s effort to gather that information from countries
across the Americas.397
That same year, Carlos Ibañez del Campo was elected President of Chile for a
second time. After his first presidency had ended with his exile in 1931, Ibañez
returned as a more centrist and populist presidential candidate, and had courted the
Mapuche vote as he assembled an electoral victory. With a new president in office,
the IIC again pressed the government to accept the Patzcuaro Convention and grant
it official recognition as a state agency, “independent and advisory in nature, which
should be consulted with reference to Indian policy and legislation in Chile.” Ibañez
met with members of the IIC’s governing board, including Lipschütz, Rodríguez and
historian Álvaro Jara, even posing with them for a photograph that was reprinted in
the Boletín Indigenista. Although Ibañez expressed “his desire that his government
take up these problems seriously and in due time” and promised to study their
requests thoughtfully, he would not grant official status nor sign the Patzcuaro
agreement during his presidency.398
However, when he assembled his new cabinet in 1952, Ibañez named
Venancio Coñuepán as Minister of Land and Colonization. In early 1953, the editors
of the Boletín Indigenista printed a short biography of Coñuepán along with news of
his appointment as Minister, in which they expressed their “hopes that in this
position he will be able to give greater support to the Chilean Indian Institute, as the
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President of Chile himself has promised to do.”399 However, Coñuepán would step
aside as Minister after only six months to become the Director of the newly
established Office of Indigenous Affairs. While Coñuepán’s tenure as DASIN’s
Director is examined in greater detail in chapter five, it is important to mention here
that in this context Ibañez’s move could be viewed as an alternative to granting the
IIC an official status as a state agency. By placing Coñuepán atop the agency he was
able to reward the most accomplished and politically connected Mapuche leader of
the era for his support in the recent presidential election, and provide a nod to
members of that constituency for their loyalty. For Coñuepán’s part, he may have
believed he would have more direct control and influence on governmental
indigenous policy from that post. The agency also mirrored the model created in
Mexico under Lázaro Cárdenas, although the Office of Indian Affairs in that coutry
was later integrated into the Ministry of Education and was never led by indigenous
leaders, rather by indigenistas with training in social science.
Also in 1953, Gregorio Rodríguez stepped down as President of the IIC and
was replaced by General Ramón Cañas Montalva, who was at the time a retired Air
Force General. In addition to his military career, Cañas Montalva was an active
scientist who published works on geography and would later go on to lead the Pan
American Institute of Geography and History. At the same time the Boletín
Indigenista reported on that leadership transition, it also provided notice of the
creation of DASIN, an issue “of utmost importance” that they anticipated reporting
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on soon.400 However, no further news of DASIN appeared on the pages of the Boletín
Indigenista for some time.
In 1954, eight representatives from Chile attended the third International
Indigenista Conference in La Paz, Bolivia. Álvaro Jara served as president of the
delegation, and it seems that they again participated as private citizens, with no
official representatives of the government in attendance.401 For the remainder of the
1950s, the IIC continued to function independently of the Chilean government and
DASIN. Although individual members contributed news and scholarly articles to III
publications, the Mapuche political project advanced separately from indigenista
contributions. As can be seen in the analysis of DASIN’s history in chapter five,
Coñuepán spent much of his time as Director of DASIN advocating for Indians and
supervising the Indian Courts, which were under his jurisdiction. But private
Chilean contributions to the indigenista movement continued.
In 1955 Lipschütz forwarded to the III news of a unique legal decision in
which a Mapuche woman was acquitted of murdering her grandmother, whom she
alleged had practiced witchcraft against her. The judge found Juana Catrilaf
Calfiñanco not guilty on the grounds that she acted in self-defense, believing as she
did that her grandmother had cast a spell upon her. In the decision, Judge Maria
Mardones cited a report provided by the IIC, authored by Rodríguez, Lipschütz and
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Rigoberto Iglesias.402 The case was later written up in a law review journal in Chile,
which gave the case an important distinction as legal precedent. The law review’s
analysis of Catrilaf’s acquittal established that an indigenous worldview could be
used as a legitimate line of defense in criminal court. This was of course very
interesting and important to the III, which had resolved at the La Paz Conference to
construct “an adequate understanding of the legal and administrative problems of
American Indians” within the frameworks of various national legal systems.403 The
issue brought together questions of legal interpretation, economic development and
Mapuche cosmology. When printed in the III journal Boletín Indigenista, it became a
part of the transnational discourse about the relationship between indigenous
people and modern nation-states. In the process, what it meant to be an Indian
became an inherently political subject, effectively placing limits on the state’s ability
to establish the terms of justice in accordance with the values of the dominant
culture. In this way, indigenismo offered the Mapuche a powerful set of analytical
tools to push back against the efforts of state actors to simply assimilate the
Mapuche or reduce their landholdings.
That decision notwithstanding, the courts remained an important
battleground in the effort to protect and advance indigenous causes. In 1955 the
District Attorney of the Court of Temuco issued a report condemning the slow and
inefficient progress of Mapuche land division through the Indian Courts supervised
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by DASIN. When viewed through an indigenista lens, District Attorney Leon Erbetta
Vaccaro’s report could be seen as verification that the protections afforded Indians
by DASIN were actually working, for as the Boletín editors point out, without
thorough “preparation and self-defense, the Indian would sell out for a paltry sum,”
leading to further concentration of land in the hands of latifundistas (large
landholders) who would leave much of it unproductive. “Such a thing took place in
Mexico, where President Benito Juárez, guided by the best intentions, abolished
communal properties, the allotments being rapidly secured by landholders. This led
to a state of misery of millions of natives, which in turn brought about the 1910
Revolution…”404 A notice printed in the next issue suggests that Erbetta’s report
prompted “indigenistas of the continent” to write to the Institute. “Their opinion is
that the aforesaid report should be openly condemned for comprising acts contrary
to the rights of the Indian population of Chile.”405
Although it remained outside of the state bureaucracy, members of the IIC
labored on in defense of indigenous causes. In 1956, they expanded the Indian Day
celebrations to comprise an entire week of events. On April 20th, Alejandro
Lipschütz highlighted the week’s events with a lecture on “The Indian Community in
Chile and Latin America,” which coincided with the publication of his new book of
the same title. While Lipschütz and Coñuepán occupied opposite ends of the political
spectrum, and therefore had little direct interaction that can be verified in the
archives, they were both present at the Indian Day celebration of 1956. The week
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culminated with the opening of a new exhibition of Indian crafts at the Cerro Santa
Lucia museum, which arose from collaboration between the IIC and the Museum of
Popular Art.406
As the IIC worked to expand awareness of the rich legacy that indigenous
sectors contributed to Chilean popular culture, legislators continued their push to
repeal legal protections for Indian lands. Chilean indigenistas kept the III informed
of developments, as Álvaro Jara did in 1958 when a bill was introduced to the
Chilean Congress that stood to abolish the Indian Courts and place “the Indians and
their property within the jurisdiction of common law, as well as (suppress) the
Department of Indian Affairs.” The editors of the Boletín Indigenista voiced their
opposition to that project on grounds that the minority status of Indians in Chile
justified special protections under the law. In doing so, they referenced Jara’s
Legislación Indigenista de Chile, where he traced the origins of and challenges to the
various indigenous laws in Chile, and thus contributed to the III’s project to collect
and disseminate information about legislation that impacted indigenous peoples
across the Americas.407
In 1959, Jara reported to the III that Antonio Mulato Ñunque and Martín
Alonqueo, the President and Secretary of the Mapuche organization Sociedad
Lautaro, had presented a written assessment of the problems facing Mapuche
communities in the south to a group of Diputados in Santiago. Among those
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Nos. 2-3, pp. 142-144.
407 Noticias: Chile, “Project for Placing the Indians of Chile under the Jurisdiction of the
Common Law,” Boletín Indigenista, 1958 Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 34-37. See also Álvaro Jara,
Legislación Indigenista de Chile, Mexico City: Ediciones Especiales del III, 1956.
406

172
problems, the loss of land was presented as the main source poverty and ill health.
Population growth, combined with individual sales of divided community land, had
led to a landholding pattern they termed minifundios (small landholdings). “Each
family is left with two or three hectares, impoverished by intensive cultivation. This
situation has obliged thousands of Araucanos to emigrate to Argentina in search of
new lands.” As a remedy, they requested the “prohibition of transfer of Mapuche
land to private persons (Chilean and foreigners), during a period of fifteen years.”
They went on to address health concerns related to poor living conditions and a lack
of access to education for Mapuche youth. But loss of land continued to be viewed as
the source of other deprivations, and also the primary aim of anti-indigenista forces
within Chile.408
Chilean indigenistas served as allies to Mapuche organizations and activists
as they sought to protect indigenous lands and support the general advancement of
Mapuche society. In June of 1959, the IIC organized the First Indigenista Forum in
Santiago. Those gathered passed a resolution to formally request legislation from
the Chilean state that served four functions. The first identified “preservation of the
Indian communities and their way of life, based on possession of the land, with a view
toward modernizing economic exploitation…” (emphasis added). The second
requested that Indian lands be protected from sale or transfer by classifying them as
“inalienable in perpetuity.” Those demands illustrate the view in Chile, shared by
both Mapuche and indigenistas, that land ownership was central to both the
preservation of indigenous culture and economic development. The latter would
Noticias: Chile, “The Mapuches Request Culture,” Boletín Indigenista, 1959 Vol. 19, No. 2,
pp. 96-99.
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also require the “organization of technical and economic help on a grand scale” in
order to increase productivity. Here we can see the persistence and scope of those
two indigenista themes in the Chilean landscape. The Forum also requested the
“perfection” of DASIN, “so that it may be used to undertake and carry out this vast
plan of protection and help,” and the ratification of the Patzcuaro Convention “in
order to be able to benefit…from the valuable experiences in Indianist work on the
continent, especially in countries such as the United States, Mexico,” and others. The
Forum recognized the value of formal organizations in assisting with the
advancement of indigenous society, but also acknowledged that it was not working
well because of flaws within DASIN and the state’s refusal to participate more fully
in the broader indigenista movement.409
In 1961, the III published a special edition of the Boletín Indigenista, which
was presented as a panoramic view of the status of indigenous populations in each
American nation-state. In consultation with specialists – in Chile, those included
Alejandro Lipschütz, Grete Mostny and Álvaro Jara – demographic data was
compiled from the most recent censuses and presented alongside other cultural
information. The guide included geographic distribution of populations, linguistic
characteristics, primary economic activities, overview of indigenous laws and a
summary list of indigenista organizations operating in each country. For Chile, the
guide drew statistics from the General Census of 1952 and established the total
Mapuche population at 127,151, acknowledging that the figure included only those
living in southern communities, as “no reliable information on the Indians in the
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northern part of the country” existed.410 That acknowledgment provides an
important insight into the importance of the existence of Mapuche communities and
communal land. According to the Chilean state, at least for the purpose of
establishing statistics, when an Indian left the reservation, they ceased to be an
Indian. Understanding that, it is not surprising that the maintenance of communal
land and ties to that land were so important to the Mapuche political struggle.

Summary
Although efforts to provide aid and social improvement to indigenous
populations began early in the twentieth century across the Americas, the founding
of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano in 1940 provided a formal network for
indigenista researchers and indigenous leaders to collaborate and share ideas.
While the period opened with broad and ambitious goals to generate solutions to
complex social problems that spanned a broad range of issues like health, sanitation,
education, racial prejudices and political participation, global and hemispheric
geopolitical priorities narrowed the scope of interventions to focus on economic
development. In that transition, nuanced connections between economics and other
aspects of indigenous culture and society were glossed over.
In Chile, as in other national contexts, the efforts and accomplishments of
indigenistas were minimized by the state’s lack of support for the IIC as an
institution, as well as fairly tepid support for their cause more broadly. The
relatively small group of indigenistas never attracted the attention and support of
Guide to the Indians Of America: Chile, Boletín Indigenista, 1961 Vol. 21, No. Especial, pp.
202-205.
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the state, while the relatively large Mapuche organizations garnered much more
serious consideration from elected officials. In some ways, we can see the strength
of the Mapuche movement as another factor that limited indigenista effectiveness.
Finally, in much the same way that economic development eclipsed more integrated
development goals and projects in the indigenista movement more broadly, the
ongoing emphasis on Mapuche land tenure and legislative reforms that either
supported or threatened Mapuche community lands overshadowed efforts to
improve education, health, infrastructure and other objectives.
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Chapter 4: Alejandro Lipschütz and Chilean Indigenismo

In many ways, the story of Alejandro Lipschütz embodies the story of
indigenistas across the hemisphere. His interest in the plight of indigenous peoples
began through personal contacts and the general belief that Indians required special
consideration as national states adopted a rational scientific approach to
development and governance. Lipschütz is also important to the story of
indigenismo in Chile, as he was the foremost Chilean contributor to the
transnational discouse in the mid-twentieth century. But Lipschütz came to
indigenismo as a second (or parallel) career, and the existence of his voluminous
body of work and its influence is remarkable considering that for him it was an
avocation coexisting alongside his career as a research biologist and Director of the
Institute for Experimental Medicine, which he founded within the National Health
Service and led for more than twenty years. Furthermore, the indigenismo of
Alejandro Lipschütz was never supported by the Chilean state, and through most of
the period ran counter to the goals of state officials and the larger Chilean public.
This chapter will first locate Lipschütz within the broad trends of Chilean
anthropology and indigenismo in the Americas, and then tease out his contributions
to the pan-American discourse and impact on the Mapuche movement. That analysis
demonstrates that his work was prolific, sophisticated and important. His personal
connections with Mapuche individuals and organizations left a lasting impact within
Chile and across the Americas.
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Alejandro Lipschütz’s indigenista career contributes several important
insights into the relationship between indigenismo and Mapuche activism
throughout the entire period. First, it shows that formal transnational indigenismo
developed significantly later than the indigenous-indigenista collaboration that took
place through the Mapuche political organizations. Related to that observation, the
formal category of indigenismo held less significance in Chile than in other
countries, at least in its ability to influence state policies. Finally, recognizing how
important partisan political alliances were for Mapuche leaders as shown in earlier
chapters, I contend that Lipschütz was fairly ineffective in the 1940s and 1950s
because the main body of the Mapuche movement was aligned with the political
right in that period, while Lipschütz was decidedly more leftist in his views. By the
end of the era that would begin to change, as the last section of this chapter shows
by following Lipschütz’s work into the 1960s as the left became more influential in
Chilean national politics. The picture that emerges shows that indigenismo, as a
body of ideas, was filtered through national political circumstances as it was applied
to the case of the Mapuche in Chile. In addition, those ideas were adopted selectively
and sometimes excluded or transformed significantly by indigenous actors and
organizations.

Biography
Alejandro Lipschütz was born in the capital of Riga, in what is now Latvia, in
1883. He was born into a family of cultured, relatively secular, German-speaking
Jews in the Livonian province of the Russian Empire. From a very early age,
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Lipschütz was effectively trilingual, as German was the native tongue of his parents,
Latvian was the popular language in the province, but primary schooling was
carried out in Russian. His father, owner of a successful publishing house, supported
his scientific education by sending him to study medicine at the University of
Göttingen at the age of twenty, but even in his teens Alejandro had begun to take an
interest in social questions by observing the emerging workers’ movement in his
hometown, which later contributed to the Russian Revolution.411
After graduating with a medical degree from the University of Göttingen,
Lipschütz went on to hold professorships at three European universities, first in
Germany, then Switzerland where he met his wife Marguerite Vogel, and finally
returning to Livonia to teach at the University of Tartu in 1919. During that time, he
studied and collaborated with important experimental scientists throughout Europe
and published prolifically, establishing himself as a world-renowned
endocrinologist in his thirties. But in the wake of the First World War and the
Russian Revolution, life was difficult in the Baltic republics and shortages hampered
his work. So in 1926 he accepted a chaired faculty position in the School of Medicine
at the University of Concepción. Attracted in part by the temperate climate of central
Chile, he immigrated with his wife, two daughters and his long-time secretary
Dagmar Staden. In Concepción he was first introduced to Mapuche culture in
villages located not far from the city. His research formed a bridge between his
interests in laboratory and social science. 412

411
412

Berdichewsky, pp. 25-32.
Ibid. pp. 32-35.

179
Lipschütz’s work in endocrinology led him to investigate ways in which
human sex glands produced sexual difference during the course of physical
development. While still in Europe he had studied the Skoptsi, a religious sect in
Eastern Europe that practiced castration for spiritual reasons. Skoptsi eunuchs
provided an opportunity to learn how the absence of sex glands altered the
development of masculine and feminine physiognomic traits. In southern Chile in
the 1930s, Lipschütz found himself amid broader efforts to reimagine Chile as a
homogeneous mestizo nation. In that climate, researchers sought to understand
apparent physical differences observable in indigenous populations. Endocrinology
provided a useful framework for those inquiries, and Lipschütz consulted on several
investigations.413 Lipschütz used hard science to dispute widely held notions of
indigenous racial inferiority, and his first indigenista book, although it was not
published until 1937 after he had moved to Santiago, drew on research he
conducted and supervised while in Concepción.414

Origins of Chilean Anthropology
Intrigued by both biological questions about indigenous peoples and his
personal connections to Mapuche through visits to nearby villages, Lipschütz began
to read works by the founders of Chilean anthropology to learn more about the
Kurt Thomas MacMillan, Hormonal Bodies: Sex, Race and Constitutional Medicine in the
Iberian-American World, 1900-1950, Dissertation: University of California, Irvine, 2013.
MacMillan gives three examples: an article co-authored by Jaime Pi-Suñer Bayo and
Guillermo Reyes on the distribution of body hair among Mapuche men and women (1933), a
second article by Pi-Suñer Bayo on Mapuche metabolism, and a 1935 dissertation by
Ernesto Oliver that Lipschütz supervised on the development of body hair as a factor of age
and race.
414 Lipschütz, 1937.
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Mapuche language and their life ways in modern and colonial times. The roots of
Chilean anthropology can be traced back to the chroniclers of Spanish conquest and
colonization, but the true scientific orientation of the observation of indigenous
populations began earnestly in Chile during the late nineteenth century with the
work of historians José Toribio Medina and Diego Barros Arana. Moving into the
early twentieth century, anthropological investigations were supported more by
new national museums than by the country’s universities, whose missions were
oriented toward professional training and licensure rather than pure scientific
investigation. The two most influential museums, “the Museo Nacional de Historia
Natural (National Museum of Natural History) led by Ricardo E. Latcham, and the
Museo Etnográfico y Antropológico (Museum of Ethnography and Anthropology)
directed by Aureliano Oyarzún,” were both based in Santiago but their influence
extended across the entire country and even to foreign scholars conducting research
in Chile. In that context, the transnational theoretical debate between evolution and
diffusion as competing producers of social and cultural change played out within
Chile, with Latcham and the Museo de Historia Natural aligning with classical
evolution of Engels and Morgan and Oyarzún’s Museo Etnográfico influenced more
heavily by the diffusionist views of German scholars like Martín Gusinde and Max
Uhle.415
Following the Second World War, Chilean universities reoriented their
mission toward research and became the intellectual centers of Chilean
anthropology. That transition in the 1940s and 1950s coincided with a generational
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shift in which a new cadre of researchers associated with universities became the
vanguard of anthropological and ethnographic research. Although his life and career
spanned both eras, Alejandro Lipschütz’s anthropological, ethnographic and
indigenista work aligns with the latter group. The new generation also collaborated
with and drew intellectual inspiration from foreign scholars who conducted
research in Chile, originating in both North American and European academic
circles.416
After 1920 the Chilean political scene underwent dramatic transformation, as
discussed more fully in chapter one. Beginning with the economic trauma wrought
by World War I and the Great Depression, Chile embarked on a developmental
program of import substitution. More factories meant more workers concentrated
in urban areas, and consequently more populist sentiments in Chilean politics.
Labor organizations became influential and the influence of Socialist and
Communist political parties grew. Later in the century anthropologists studying
campesinos and indigenous populations were inclined to support political
movements and apply their research to those ends. In such a contested political
climate, Lipschütz was not only important for the work he personally contributed,
but also the many younger scholars whom he influenced.417
In order to fully understand Alejandro Lipschütz’s contributions to
indigenismo, it is important to recognize the confluence of four broad trends. First,
his background as a medical doctor and research biologist made him an informed
critic of prevailing views of race in his era. Second, the reorientation of the Chilean
416
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academy toward evidenced-based research and within it the transformation of
anthropology brought his racial and evolutionary ideas into contact with questions
pertaining to indigenous populations, both related to their origins and their current
social conditions. Third, Lipschütz’s own politics and experiences as an observer of
the emergence and evolution of Russia’s communist transition made him
sympathetic to the idea of popular organizing and social reform, and also made him
a politically engaged scholar. Finally, the emergence of indigenismo as a
transnational ideology and movement provided a platform and community in which
to apply those various elements of his background.

The Indigenismo of Alejandro Lipschütz
Considering his training as a biologist, it is interesting to note that most of
Lipschütz’s indigenista work engaged with questions of cultural anthropology from
a social perspective. Yet it was Lipschütz’s biological understanding of the fallacy of
indigenous racial inferiority that led him into anthropology and indigenismo in the
first place. His 1937 work Indoamericanismo y Raza India was the bridge by which
he crossed the divide between physical and social science. Work that followed was
in one way or another dedicated to combatting or correcting the wrongs
perpetrated by anti-indigenous racism and to create and support conditions
conducive to political self-determination for indigenous populations in the
Americas.418

See also Alejandro Lipschütz, El Problema Racial en la Conquista de América y el
Mestizaje, Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1967, and Perfil de Indoamérica de Nuestro
Tiempo, Antología 1937-1962, Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1968.
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Beginning with Indoamericanismo y Raza India, Lipschütz consistently
maintained that there was no biological justification for social inequality or racial
inferiority of indigenous peoples. His anthropological work endeavored to show that
observed differences between ethnically distinct populations were socially and
politically constructed.419
In general, Lipschütz leaves clearly established that the social laws and those that
govern the evolution of society, are the same for all human societies, but they
manifest themselves according to the specific characteristics, sometimes natural,
sometimes historical, in which the society’s modes of production are developed, and
where the greatest types of social formations have existed, they introduce their own
modalities.420

In Indoamericanismo y Raza India, Lipschütz showed that social forces impact ethnic
groups in similar ways. For example, he compared indigenous hierarchical societies
of the Americas (Inca, Aztec & Maya) with those of Europe, and similarly equated
pre-modern European tribes with indigenous societies like the Mapuche. In making
those comparisons, Lipschütz discussed the tensions between tribal and national
identities, and showed that those double affiliations occurred in a variety of national
contexts, including Russia and the United States. Chile was no exception, with the
Mapuche caught in the bind of “double patriotism.” Their troubles were exacerbated
by the fact that the Chilean state and Chilean society had oppressed them, stolen
their land and discriminated against them on almost every level of social interaction.
Out of this recognition arose Lipschütz’s commitment to social and political activism
on behalf of indígenas in Chile.421
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One of the most salient features of Lipschütz’s work in anthropology and
indigenismo, is that his thinking did not devolve into biological reductionism, “as
could have been expected in a biologist moving into the social sciences.”422
Furthermore, he viewed indigenismo as more than a form of benevolent social
action, rather as an outgrowth of bona fide social science (applied anthropology).
But as a social scientist and a Marxist, he also believed that the scientist’s role
included political intervention on behalf of the subjects of analysis.423 Much of his
thinking aligned closely with the movement’s leaders in North America, especially
John Collier and Manuel Gamio. However, both of those men were constrained by
their formal roles as employees of the state, and many others preferred instead to
pursue policies from a detached, apolitical and scientific orientation.424 Lipschütz
felt it was the duty of social scientists to engage with politics in support of the
people they studied. He further criticized as “timid” social scientists that adopted a
more neutral, apolitical, stance.425
Lipschütz was greatly influenced by the trajectory of Mexican history and
politics. He was an acquaintance of Manuel Gamio and drew inspiration from the
example of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920, and also the revolutionary
government of Lázaro Cárdenas that followed. In Mexico, indigenismo was
institutionalized with a whole range of policies that supported the advancement of
indigenous populations and their incorporation into the national state as citizens.
Lipschütz’s brand of indigenismo was also influenced by his socialist political
Berdichewsky, p. 74.
Ibid. pp. 74-75.
424 Giraudo and Lewis, pp. 3-11.
425 Richard P. Schaedel, introduction to Berdichewsky, 2004, pp. 15-24.
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inclinations and the work of Peruvian journalist and Marxist political theorist José
Carlos Mariátegui.426
Within the world of indigenista thought, two of the strongest voices in
support of indigenous self-determination were those of Mariátegui and Lipschütz.
But even for them the concept was more theoretical than practical or political.427
Mainstream leftist politics preferred to conceive of Indians in class-based terms,
combining forces with workers or peasants for the overthrow of capitalist
structures. As we saw in chapters one and two, Mapuche-led political organizations
were caught up within these trends along with the indigenistas. By the late 1960s,
Lipschütz came to realize that indigenismo as a movement was failing to restore
rights, ancestral territories and cultural artifacts to indigenous peoples.428 His
biographer Berdichewsky described Lipschütz’s divergence from mainstream
indigenismo as follows:
Indigenismo in America, during more than half a century of life, from the 1920s to
the 1970s, was a progressive movement developed by socially advanced, nonindigenous populations that tried to resolve the ‘indigenous question.’ Lipschütz
understood the basic contradiction of the indigenista movement by the 1960s and
1970s. He was one of the first to make up his mind about it, as much on an
ideological level as in his vision of indigenous autonomy; he expressed the real
tendency and the historical and social practice of real indígenas.429

1937-1949
At the same time Alejandro Lipschütz was working to break into the field of
indigenismo and applied anthropology by publishing books and articles on
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indigenous questions, he was corresponding and collaborating with a host of
international researchers. Lipschütz’s insertion into a network of indigenistas
across the Americas would help to establish him as a leading indigenista, and
provide a Chilean perspective on indigenismo that was in some ways distinct from
the discourse in other national contexts. Lipschütz’s voice added variety to
indigenismo in Chile and provided it with a unique blend of characteristics that
drew from his own life experiences and an eclectic set of influences. What started as
a quest to illustrate the biological instability of race as an analytic category,
eventually grew to a broad view that the future of indigenous peoples would always
be dictated to them in postcolonial, imperialistic terms unless indigenous peoples
organized themselves to fight for independence or at least autonomy within the
context of national states contrived along a trajectory of European conquest and
domination.
In 1944, Lipschütz followed the well-received Indoamericanismo y Raza
India, which was more like an essay on racial myths than a complete treatment of
the racial questions pertaining to indigenous Americans, with a vastly expanded
second edition entitled El Indoamericanismo y el Problema Racial en las Américas.430
At more than 500 pages, the second edition added a broader review of existing
literature and tackled the question of African migration and racial mixture in the
Americas also. Taken together, those works in addition to his “day job,” earned
Lipschütz a reputation and respect among indigenistas across the Americas.
Throughout the 1940s, Lipschütz corresponded with important figures in the
Alejandro Lipschütz, El Indoamericanismo y el Problema Racial en las Américas, Santiago,
Chile: Editorial Nascimiento, 1944.
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indigenista movement, including Manuel Gamio and Juan Comas in Mexico, and John
Collier in the United States.
For the much-expanded second edition of Indoamericanismo, Lipschütz
collected eighty-three images, including charts, tables, microscopic slides and many
photographs of indigenous people and cultural artifacts. Some images were his own
productions, but many were gathered by writing to indigenistas in his expanding
network. For that purpose, the newly formed III was extremely useful to him. In July
of 1943, Lipschütz wrote to Manuel Gamio to request copies of photographs used in
III publications and for permission to reproduce them in his book. He also
mentioned that he was including a chapter on Africans in the Americas.431 Gamio
replied by sending original photographs for Lipschütz to reproduce and return, and
mentioned that he was eager to read the new chapter on Africans, indicating there
was great interest for that subject in Mexico.432 Gamio shared Lipschütz’s request
with his colleague Juan Comas, who in turn sent it to another colleague, Professor
Pablo Martínez del Rio. Comas then wrote to Lipschütz to share with him a
reference to a French work on racial categories and two bibliographic summaries
that might be useful.433 Lipschütz concluded the exchange by sending a thank you
note to Comas, Gamio and their colleagues at the III expressing his appreciation for
their assistance and mentioning that he would be sure to cite the photographs to the
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fledgling III journal América Indígena, in which they had originally been
published.434
In the early 1940s, Lipschütz’s indigenista network also extended to North
America, where he was in contact with John Collier, the Commissioner of the U. S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs. In August 1943 Lipschütz received a note from Collier’s
administrative assistant E. M. Izquierdo approving his request to reproduce
photographs from BIA publications in El Indoamericanismo. Izquierdo went on to
make suggestions about how to go about publishing an English translation of the
text, although he lamented that the BIA did not currently have funds for such an
endeavor. He did however request a copy of the Spanish version for the BIA library
once it was published.435 Later, after Collier retired as the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs in 1945, he would continue trying to help Lipschütz get English translations
of his work published in the United States by reaching out to his contacts at
university presses, but ultimately those efforts were unsuccessful.436
When El Indoamericanismo was published, Lipschütz sent complimentary
copies to scholars across the globe, which functioned as a way to continue building
his professional indigenista network. In December of 1944 John Collier wrote to
Lipschütz congratulating him on the publication of El Indoamericanismo and
thanking him for sharing a copy of a radio address that Lipschütz had made about
the book. He went on to affirm the interdependence of their work by stating his
Alejandro Lipschütz to III, Aug. 24, 1943. CAL, Caja 6370.
John Collier to Alejandro Lipschütz, Aug. 9, 1943. CAL, Caja 6370.
436 Correspondence between John Collier and Alejandro Lipschütz, 1956-1959. CAL, Caja
6373. Most notably, in 1956 following Lipschütz’s publication of La comunidad indígena en
América y en Chile, Collier wrote letters to various university publishers in the U.S. in the
attempt to get that work translated and circulated in the North American academy.
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agreement that indigenous peoples have something important to offer their
respective national communities in the form of their culture, and that national
progress in many countries depended on the progress of their indigenous
populations. The two indigenistas shared an optimism that the future would bring
such progress, and held the mutual view that “trying to help the Indians to help
themselves and to exercise their rights and discharge their obligations of
conscientious citizenship” was the way to pursue that progress.437
While Lipschütz, Collier, Gamio and Comas endeavored to build a
transnational network of scholarly inquiry around subjects pertaining to indigenous
peoples in the Americas, in the mid-1940s that network was relatively small and
fragile and suffered from the isolation produced by long distances, language barriers
and the difficulty of procuring information published in other national contexts. In
the fall of 1944 Lipschütz sent a copy of El Indoamericanismo to Melville Herskovits,
the influential anthropologist at Northwestern University who helped establish
African and African-American studies in the North American academy. In his reply,
Herskovits lamented that “more of the work of the late Professor Franz Boas and the
late Professor T. Wingate Todd was not available to you.” Herskovits also arranged
for several of his own publications to be sent to Lipschütz for his future reference on
questions pertaining to “the problem of the origins of New World Negroes.”438
In November, Lipschütz wrote back, thanking Herskovits for the texts, but
also providing insight into his own view on the significance of the work.
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I was also very interested in reading your brilliant article on Native SelfGovernment published in Foreign Affairs. I fully agree with your standpoint but I
have not the necessary optimism as resumed [sic] in your words of “sufficient good
will.” The point is that this good will is lacking on the part of whites in Africa and
elsewhere where colored people served for the purpose of making money by the
white. The only way to come out from the difficulties is dropping the capitalistic
system as it has been done in the U.S.S.R where the problems of mutual relations
between white and colored have been settled definitively. And it is surprising that
this was done happily without sacrificing those advantages which are due to the
incorporation of formerly independent territories into the economy of the
Empire.439

Already in 1944 Lipschütz was developing his view that self-government was to be
the ultimate goal to which indigenismo should be applied. Furthermore, he
expressed his lack of confidence in the ability to achieve that through reform of
capitalistic and imperial politico-economic structures. Instead, the liberation of the
Indian in the Americas was tied to socialist revolution in his view, just as it had been
for blacks in Africa and the Soviet Union.
Although Lipschütz held firm convictions about the future of indigenous
peoples and their liberation from capitalist and imperialist forces, he maintained
cordial friendships with indigenistas across the ideological spectrum. In January
1946 he received a long letter from Doris Stone, the daughter of Samuel Zemurray,
who was popularly known as “Sam the Banana Man.” In 1946 Stone was living and
working in Costa Rica where her husband Roger Stone had business interests in a
large coffee plantation. She wrote Lipschütz about her plans to build reservations
for Indians “not to keep these people like monkies [sic] in a zoo, but to educate them
to become useful citizens.” She was petitioning the ruling junta for money to create
schools for Indians who could be trained as teachers and return to their people to
educate them to work for progress and protections from non-indigenous colonists
439
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who were moving into their territory as a new highway was being completed.440
Stone’s project was similar in orientation to indigenista efforts in Mexico to create
indigenous boarding schools. She was trained as an ethnographer and later became
the Director of the National Museum of Costa Rica. Her friendship with Lipschütz
and his wife Marguerite illustrates the flexibility of indigenismo as an ideal.
Lipschütz, an ardent communist who was ultimately working for the liberation of
indígenas from the clutches of capitalistic imperialism, maintained a friendship with
the daughter of Samuel Zemurray, chairman of the United Fruit Company who
orchestrated several coups in Central America to oust or establish dictators in
service of his neo-colonial corporation. Zemurray infamously pushed the CIA to
intervene in the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala in 1954, thus bringing to
an end the most promising socialist experiment in Latin America at the time.
If Indoamericanismo y Raza India represented Lipschütz’s theoretical jump
into indigenismo in the late 1930s, the interdisciplinary field research he supervised
in Tierra del Fuego in 1946 constituted a more praxis-oriented transition in which
he established himself as an applied anthropologist. In the process, he earned
credibility as a field researcher with indigenistas abroad, and continued to expand
and solidify his network. Having previously consulted on biological studies of
Mapuche in south-central Chile, in 1945 Lipschütz assembled a team of researchers
to gather a broad range of data about the Ona, Yamana and Alakaluf cultures of the
extreme southern reaches of Chile and Argentina – peoples collectively referred to
as “Fuegians.” The mission’s two primary goals were to collect information on
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physical characteristics that would be useful to the National Health Service and
cultural practices that would benefit the Chilean Museum of Natural History.
Accordingly, Lipschütz asked Grete Mostny, Director of the National Museum of
Natural History, to join the mission. But as the mission also sought to contribute to a
broader transnational debate about the racial origins and cultural adaptations of
indigenous Fuegians, Lipschütz built an international team of researchers and drew
support from a host of Chilean institutional sponsors. The Misión Científica Chilena
para el Estudio del Indio Fueguino (Chilean Scientific Mission for the Study of
Fuegian Indians) included Chilean Army General Ramón Cañas Montalva and foreign
scholars like Ecuadoran anthropologist Antonio Santiana, French anthropologist
Louis Robin, and German photographer and ethnographic filmmaker Hans
Helfritz.441 For Lipschütz, the expedition resulted in two inter-related outcomes.
When Antonio Santiana abruptly left the mission in the field and later claimed that
his research findings had been stolen by the team, Lipschütz found himself
embroiled in the second rather messy and public controversy of his career.442 At the
same time, the broad publication and dissemination of the mission’s findings
through journal articles, conference presentations, the highly collaborative nature of
the mission itself and publication of the group’s collected works in a volume entitled
Cuatro Conferencias sobre los Indios Fueguinos helped Lipschütz continue to grow his
network of professional indigenista contacts.

MacMillan, pp. 130-131.
For a fuller discussion of the Lipschütz-Santiana controversy, see MacMillan chapter 3.
The previous controversy, his highly publicized lawsuit and subsequent firing from the
University of Concepción in 1936, stemmed from a contract dispute.
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While still in the field on the Fuegian expedition in March of 1946, Lipschütz
wrote to Manuel Gamio as Director of the III from Punta Arenas. He sent Gamio
information about the expedition for publication in Boletín Indigenista.443 Later that
month Gamio replied to inform Lipschütz he would gladly publish the information,
and took the opportunity to express an appreciation for Lipschütz’s varied work and
tireless efforts. “I admire the intensity and variety of your activities, because as I see,
after your trip to Tierra del Fuego, you will give lectures in England about hormones
in relation to their cancer-fighting properties. I would be glad to know the secret of
your eternal youth that keeps you first in line among the hardest-working
researchers on the continent.”444
While in England lecturing on his biological research, Lipschütz also gave an
interview to the BBC about his recent work in Tierra del Fuego, which included a
hypothesis that he and his team constructed to explain the historical decrease in the
population of indigenous Fuegians. They had heard stories about professional
Indian hunters who were paid by the head for the number of Indians they killed.
Coincidentally, Dr. H.M. Stanley Turner, a medical doctor, President of the British
Medical Association and also a Wing Commander in the R.A.F, heard Lipschütz’s
radio address and wrote him a letter about a story he heard while stationed in the
Falkland Islands between 1909-1915. In their exchange of letters, Turner explained
that those hunters were sold obsolete Martini-Henry rifles from the British Army in
the Falklands with the understanding they would be used to kill Indians, and the
two men tried to reconstruct figures about how many Indians the hunters may have
443
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killed.445 In other correspondence, Turner suggested (from his own expertise in
medicine) that studying the Rh factor could aid in mapping blood characteristics
among indigenous peoples.446 In this way Lipschütz’s travels and public profile as a
researcher in experimental medicine contributed to his work, reputation and
transnational network as an indigenista.447
Following his trip to England in 1947, Lipschütz traveled to the United States
where he gave medical lectures in St. Louis and also visited Washington D.C. In the
capital, Lipschütz met with T.D. Stewart, then editor of The American Journal of
Physical Anthropology who later went on to become the Director of the Smithsonian
Museum of Natural History. In an exchange of letters with Stewart following his
visit, Lipschütz recounted the remainder of his trip, in which he toured Mayan
remains throughout Central America and met with indigenistas in several
countries.448 Stewart was also in contact with Grete Mostny and Fidel Jeldes, with
whom he was working to publish some of their work from the Fuegian expedition in
the Journal of Physical Anthropology.449 Lipschütz’s travel and connections were not
only an asset to his own publications, but also those with whom he collaborated.
Upon his return to Chile, Lipschütz set to work preparing for the second
Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, which was to be held in Cuzco, Peru in
October of 1948. While Chile had sent a delegation to the 1940 Patzcuaro Congress,
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the government had not officially complied with any of the accords that came out of
that conference. Indeed, much of the work of the III was put on hold across the
Americas after Patzcuaro, as World War II stole the attention of most of the world’s
governments, especially shifting the focus of the United States away from domestic
Indian affairs. Lipschütz had not attended the Patzcuaro Congress, but as his
thought and work turned increasingly toward indigenista issues in the 1940s, he
became more involved with the III. He began corresponding more with indigenistas
through the III network and gradually began championing indigenista causes in
Chile. As the preparations for the Cuzco summit unfolded in 1948, Lipschütz
planned to attend as a member of the Chilean delegation, representing the
University of Chile and the Chilean Museum of Natural History. He was to be named
the technical secretary, official spokesperson for Chile and the president of the
anthropology section of the conference.450
In May of 1948, Manuel Gamio wrote Lipschütz to request that he gather
information about what measures had been taken in Chile to comply with the
resolutions passed at the 1940 Patzcuaro Congres.451 So in the summer of 1948,
Lipschütz began writing letters to functionaries across Chile to collect and
disseminate information on behalf of the III. Between June 21st and August 5th 1948,
Lipschütz wrote at least twenty letters requesting that people supply information so
he could report to the III what had been done in Chile since the 1940 Patzcuaro
Congress. He acknowledged that there was not yet a central office affiliated with the
III in Chile, so he was circulating the request personally to interested researchers.
450
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Following a standard introduction explaining his request, Lipschütz included the
relevant parts of the resolutions passed at Patzcuaro pertaining to the expertise of
his request’s recipient. Of the twenty requests recorded in Lipschütz’s personal
papers, five are accompanied by responses. Taken together they illustrate the
indifference of many sectors of Chilean society toward indigenous concerns and the
difficulty of organizing efforts on behalf of Chilean indígenas.452
From the School of Public Health at the University of Chile, Lipschütz
received a reply that they had no information to address his request.453 Although the
Director of the Institute of Criminology replied that he could not directly answer
Lipschütz’s questions, he referred him to Fidel Jeldes, the anthropologist working at
the Institute who had been part of Lipschütz’s recent Fuegian expedition. Jeldes had
also written a short work entitled “Some Considerations on Criminality among the
Araucanians,” which he enclosed for Lipschütz to read.454 Doctor Ernesto Herzog,
Director of the Institute of Pathology at the University of Concepción and a former
colleague of Lipschütz, wrote that he had previously heard nothing about the 1940
Congress nor the resolutions passed in Patzcuaro. He claimed that no one in
Concepción outside of their few mutual acquaintances was working on indigenous
issues.455 Professor Eugenio Pereira Salas of the Institute for Musical Research in the
School of Fine Arts at the University of Chile wrote that his Institute “had complied,
from a certain point of view,” with the resolutions passed at Patzcuaro by building
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an archive of Araucanian music and sharing that music publicly.456 However, the
implication in all four of those responses is that if any work was undertaken that
complied with the resolutions passed at Patzcuaro it was not an issue of compliance,
only because it was otherwise a relevant part of their work.
The most thorough reply that Lipschütz received from his many inquiries
was from Father Juan de Forchheim, the Catholic Church’s Dean of Humanities and
Director General of Primary Schools in Araucanía. Forchheim wrote that he was a
subscriber to the III publications Boletín Indigenista and América Indígena, and had
recently received an invitation to the Second International Conference in Cuzco. He
claimed to have written a paper that he sent to the Patzcuaro Conference, which was
read there by Venancio Coñuepán. Regarding the effects of the resolutions passed at
Patzcuaro in Chile, Forchheim had seen little effect on public opinion. In and around
Temuco, there was a “suicide belt” of neglect and economic and agricultural
stagnation.457 The reinvigorated activism of Mapuche organizations like the Unión
Araucana and the propaganda that periodically flared up to support the
development of new schools in the region, particularly the stories printed and
circulated by teachers who had come to the region to teach Mapuche children,
represented bright spots in his view.458
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Regarding research into indigenous languages, Forchheim wrote that no new
work on Mapudungun had been conducted since that of Rodolfo Lenz, Félix de
Augusta & Ernesto Moesbach in the late nineteenth century. Regarding education
more broadly, in his view the state still had not adopted a meaningful or adequate
program for educating Indians. Those working in various missionary efforts,
including two indigenous priests and many Mapuche teachers, had filled the gap.
Forchheim wrote that “the majority of the recommendations (Article 36, on
Indigenous Education) always figure into our educational ideals, as made clear by
the number of ‘friends of the school’ dating back to before the first Congreso
Indigenista.” There did exist many vocational schools, which offered training in
“home economics” and agricultural skills. But they did not have enough
opportunities for talented students to enter secondary schools to get training in
humanistic education needed to become leaders who might then help their fellow
Mapuche regain political rights, he wrote.459 That criticism had been levied against
Guido Beck’s mission schools since the early 1930s, so it is interesting to see it
brought up in twenty years later by an educational leader within the same system of
schools.
Referring to more technical concerns, Forchheim mentioned they were
struggling to build schools with sufficient heat, light and water and which were
located close to indigenous communities. However, they suffered from lack of
material support, especially as it pertained to the health and well being of students.
Many schools had a health office in name, but few had a doctor that regularly
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serviced patients. Some material support was being provided in the form of free
breakfast distributed to students in 168 schools, but little to no remuneration was
coming from municipalities or the state. In short, not enough support was coming
from the state to aid schools in complying with the III’s recommendations. In
Forcheim’s view, efforts to benefit Indians in Chile needed the legitimacy of an
official organization and support from the state to carry out the suggestions of the
III. As to whether or not any progress had been made in the Camara de Diputados,
he suggested asking Coñuepán directly.460
Many of the problems identified by Forchheim could conceivably have been
addressed if a national indigenista institute existed within Chile. According to
Berdichewsky, “when the Organization of American States created the Instituto
Indigenista Interamericano, it was Lipschütz who was prepared to implement the
program in Chile.”461 However, in 1940 Lipschütz lacked a committed group of
indigenista counterparts in Chile to collaborate on the founding of a national
indigenista institute. In the end, the Cuzco congress was delayed again and did not
take place until 1949, and Guido Beck stood in for Lipschütz as president of the
Chilean delegation.462 But later that year, Lipschütz and others came together to
establish the Instituto Indigenista Chileno, which was “set up as a private
organization on September 1, 1949.” And while, “it is hoped that in due course it will
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become an official agency,” the organization received no funding from the state and
had no formal role in setting indigenous policy in Chile.463
However, the diverse group of members that made up the IIC did come
together to advocate for a more formal role in setting indigenous policy in Chile.
After 1949, the IIC made an official declaration to oppose plans to develop areas
around Temuco and settle German and Italian colonists there, in response to those
critics who advanced the idea as a way to solve the “suicide belt” problem. They
used Mapuche status as citizens with the same rights as white Chileans to oppose
the government’s plan, and wrote that if the goal was to increase agricultural
production state banks should invest in improving Mapuche cultivation of the land
rather than push them out and replace them with other people. To make this
argument the IIC referenced the 1813 Chilean constitution, the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act in the United States and a July 1947 executive order signed by
President Gabriel González Videla that condemned usury and other abuses carried
out against Mapuche landowners. The latter, they argued, specifically contradicted
the proposal then under consideration by the government. Finally, they requested a
more formal role for the IIC by asking for official recognition by the state, in keeping
with the conventions of the III. Although the IIC wanted that recognition, they
simultaneously wanted autonomy and to be consulted before any modifications to
indigenous laws were passed. This document was signed by a host of functionaries
within Chilean society, including anthropologists like Lipschütz and Grete Mostny,
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but also judges, public health officials, former army generals, a supreme court judge,
a UN delegate and Mapuche representatives.464

1950-1961
In March of 1947, Presidential Decree No. 987 had established a commission
to study the possibility of reforming laws pertaining to indigenous peoples in
Chile.465 The study they produced addressed themes like the organization and
function of the Juzgados de Indios, protection of indigenous rights and organization
of property, needs for indigenous education and rural development, and finally the
creation of a department of indigenous affairs located within the Ministry of Land
and Colonization. In order to carry out those reforms, the commission
recommended revising the Ley Indígena 4.111 of 1931 and following the
international accords of the III established at the Patzcuaro and Cuzco conferences.
Those included creating a national indigenous institute to be funded by the state and
granted official powers.466 While the IIC remained a private organization, the
Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas that would be created in 1953 by presidential
decree could be viewed as partially the result of this project.467 Ley 4.111 would not
be revised until 1961, but DASIN was given broad powers to interpret and
implement the law by controlling the courts and their employees as dependent
branches of the Ministry of Land and Colonization.
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Although Lipschütz was not officially named to the commission, he consulted
on the project. In March 1950, Minister of Land and Colonization Ingnacio Palma
reached out to Lipschütz to ask for his advice. “Having considered the problem in
the south, I think that some form of restoration of traditional indigenous institutions
will be necessary to consider in the new law,” Palma wrote.468 Lipschütz replied that
he would be glad to meet with the Minister for such a conversation, and also that he
had been following the project through the IIC, which had been brought into the
conversation by Javier Fermandois, as Director General of the Ministry and the vice
president of the commission.469 Palma personally invited Lipschütz to attend a
meeting with employees of the Ministry in Temuco in August 1950.470 He later
wrote to thank Lipschütz for sending him a copy of his recent book on the Fuegians
and mentioned that he had studied with anthropologist Martín Gusinde for three
years as a secondary student, and was grateful for the wealth of scientific data that
Lipschütz’s work had brought to the subject.471 Lipschütz also advocated on behalf
of the IIC with other government officials in this period, for example addressing the
Minister of Education to request that the position of Inspector of Indigenous
Education in Temuco be filled through the appointment of an indigenous teacher.472
Also in 1950, Lipschütz and Mostny collected several of the most significant
lectures and papers they and others had given on the Tierra del Fuego mission and
published them in a volume entitled Cuatro Conferencias sobre los Indios
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Fueguinos.473 They noted in a foreword that Santiana had published findings
separately, but those were not included in the text.474 While they both attempted to
support the publication of other manuscripts, the most significant achievement of
the Fuegian research mission was that it established Lipschütz as a bona fide
indigenista on a transnational scale.475 By the early 1950s North American
anthropologists began to take interest in studying the Mapuche, and naturally they
looked to Lipschütz for guidance and assistance in coordinating and conducting field
research. One such researcher was Louis C. Faron, an anthropologist trained by
Julian Steward at Columbia University.
Lipschütz helped Faron make contact with Mapuche scholars and subjects,
and they continued to exchange letters while Faron was conducting field research.
In January 1953, he wrote to Lipschütz updating him on progress, and thanking him
for putting him in touch with Domingo Curaqueo, a Mapuche professor at the
University of Chile, who then wrote “to his friend Victor Painemal, who in turn put
me in touch with Martín Alonqueo.”476 Faron and his wife lived with members of the
Alonqueo family while studying Mapuche kinship and agricultural production in
1953. Faron reached out a second time to ask Lipschütz to speak to Curaqueo and
Alejandro Lipschütz and Grete Mostny, Cuatro conferencias sobre los indios Fueginos,
Santiago, Chile: Revista Geographica de Chile, 1950.
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ask him to put Faron in contact with Mapuche farmers in Lonquimay, as he sought
to expand his research to include a second field site.477 Finally, Faron wrote also to
ask Lipschütz to write him a letter of introduction to his contacts in Tierra del
Fuego, as he hoped to follow up on several of Grete Mostny’s lines of inquiry among
the indigenous Fueginos.478
In the early 1950s, Lipschütz also began interacting with Mapuche
organizations more directly. While he continued to exchange ideas and friendly
correspondence through the indigenista network, and also publish books on
indigenista themes, this reorientation of his activities had an impact on his work. By
the 1950s, Mapuche organizations had achieved greater political significance
through the rise of the Corporación Araucana, the election of several more Mapuche
deputies to the lower house of the legislature, and Carlos Ibañez del Campo’s
appointment of Coñuepán to establish and direct DASIN within the Ministry of Land
and Colonization. For his part, Lipschütz would continue to write, publish and
interact through the indigenista network. He would also increasingly engage
Mapuche political organizations within Chile, but his leftist political views would
limit his interaction with “official” indigenous policy and representatives as more
moderate Mapuche politicians and activists were aligned with the Ibañez
government.
Lipschütz had always used his many personal connections with Mapuche
individuals to support their own self-advocacy through training and mentorship. In
a letter from Domingo Tripailaf in July of 1951, Tripailaf thanked Lipschütz for
477
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sending him a book, but also for his long and tireless work on behalf of his people.
He referred to Lipschütz as inspiring, which illustrates Lipschütz’s goal of
empowering Mapuche to better their own social, economic and political situation.479
As the 1950s wore on and Mapuche organizations began to formalize their activities,
Lipschütz was invited to attend and participate in a number of meetings convened
by Mapuche organizations. Martín Painemal and Juan Llanquinao requested his
presence at the first National Mapuche Congress in December of 1953, to be held in
Temuco. Continuing the theme of combining indigenista work with his career as a
doctor and biologist, Lipschütz was scheduled to attend a medical conference on the
same day, but was able to participate in both events. In an attempt to make
participation in the congress as broad as possible, it was called to order without
distinction to the political or religious agendas of the participants, rallying around
the cause of studying and solving problems faced by Mapuche broadly. Those
included the loss of land, rising prices and falling yields of agricultural products,
inadequate educational facilities for Mapuche youth and the difficulty of passing
language, culture and traditions to the next generation. The list of Mapuche
organizations fighting this onslaught included the Corporación Araucana, Unión
Araucana, an urban organization based in Santiago called the “Unión Araucano
Sociedad Galvarino” and others.480
Through his work with Mapuche organizations, Lipschütz realized that the
various problems they were trying to solve all in some way or another threatened
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the stability of their communities. Those organizations began thinking and talking
about “community” as an analytic framework within which to grapple with those
challenges. In October of 1955, Galvarino and the IIC jointly hosted a forum on
community, and the Galvarino leadership personally invited Lipschütz to attend.481
Lipschütz replied that he was unfortunately confined to bed for a few days and so
would not be able to make it. However, he did provide a letter in which he shared
his thoughts on the topic. Lipschütz asserted the importance of the agricultural
community as a defense against the “proletarianization” of the Mapuche. He
disputed the notion that legal protections preventing the sale of property deprived
Mapuche of their rights, and equated that to the argument that holding a mortgage
deprives one of the right to sell their land and keep the profits. Instead, he argued
that Mapuche should borrow funds for the purchase of more land from a special
fund created by the state if one wished to buy a parcel and move away from the
community. “You have to develop the community, you have to improve it, but not
liquidate it.” 482
The forum drew a crowd of more than 200 people and passed a series of
resolutions that expressed their positions on a variety of topics that could help
defend Mapuche communities from the loss of land, while at the same time improve
living conditions for comuneros. They began with a statement justifying the
preservation of Mapuche communities in accordance with the títulos de merced that
created them. Preserving and improving laws that protected communities, while
speaking out against legislative efforts intended to include indígenas under common
481
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Chilean law, would further that project, they argued. They also advocated for state
efforts to support education in the communities, found post offices, hospitals and
pharmacies, and lend money for land improvements. Finally, the accords were to be
presented to public officials and journalists were asked to print and distribute
them.483
Prompted by the ideas circulated at the forum, Lipschütz published La
Comunidad Indígena en América y en Chile in 1956. The book brought together many
themes that Lipschütz had treated before, but put them to work in service of
preserving indigenous communities. In the preface, he described the project as
follows:
The present volume owes its origin to circumstantial causes. The “Unión Araucana
[Sociedad] Galvarino” and the “Corporación Araucana” extended me an invitation to
summarize, in a lecture, my ideas about indigenous community in Chile. This was a
very gracious invitation, because with it the directors of the societies, who look after
the interests of the indigenous people of Chile, have asked me to use my scientific
objectivity to make them aware of concepts that on several occasions before I had
applied to the vast problems of indigenous peoples across the Americas.484

The collaboration Lipschütz described indicates that the agency of the indígena and
the indigenista were working together to understand a complex set of problems and
try to solve them. The instance provides an example that connects significant
Mapuche leaders and organizations directly to the IIC and Lipschütz personally. His
subsequent correspondence with Mapuche leaders and indigenistas outside of Chile
connected the Mapuche movement to the broader transnational indigenista
movement.
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As he was compiling La Comunidad, Lipschütz wrote to Coñuepán at DASIN
to request verification of statistics on indigenous land ownership in Chile.485 He was
trying to track down discrepancies between figures he had received from Louis
Faron and some recently presented in the Cámara de Diputados. Treating that
subject in the book, Lipschütz claimed that within a two-year period in the early
1950s, the subdivision of Mapuche land prompted 29 percent of divided land to be
sold or otherwise lost by Mapuche communities.486 Refuting the claims of those
advocating subdivision of indigenous land that individual property rights would
encourage investment and more efficient exploitation of agricultural land to benefit
Mapuche smallholders, Lipschütz asked, “What then is the real reason of the steps
being taken to ‘liquidate’ the indigenous community in Chile?”487 In writing La
Comunidad, Lipschütz also had the opportunity to correspond with Mapuche
Diputado José Cayupi. In June of 1956, he wrote Cayupi to congratulate him on a
recent speech in the Cámara and thank him for loaning Lipschütz some documents
that he used in writing the book.488 While Lipschütz collaborated extensively with
other indigenista scholars in the Fuegian project, La Comunidad involved more
collaboration with Mapuche leaders and organizations.
The publication of La Comunidad also stimulated further dialogue with
indigenistas in Mexico and North America. Manuel Gamio wrote Lipschütz twice in
1956 to ask him to contribute an article on indigenous community for publication in
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América Indígena.489 Lipschütz sent a copy of the La Comunidad manuscript to
Alfonso Caso, who at the time was serving as Director of the Instituto Nacional
Indigenista in Mexico, and asked him to write a prologue for the book.490 The
publication of La Comunidad also brought renewed correspondence with a host of
North American scholars, including Faron, Herskovits and Robert Redfield.491 That
dialogue accomplished several things for Lipschütz and his indigenista work. On one
hand his cordial relationship with John Collier led the latter to make numerous
attempts to get La Comunidad translated and published by various North American
university presses.492 At the same time it engendered a dialogue that compared
Indian policy in the United States with legal reforms in Chile. The writing,
publication and distribution of La Comunidad perhaps represents the most concrete
example of Mapuche organizations and activism directly contributing to
indigenismo as a formal, transnational intellectual debate.
After 1950, winds of change were altering the political landscape across the
globe. Internationally, the expansion of the Cold War caused the United States to
change both its Indian policy within the country, and also the nature of its
engagement with Latin American states. In a 1956 letter to Lipschütz, John Collier
wrote, “I resigned as Indian Commissioner in 1945, to engage in international work.
However, it is a fact that the policies I had worked for were continued until 1950,
when the whole movement of national policy was thrown into reverse.” Collier
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continued, “The Democratic Party’s platform this year, on Indians, has adopted
completely the Indian’s own program and stated it with lucidity and brevity.”493
Lipschütz replied:
“I was especially interested to hear that the Indians own program has been adopted
by the Democratic Party. Let us hope that this program will become a reality. Quite
recently I had lunch with the leaders of the Araucanians. The Araucanian members
of the Chamber of Deputies informed me that they were successful in the Program
Committee: the Committee refused to bring before the Chamber the project of a law
abolishing protection of Indian land property. Unfortunately the Indians are
politically very divided.”494

The following year, Lipschütz updated Collier on the situation in Chile. “You may be
interested to know that local groups are again working hard to obtain derogation of
all the laws of protection of Indian (land) tenure including the law by which our
Indian office (DASIN) has been created. Let us hope that they will not succeed.”495
Collier replied:
“…the Indian situation in the USA is paradoxical, if not desperate, i.e., the
expenditure on Indians has increased fourfold in three or four years and the
fundamental benefits to Indians have not increased at all; while the onslaught
against Indian properties, goes on unabated. I note your information as to the
continuing attack against the Indian community in Chile.”496

Later, in 1959, Collier reported:
“Concerning USA Indians, I can report that within the last two years, approximately,
the Interior Department has moved away from its atomizing policies of the years
since 1950, and approximately into the philosophy of the Indian Reorganization Act.
For how long this good report may continue to be made, I can’t guess; you, better
than almost anyone else, know in history and in the present what sort of struggle
the Indian community has to wage, usually alone and unhelped.”497
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Lipschütz and Collier thus shared the frustrations and uncertainties involved in
navigating the ever-shifting sands of national indigenous policies. In one another
they found academic support and also intellectual inspiration.
In Chile, although efforts to bring Mapuche organizations together across
political and ideological spectra continued throughout the 1950s, those efforts were
often frustrated by the ambitions of individuals and infighting between
organizations. The IIC sometimes found itself dragged into those disputes. In June of
1959, Juan Huaiquimil and Armando Huarapil, president and secretary of Galvarino
respectively, wrote a letter to the president of the IIC to oppose a forum organized
by the Corporación Araucana because it was not opened to the public. Due to recent
unfavorable results in the Juzgado de Indios in Temuco, they claimed it would only
serve to fracture Mapuche solidarity due to frustration with the Corporación’s
leaders. They further claimed that someone within the Corporación had been
claiming to represent the opinions of Galvarino, an act they considered
“subterfuge.”498 In October of 1960, a large gathering of Mapuche convened to
discuss education, indigenous laws, the Juzgados de Indios and relations with the III.
Illustrating divides within the Mapuche movement, attendees called for Coñuepán’s
dismissal as Director of DASIN, under the rationale that he was not adequately doing
his job and was currently running for office again. They also repeated the request
that the state send official representation to the III in Mexico City.499 Again in 1961,
the leaders of Galvarino invited members of the IIC to attend a public meeting to
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discuss the leadership of DASIN, among other things.500 But by the early 1960s, the
attention of Mapuche organizations and indigenistas again returned to stave off
efforts to change the Ley Indígena that would make it easier for Mapuche communal
land to be subdivided and sold. This time, the push came from President Jorge
Alessandri, who had been elected in 1958. The 1961 reform of the Ley Indígena
would also serve as a bridge to broader agrarian reform efforts later championed by
President Eduardo Frei Montalva after his election in 1964.

1961-1973
Following the 1958 national elections in which Mapuche politicians were
swept from office, grassroots Mapuche organizations began to shift leftward along
the political spectrum. As the 1960s unfolded, the weight of influence held by
Mapuche organizations shifted toward those that aligned not with conservative
politicians like Ibañez del Campo or his successor Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964).
Rather, left-leaning Mapuche organizations ultimately became an important pillar of
support for Salvador Allende in his unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1964, and
later the 1970 electoral victory of his leftist Popular Unity coalition government.501
Meanwhile, Lipschütz continued to engage with Mapuche organizations and the
transnational indigenista network. In doing so he stayed abreast of the themes of
the era, grappling with questions of agrarian reform and the relationship between
indigenismo and socialist revolution. He stayed true to his principles, including
broad support for socialism but also the preservation of indigenous communities.
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He resisted the temptation to incorporate indigenous peoples into broader class
struggles in ways that would threaten their cultural preservation or ability to seek
political autonomy. But the most significant shift for Lipschütz was that in this
period he more directly engaged the state to advocate for indigenous protections. As
leftist political forces ultimately came to control the state by the end of the decade,
national politics in Chile finally came into alignment with Lipschütz’s own views and
values.
In 1960, legislators proposed changes to the Ley Indígena 4.111, which
accompanied a broader effort to pass a package of agrarian reform measures that
would benefit Mapuche and non-Mapuche Chilean peasants alike. The original
purpose of the project was to reform the way the Juzgados de Indios functioned to
settle indigenous land disputes and sell or divide community lands. However, in the
course of their work, the commission decided that a completely new and revamped
Ley Indígena was needed.502 The legislation that resulted mostly dealt with land
issues, although discussions that arose subsequently raised other indigenous
concerns. Most significantly, the Ley Indígena 14.511 of 1961 established the
Juzgados de Letras de Indios (Indian Civil Courts) to deal with land and title issues. It
did establish some protections against selling and dividing community land by
creating a fifteen-year moratorium or waiting period for sales, but that nevertheless
opened the door to the dissolution of community lands more than had been
previously possible. The Ley Indígena 14.511 also established more detailed
procedures for settling land disputes, recording sales or transfers of title, and

502

Boletín No. 19.186, Commission to Reform Ley Indígena. CAL, Caja 6357.

214
procedures for the state to expropriate land from indígenas or assign state land to
indigenous communities through the Juzgados de Letras. Most of these mechanisms
were thought necessary and relevant in the early 1960s as the Chilean state
embarked on a broader program of agrarian reform. Finally, the Ley 14.511 also
created regional banks as dependencies of the Banco del Estado to loan money to
indigenous communities and individuals.503
Mapuche organizations, indigenistas and others rallied to oppose those
changes and identify the many and various ways they would impact Mapuche
peasants. In August of 1960 the President of the Corporación Araucana in Santiago
Lorenzo Lemunguier penned a long letter to President Alessandri to oppose the new
Ley Indígena on the grounds that it would make the subdivision of Mapuche
community land easier. He argued that as a general rule, the elimination of
indigenous communities would have broader negative consequences for Chilean
society, and that instead the government should provide more technical and
material support to help Mapuche increase the agricultural productivity of their
land. He asked the government to postpone action on the new law so that Mapuche
organizations would have more time to propose alternatives that would prevent the
inevitable loss of land.504 By December of 1960, six major Mapuche organizations
(including Galvarino, Corporación Araucana and Movimiento de Unificación
Araucana) came together with the IIC to jointly request that the ratification of Ley
14.511 be delayed to give them more time to study and prepare a response. They
complained that the proposed changes were causing a panic among the indigenous
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population of the south and that indígenas across the country were universally
opposed to the law because it made it easier to divide community lands, allowing a
minority of the community to decide the fate of the whole group. In crafting their
opposition to the law the authors cited Federal Indian Laws in the United States,
which established tribal lands as inalienable in 1934, although they ignored the
“termination” policies of the post-War period.505 Despite widespread Mapuche
opposition, the Ley Indígena 14.511 was passed on January 3rd, 1961. In May 1961
Galvarino organized a public meeting to discuss the new law and other issues. In a
letter addressed to the “President and members of the National Indigenista
Institute,” the leaders of Galvarino invited the IIC to attend a large public rally where
themes like the leadership of DASIN, the reform of the Ley Indígena 4.111 and the
defense of Mapuche language, culture and folklore would be discussed.506
Following the promulgation of Ley 14.511, DASIN was increasingly viewed as
an organ of the state, and one that was not particularly responsive to indigenous
concerns in the early 1960s. However, the office did carry out significant work in
coordinating or at least recording the efforts of various government agencies. In the
annual report recapping the work of 1963, DASIN chronicled efforts that spanned
the study and rectification of a variety of land issues, including legal disputes,
technical challenges and efforts to increase agricultural production. The office,
although situated as a dependency of the Ministry of Land and Colonization,
coordinated efforts with the Ministry of Education to improve indigenous education
and worked with the Ministry of the Treasury to absolve debt and extend credit to
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indigenous farmers. DASIN was also involved in coordinating relief efforts following
major earthquakes in 1960 and consulting on construction projects, including
hospitals. Much of their work had to do with the agrarian reform efforts, even
though the impact of agrarian reform on Mapuche communities was limited in the
early 1960s. DASIN also collaborated with agencies outside of Chile to benefit
Chilean indígenas, for example a program funded by the Mexican government to
revive the art of Mapuche silverwork and Rockefeller Foundation initiatives to
found schools in the south. Looking to the future, the 1963 report offered six
proposals for improving education for Mapuche, which included: creating new
primary schools, improving vocational training, serving breakfast and lunch to
students, providing grants for students to continue their studies after primary
school, offering adult education courses, and producing educational films for the
benefit of Mapuche and all Chileans.507
Although intimately involved in the creation of DASIN, neither Lipschütz nor
the IIC appear to have been consulted in the same way they were in the late 1940s
and early 1950s when the Ministry of Land and Colonization was getting DASIN off
the ground. But when asked, Lipschütz did offer his advice and professional
opinions, and when opposed to wrongheaded initiatives he spoke out vocally,
especially when they pertained to the subdivision of indigenous community land. In
March of 1962, he wrote to José Gonzáles, Secretary of the Socialist Party, to oppose
the proposition that indigenous land be incorporated into broader farming
cooperatives composed of Mapuche and non-Mapuche land and workers. He
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reiterated that indigenous interests could only be protected and served by
preserving the integrity of their communities through communal land ownership.
Lipschütz also took the opportunity to advocate for the creation of a National
Mapuche Council, led by Mapuche and elected by Mapuche, and functioning to
protect Mapuche material and cultural interests.508
As an indication of his influence across Latin America and particularly in
socialist circles, when Lipschütz celebrated his eightieth birthday in 1963, he was
awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Havana.509 Despite his age,
Lipschütz continued to write, publish and participate in the transnational
indigenista discourse. In fact, the 1960s and early 1970s were a particularly
productive time for his indigenista work. Following his retirement as Director of the
Institute for Experimental Medicine in 1962 he dedicated more time to writing,
publishing four books on indigenista themes between 1963 and 1974.510
Significantly, he also continued as an active member of the IIC and collaborated with
Mapuche leaders and organizations as they grappled with the questions of the day.
In 1964 he joined the Chilean delegation to the fifth Congreso Indigenista
Interamericano in Quito. There he presented on the themes of agrarian reform and
colonization as they pertained to indigenous populations, which coincided with the
start of a major push for agrarian reform under President Eduardo Frei Montalva.511
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Lipschütz’s status as a scientist gave him credibility in the eyes of Chilean
society and Mapuche actors, and that cachet extended beyond his formal scientific
training in biology. In June of 1960, members of the Movimiento de Unificación
Araucana (Araucanian Unification Movement) wrote to ask for his help in a court
case that was underway. In keeping with millenarian oral traditions, a machi in
Puerto Saavedra had sacrificed a child on the shore of the ocean and threw his
remains into the sea to calm its rage and prevent tsunamis. The authors of the letter
acknowledged that the act was profoundly disturbing and it offended the norms of
contemporary western civilization. However, they blamed the “cultural
backwardness” of the Indians who carried out the act, and in keeping with
indigenista philosophy argued that their culture needed to be brought gradually and
thoughtfully into alignment with the more current norms of the country. They also
acknowledged that in ancient times the forebears of western civilizations (Greeks
and Romans) had also practiced human sacrifice. They objected to the treatment of
the issue in the newspapers, which had sensationalized the events for profit and
exploited them for commercial gain. They sought a judicial interpretation of the law
that took into consideration the complicated history, social reality and cultural
legacy of the Mapuche in Chile. They wrote to Lipschütz to ask him to serve on a
commission that could interpret this act for the courts, in light of its ceremonial
significance and legitimacy from the perspective of indigenous medicine.512 The
request aligned quite specifically with much of his previous work, and the article
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that Lipschütz had published in the III’s Boletín Indigenista, which utilized a similar
defense in another murder trial.513
Lipschütz maintained active correspondence with North American academics
with whom he had shared interests and insights in the past, and also continued to
reach out to people whose work he respected but did not necessarily know
personally. In February, 1964 he wrote to Woodrow Borah, an anthropologist at the
University of California, Berkeley who studied peasants in Latin America. “Although
we have not been in correspondence, I have long read and made use of your work.
Your insight into the problems of rural poverty in Latin America, and the directness
with which you have cut through the entire mythology of indigenismo lighted my
path twelve years ago for an understanding of much of the problem.”514 Likewise,
his engagement with socialism and Marxist theory often set the tone for these
exchanges. In November 1965 he wrote to Leslie White, an important
anthropologist at the University of Michigan:
“My feeling is that progress of social or cultural anthropology is intimately
dependent on the spread of Marxian thought. Malinowski contributed to this
progress because his thought was greatly influenced by Marx, though personally he
was convinced that he was an anti-Marxist. It is the same with Kroeber…” 515

Although Lipschütz had held communist views since his early years in Europe, it
was not until the 1960s that socialism became a viable alternative in Chilean
national politics. Although some Mapuche leaders had flirted with the left in the
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1920s and early 1930s (notably Aburto and Huenchullán), the failure of the
Corporación’s more moderate position pushed the next generation of Mapuche
activists further to the left.
By the end of the decade, the tenor of public events had become more
radical and aggressive in their advocacy for change, and simultaneously more
legitimate within the academy. In November 1970, the Department of University
Extension of the University of Chile hosted a public forum entitled, “The Mapuche:
Second Class Citizens?” which featured participants from Mapuche organizations,
government agencies and university professors.516 Interestingly, those developed as
Mapuche began to enjoy increased access to some state services and more support
from indigenistas who had access to academic circles. This can be seen in the
program of a conference hosted jointly by the IIC and Galvarino, which included
remarks from IIC President Tomás Lago, Galvarino President Remigio Catrileo,
Mapuche Professor Domingo Curaqueo and a lecture by Lipschütz. The evening
concluded with a musical rendition by Lautaro Manquilef and his band.517 Cultural
appreciation and support for the preservation of Mapuche culture developed
alongside increasingly radical calls for change.
In addition to his work supporting Mapuche political organizations and
initiatives, Lipschütz used his influence and contacts to support Mapuche cultural
and artistic preservation. On Christmas Eve 1970, he and Marguerite addressed a
letter to the Director of DASIN to suggest that a collection of art by the Mapuche
painter Celia Leyton was a cultural treasure and should be preserved. In that
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request, they referenced the work of the Office of Indigenous Affairs in Mexico,
making a point that indígenas should be integrated into the nation-state in ways that
preserve their cultural practices and legacy. The Lipschützes requested that DASIN
provide or secure a place for the collection to be held, independent of the national
museums where the collection would be lost among so many other works, only to be
displayed infrequently. Ever optimistic, they proposed that the “future home of the
IIC” would eventually become a good permanent solution.518
While Lipschütz was supporting, training and collaborating with young
Mapuche students and activists, he also trained Chilean scholars, who carried on his
indigenista work. Bernardo Berdichewsky, who later wrote a biography of his
former teacher, and Cristián Vives, a sociologist working for the Corporación de la
Reforma Agraria (Corporation for Agrarian Reform), wrote a paper advising
Salvador Allende’s UP government to adopt an indigenista program to forestall the
processes of change in the Araucanía, specifically through agrarian reform. By
addressing the cultural distinctiveness of Mapuche populations and the long history
of racial discrimination as justification for such a program, they affirmed the
Mapuche right to self-determination and integration without assimilation. Within
the process of agrarian reform, they suggested provisions for communal land tenure
and proposed a series of other legal and administrative supports for Mapuche
communities, including improvements to the constitution and function of the
Juzgados de Indios, creation of a national indigenista institute supported by the
state and affiliated with the III, and support for existing Mapuche organizations.
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Other suggestions included hygiene and public health initiatives, promotion of
Mapuche folklore and folk art, bilingual education for Mapuche children and the
teaching of Mapudungun to Chilean children in non-Mapuche schools. In a two-page
appendix, Lipschütz lent his support to the proposals of Berdichewsky and Vives,
and significantly advocated for the creation of a Mapuche Council, to be elected by
Mapuches themselves and with an official status within the state.519 That final point,
although Lipschütz had held the conviction for some time, parallels broader
disillusionment with indigenista efforts across the Americas by the early 1970s.
Berdichewsky describes the decline of indigenismo commencing in the 1970s,
which corroborates similar assertions by Stephen Lewis and Laura Giraudo in Latin
American Perspectives. By that decade, indigenous leaders and their organizations
across the Americas were rising to eclipse the indigenista organizations that helped
them gain a footing in political struggles.520
Lipschütz had an ongoing tense relationship with the more conservative
institutions within Chile, in particular with the editorial board of El Mercurio, the
nation’s paper of record, but a conservative one. Writing to Eduardo Castro in 1971,
his editor at Editorial Universitaria, Lipschütz made suggestions as to how Castro
could most effectively promote Lipschütz’s recent book on Bonampak in Chile. He
suggested, “The most important (way) would be an article in El Mercurio, which
doesn’t like me because of my bad conduct in the treatment of social problems, and
especially indigenista ones.” Lipschütz went on to make suggestions for Mexico,
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Guatemala, Cuba, Colombia and Uruguay, which illustrate not only his tense
relationship with the Chilean establishment, but also his broad range of contacts
across Latin America. 521
By the end of the decade, however, the whole tenor of Chilean national
politics shifted dramatically to the left with the election of Salvadore Allende and his
Unidad Popular (UP – Popular Unity) coalition government. In response to growing
cries for dramatic action needed to address Mapuche social inequalities, and also as
a result of broad Mapuche support for Allende in the election, the UP undertook a
major reform of the Ley Indígena in 1972. Although he was in his late eighties and
officially retired, UP officials sought Lipschütz’s counsel for his expertise on
indigenous rights and issues, and also because his politics were compatible with
their agenda. In summarizing the new law, the indigenous problem was
characterized as part of the UP’s over-arching goals, but at the same time a unique
situation that required special efforts to rectify.
The basic program of the Unidad Popular attaches great importance to the situation
of the most disadvantaged sectors of our society. Within the demands of the
working class and peasants, there exists a sector that, above all the rest, has been
forgotten for centuries, and is undoubtedly the most authentic example of a system
that has supported the blind exploitation of man by man: the indigenous sector. The
indigenous “problem” is a central concern for the Popular Government and should
be also for all Chileans. We defend the integrity and support the expansion of
indigenous communities so long dispossessed, in order to give them adequate,
timely and sufficient technical and financial assistance – to provide the same
possibilities as other citizens.522

In presenting the actual text of the proposed law to the Cámara de Diputados, the
Commission on Agriculture and Colonization, which had been tasked with studying
the issue and drafting the legislation, added that it was their hope that the law
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would “end, once and for all, the false image that the rest of the country has formed
of the indigenous race.”523
On August 10, 1972, Acting Director of DASIN Hugo Ormeño Melet wrote to
Lipschütz to ask for his suggestions and observations on the proposed law.524 Two
weeks later, Director Daniel Colompil Quilaqueo sent a second request, this time
with a copy of the text that had been vetted by the judicial team and which was
currently being analyzed by Mapuche organizations before an anticipated vote in
early September.525 Lipschütz thanked Colompil for asking for his input, but wrote
that, “My knowledge and scientific interests allow me to give my opinion only
on…(the subject of) indigenous development. Those are related to problems of
‘tribal autonomy’ in the advance of the ‘great nation,’ problems that acquired
significant importance in recent years.”526 The section of the law that Lipschütz
referred to replaced DASIN with the Instituto de Desarollo Indígena (IDI – Institute
for Indigenous Development). The IDI was proposed to exist for a period of twenty
years, but Lipschütz recommended decreasing that duration to five, after which
Mapuches would take over and operate autonomously. He also suggested that
instead of including seven Mapuche representatives on the governing council, the
number should be increased to fifteen. Finally, he advised referring to those
representatives as simply “Mapuche” instead of “Mapuche campesinos” because as
he pointed out, “’the principal objectives of the Institute’ are not only (to find)
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solutions to problems related to lands but also educational, cultural and public
health problems” (emphasis in original). 527 In the resulting Ley Indígena 17.729,
none of Lipschütz’s three suggestions were accepted.528 But Minister of Agriculture
Jacques Chonchol did invite him to the official promulgation of the law at the Palacio
Moneda on September 15, 1972.529

Summary
For more than four decades, Alejandro Lipschütz was an active participant in
national and transnational debates about the place of indígenas in contemporary
western society. In that time he worked tirelessly, mostly outside the traditional
boundaries of his professional obligations, to study and propose solutions to
problems faced by indígenas in Chile and across the Americas. In doing that,
Lipschütz provides us with an example of how integrated and complex the
indigenista discourse was. During the 1940s he established himself as a legitimate
researcher in the field of applied anthropology despite the fact that his formal
training was in biology. He built a transnational network of professional contacts
who read and disseminated his work. In the 1950s, Lipschütz forged critical ties
with Mapuche leaders and political organizations despite the fact that he did not
share their ethnic identity, lived far removed from the majority of the population
and was in fact himself an immigrant to Chile. Finally, although more conservative
politics held sway during the 1950s, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the national
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political climate turned in the direction of his long-held personal beliefs. Although
he was officially retired, his public profile did not diminish and the frequency and
volume of his publication actually increased. Across the entire period, from 1937 to
1973, Lipschütz wove together scholarship, politics and broad collaboration with
indigenous leaders to construct an indigenismo that served to connect otherwise
disparate actors and ideas. In doing so, he also maintained a commitment to political
autonomy for indigenous peoples that would later become foundational for many
indigenous activists in Chile and across the Americas after identity-based social
movements emerged in the 1980s.
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Chapter 5: Venancio Coñuepán and the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas

Thus far, we have seen that Manuel Aburto represented an archetypal
indigenous leader by combining traditional notions of Mapuche authority and
political strategy with a sophisticated understanding of the social and political
environment in which he was fighting for his people. Meanwhile, Alejandro
Lipschütz characterized the traditional description of an indigenista as a white man,
based in the nation’s capital. He was integrated into the formal academic networks
and government bureaucracy of his time and attempted to use those positions of
privilege to advocate for solutions on behalf of indigenous people. We now turn our
attention to Venancio Coñuepán, whose life and career show him to be both an
indigenista and an indigenous activist, blurring distinctions between the two
categories and demonstrating that they were highly permeable. Coñuepán’s creation
and leadership of the national Office of Indigenous Affairs in the 1950s was an
episode in which he clearly functioned as both Indian and indigenista
simultaneously.
If there was a singular point, or goal, to Coñuepán’s thirty-year career in
politics, it was to reach a high enough height within the formal structure of the
Chilean government to protect the rights of Mapuche and lead them toward formal
political participation as equal citizens of Chile. He viewed the creation of a
government agency tasked with that specific purpose as the best vehicle by which to
accomplish his goal. In 1953, Coñuepán’s efforts and accumulated political influence
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led to the creation of the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas and his appointment as the
Director of that agency. Because DASIN was tasked with overseeing the Juzgados de
Indios (Indian Courts), Coñuepán was positioned to manage the courts to provide
protection to Mapuche as they defended their interests. In the course of his tenure
he also engaged other branches of government toward similar ends. In addition, he
leveraged his personal influence with white Chilean leaders and his indigenous
identity to function as a go-between, bridging what often seemed like two very
different worlds sharing the Chilean landscape in the twentieth century. And
although he sought to make Mapuche into citizens with equal rights, he employed
indigenous identity and the legacy of conquest and colonization to argue that the
Mapuche formed a special class of citizens, one that needed and deserved unique
consideration and protection.
Twice elected to the Cámara de Diputados and long-time leader of the
Corporación Araucana, Coñuepán’s support had helped return Carlos Ibañez del
Campo to the presidency in 1952 after a twenty-year hiatus. Upon his election,
Ibañez first rewarded Coñuepán with a cabinet-level appointment as the Minister of
Land and Colonization, but Coñuepán and the Corporación had lobbied for the
creation of an office dedicated to the protection of indígenas, in one form or another,
since even before his speech at the Patzcuaro Conference in 1940. So in 1953, as
part of a broad administrative reorganization of the federal government, Ibañez
created the Office of Indigenous Affairs within the Ministry of Land and
Colonization. Ibañez chose Coñuepán to lead the new agency. As the Director of
DASIN, Coñuepán achieved some success using his post to protect the rights of
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Mapuche during the time Ibañez was in office. But ultimately, his accomplishments
did not outlast his tenure. As political winds shifted, Mapuche deputies were swept
from office in the 1958 congressional elections at the same time Jorge Alessandri
succeeded Ibañez as President, and afterward a new generation of Mapuche leaders
would seek political advantage by allying with the left to attempt more radical
reforms and bring about a new political order.
This chapter examines the work of Venancio Coñuepán as the Director of
DASIN. As a historical episode, the mid-1950s represents a unique moment in the
twentieth century history of Mapuche-state relations and a distinct form of
indigenismo, led not by white urban intellectuals but rather by indigenous
leaders.530 Despite relatively weak ties to transnational indigenista projects, DASIN’s
work was consistent with ideas circulating through that network, and therefore its
successes and failures ought to be considered in the light of that broader
transnational context. In addition, this chapter shows that DASIN represents a
material form of indigenismo, consistent with economic themes of development and
dependency circulating throughout the Americas, but largely distinct from other
aspects of the indigenista discourse that emphasized culture and integrated
development.
In order to evaluate DASIN as an indigenista project and understand
Coñuepán’s leadership of the agency, I first introduce his life, background and
career. Following that, I explain the political environment that led to Ibañez’s
election in 1952, and discuss Coñuepán’s leadership of the Ministry of Land and
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Colonization. Then I explore the reorganization of the federal government that
coincided with the creation of DASIN in order to build context around the political
environment in which it operated. I next turn to study the actual work that DASIN
carried out during Coñuepán’s tenure as the ageny’s Director, specifically as it
related to Coñuepán’s role as an interlocutor in land claims and disputes, and his
interactions with various government officials. I examine the forestry industry in
greater detail, using the case of the Comunidad Bernardo Ñanco as an example,
because it received significant coverage in the regional and national press and led to
changes in the way DASIN approved contracts between Chilean companies and
Mapuche communities. I show that the government’s goals for developing the
forestry industry continued a pattern of colonial incursions onto indigenous lands
and provide an example that explains the materialist orientation of DASIN. Finally,
the complicated and frustrating work of DASIN is evaluated as an indigenista
project, with special emphasis given to ways in which transnational connections can
be seen in the work of DASIN and the Ministry of Land and Colonization during the
1950s. The chapter concludes by examining Coñeupán’s role supervising the Indian
Courts, a significant part of his role as Director, but one that led to persistent
frustration and conflict with the judges and courts he was tasked with overseeing.

Biography and Political Context
Born in Cautín Province in 1905, Venancio Coñuepán received his formal
education at the same schools that Manuel Aburto and Manuel Manquilef had
attended during their early years – first the Anglican mission school and then Liceo
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Temuco. Coñuepán had attained some wealth and success by the age of twenty-five
working for the Ford automobile company in Temuco. In the late 1920s he rose to
prominence within the Sociedad Caupolicán, becoming its secretary in 1929 and
president in 1931.531 “Relying on his personal experience and that of other
merchant leaders, he proposed that the Mapuche win equality within Chilean
society through economic success.”532
Coñuepán’s rise to prominence derived from at least three major factors.
First, and principal among them, was his family history and personal qualities that
established him as a ñizol longko, or “prominent chief.” Within traditional Mapuche
society, the political power of longkos was not equal, and derived from many
factors, including the size and significance of their kinship network, ability to
mobilize forces in times of war, and wealth. Venancio descended from a prominent
family of Mapuche longkos and his lineage could be traced back to famous chiefs
who allied with Chilean patriot creole forces during the war for independence and
also the Chilean army during the Pacification. In addition, the wealth displayed by
his family’s large reduccion near Temuco and the income from his career enabled
him to dress well, drive an automobile in an era when few Mapuche could afford
one, and publicly display generosity to friends and acquaintances. His education and
personal abilities also made him an excellent public speaker, and one who could
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deliver his message to both Chilean and Mapuche audiences, as he often did in
bilingual speeches.533
Leveraging those personal characteristics, Coñuepán’s success also resulted
from his ability to mobilize a substantial ethnic Mapuche political base through the
consolidated capacity of the movement’s major organizations under the umbrella of
the Corporación Araucana.534 Building on the success of Mapuche mobilization that
caused President Ibañez del Campo to soften his program of indigenous land
division during his first presidency (1927-1931) Coñuepán sought increased
collaboration between Mapuche organizations in the 1930s. Ultimately, those efforts
led to the creation of the Corporación Araucana in 1938. As discussed in chapters
one and two, Coñuepán assumed leadership of the Corporación after its formation in
1938, having worked for nearly ten years to grow an alliance between the major
Mapuche organizations. Although the Corporación originally functioned as an
umbrella group that allowed its constituent organizations autonomy to pursue their
own agendas and political stances, by the 1950s its influence had increased and the
Corporación began to function more like a political party, although he was formally
a member of several other conservative political parties in that era.535
During the 1940s, Coñuepán strategically crafted political alliances with the
conservative sectors of Chilean politics, which held the most sway in the rural south,
resulting in electoral success. The Corporación supported Mapuche leaders in their
José Ancan Jara, “Venancio Coñuepán: Ñizol Longko, Líder Regional, Hombre de Estado:
Resplandor y eclipse de la Corporación Araucana en medio siglo de organización indígena
en el sur de Chile, 1938-1968, in Intelectuales Indígenas Piensan América Latina, Claudia
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bids for elected office and generated broad Mapuche support for conservative
political factions. Coñuepán was elected to the Cámara de Diputados representing
the Partido Alianza Popular Libertadora (Popular Freedom Alliance Party) in 1945,
the Conservative Party in 1949, and then again in 1965 following political
appointments during the Ibañez and Alessandri administrations. His electoral
success simply would not have been possible at that time if Mapuche leaders had
positioned themselves elsewhere on the political spectrum, according to former
Corporación Secretary and Inspector of Indigenous Affairs, Carlos Huentequeo.
The Conservative Party was the most powerful in our (region)…so if we wanted to
make an allegiance, how could we go to the Socialist Party in that era, or to the
Communist Party? They had no power here…so we aligned ourselves with those
who had the most power, to achieve something with that power…and that is what
our people never understood.536

Although Carlos Ibañez was not officially a member of the Conservative Party, his
success in the 1952 presidential election stemmed from his vague representation of
conservative interests, combined with electoral frustration with partisan political
coalitions and twelve years of Radical Party control since Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s
Popular Front victory in 1938.
During the administrations of Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941), Juan Antonio Rios
(1942-1946) and Gabriel Gonzalez Videla (1946-1952), the Chilean economy
struggled to effectively carry out import substitution development schemes, and the
people suffered under high rates of inflation that accompanied deficit spending by
the government. In the 1952 election, Ibañez was able to leverage the people’s
frustration with economic stagnation and their disenchantment with partisan
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political bickering by establishing himself as a candidate who was “above petty
politics.” In addition, he promised to rein in government spending and address the
country’s development goals by reforming state-owned industrial enterprises and
government lending practices. Although his platform was generally conservative, he
resisted strict ideological classification, and received electoral support from across
the political spectrum. Nevertheless, Ibañez’s broad and nondescript populist appeal
was built upon his political legacy that spanned a generation.537
As a result of the election of 1952, Carlos Ibañez del Campo was returned to
the presidency after a long and storied thirty-year career in Chilean politics. During
his first presidency he had been a driving force behind the Ley Indígena 1.469 of
1927 that made the subdivision of indigenous communal landholdings much easier,
and also persecuted Manuel Aburto and his Federación Araucana. But following the
ascent of the Corporación Araucana under Coñuepán’s leadership, Ibañez rewarded
Venancio for his support. Following an overwhelming victory at the polls, Ibañez
named Coñuepán Minister of Land and Colonization, an important position for a
Mapuche politician to occupy given the long legacy of land fraud and usurpation
associated with the colonization of southern Chile. On the fifteenth of November,
1952, Coñuepán wrote to the President of the Cámara de Diputados to inform him
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that he had accepted the appointment, and thank him for his support during his time
as a Deputy.538
Coñuepán attempted to use his position as Minister of Land and Colonization
to bring together many branches of government for the benefit of the Mapuche
people and the problems they faced. Sometimes those efforts were relatively small
and came about as reactions to specific problems or grievances. But as Minister he
was also responsible for representing many other interests, including those of nonMapuche indigenous peoples, Euro-Chilean citizens and state-owned property.
Although Coñuepán held the post for less than six months, his time as Minister of
Land and Colonization helped him learn how to navigate overlapping state
bureaucracies and allowed him to expand his professional network within the
government, and even in some cases outside of Chile.
While serving as Minister in 1953, Coñuepán proposed projects to construct
houses, study soil erosion, the effects of forestry on indígenas and expropriate land
from large fondos for redistribution to smallholders. He boldly requested the
assistance of his fellow ministers for those efforts. “These are not expenses, but
create wealth for the state and help solve a variety of social problems,” he wrote in
one such request.539 In 1952, the Ministry of National Defense requested
information from Land and Colonization about the possibility of establishing an
experimental agricultural station to carry out reforestation on Isla de Pascua. That
proposal included the sum of 500,000 pesos to be allocated for material assistance
Venancio Coñuepán to President of Cámara, Nov. 15, 1952. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes
Nacionales, Libro 3739.
539 Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Finance, Nov. 24, 1952. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes
Nacionales, Libro 3740.
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to indigenous islanders.540 Later, in January 1953, Coñuepán allocated 300,000
pesos to provide food and supplies to fifty soldiers who were working on a
forestation project in the Dunes of Chanco in the Maule region (just north of the
Araucanía) over a ten-month period.541 In another collaborative effort, Coñuepán
appointed Jacques Chonchol, an agronomist who later became Minister of
Agriculture during the presidency of Salvador Allende, to lead a commission
studying ways that the armed forces could contribute to public works projects.542 In
other instances Coñuepán’s schemes constituted grander projects, like the request
he made of the Minister of Housing for the large sum of 57 million pesos. While
many of these efforts were intended to benefit non-Mapuche Chileans, even as
Minister, Coñuepán attempted to use his influence to aid the advancement of his
people.
In many instances he found support for those efforts from officials in other
branches of government. Early in his tenure as Minister of Land and Colonization,
Coñuepán reached out to the Director General of Internal Taxation to request the
suspension of land seizures from indigenous peasants due to outstanding tax debts.
He proposed that in order to solve a “grave social problem,” those smallholders
should have their back taxes and outstanding debts cancelled. He blamed their
inability to pay on their extreme poverty, lack of farming tools, exhausted soil and
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even “ignorance and lack of culture.”543 In some cases, settlement and division of
indigenous landholdings resulted from the need to pay back taxes, but in other
instances it led to tax and debt relief, as in the case of Alberto and Carlos Chihuailaf
Railef in November of 1952.544 Again in January of 1953, Coñuepán requested tax
and debt relief for other “small indigenous farmers.” He argued that it was the
President’s wish that agricultural production be stimulated and seizing their land
would have the opposite effect.545
Under Coñuepán’s leadership, local and regional officials delivered
grievances to the Ministry of Land and Colonization. That was the case of a
correspondence in February of 1953, following a large public meeting presided over
by local officials the southern town of La Unión, in Ranco Province. Interestingly, the
letter was addressed to the President of the Republic, and laid out demands to the
Ministry of Land and Colonization as well as six other ministries. But Land and
Colonization was listed first, and Venancio Coñuepán was the only minister
addressed by name and of whom the complainants demanded a personal visit. Their
request illustrates the importance of Land and Colonization in the rural and
agricultural south, and also the significance of Coñuepán’s ethnic identity in his post
as Minister.546
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Coñuepán also fielded complaints from indígenas about various types of
prejudicial or discriminatory treatment, such as insults and personal attacks. In
November of 1952, while serving as Minister, the president and secretary of the
regional headquarters of the Corporación Araucana in Malleco registered such a
complaint. 547 Their correspondence indicated that Coñuepán’s position within the
government engendered more direct access to state authority for Mapuche
organizations, especially those with which Coñuepán had been personally affiliated.
In many cases, Coñuepán or his subsecretaries would forward those complaints to
the Carabineros.548
As Minister of Land and Colonization, Coñuepán also had opportunities to
extend his reach outside of the Chilean government by contributing to international
aid and development efforts. Throughout the 1950s, various branches of the Chilean
national government participated in efforts to improve conditions for rural peasants
by cooperating with international organizations and foreign governments. Those
interactions made clear that Chileans were participating in transnational discourses
on a variety of subjects, and several that pertained directly to indígenas. But it is
striking is how rarely those peasants are referred to, or given special consideration,
as indígenas.
In September of 1951, José Ramón Astorga, an Inspector working for the
Ministry of Land and Colonization, participated in a conference on land tenure in the
Americas at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Nowhere in his paper does he
Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Justice, Nov. 15, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes
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reference indigenous issues as relevant to land tenure questions in Chile.549 In June
of 1953, the Minister of Education wrote to the Ministry of Exterior Relations
requesting passports and visas for five primary school teachers to travel to
Patzcuaro, Mexico to attend training provided by CREFAL, an institution organized
under the auspices of UNESCO to provide training to teachers in rural settings. In
that communication, no mention of where the teachers were to work or what ethnic
identity they claimed was identified.550
It was apparent, however that in the context of the Cold War, the United
States was calling for agrarian reform in countries where communist elements
threatened the peace and stability of the region. Pasted into the records of the
Ministry of National Property is an article from El Mercurio dated December 1, 1951,
in which U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the argument that such action
by developing countries could forestall communist uprisings.551 In addition, General
Ramón Cañas Montalva of the Panamerican Institute of Geography and History, the
indigenista who had assisted Lipschütz’s team during his Tierra del Fuego mission
and later became president of the Chilean Indigenista Institute, communicated with
Coñuepán in January of 1953, asking for his cooperation with studies they were
conducting. Montalva was bringing a team to Chile later that month to assess the
country’s natural resources and asked for the Ministry’s support, suggestions and
cooperation in their work. In his letter introducing the team, he referenced the
Documents related to José Ramón Astorga’s attendance at land tenure conference, Sep.
1951. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3830.
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importance of their work to improving the health and livelihood of working classes,
but not peasant farmers or Indians.552 That characterization is consistent with the
priority of stimulating economic development on an industrial scale, and the shift
from integrated development projects to targeted economic development that was a
dominant trend in the post-War era.
Yet as Minister of Land and Colonization, Coñuepán’s participation in some
inter-American dialogues related to agriculture and rural development began to
specifically mention indigenous land tenure. In April of 1953, the Director General
of the Ministry wrote to the judges presiding over Indian Courts in Pitrufquén and
Temuco to request data about indigenous land holdings and agricultural challenges
in preparation for a “Seminar on Latin American Indians.” The judges wrote back
with fairly detailed statistics on population and hectares under cultivation,
indicating that the main problems faced by Indians stemmed from excessive
division and exploitation of land and the degradation of soils that resulted from it.
However, this interaction took place between the Ministry and two judges under its
charge, rather than scientists or technicians who seemed to dominate conversations
about rational management of national resources to the exclusion of indigenous
peoples.553
Thus we can see that indigenous identity tended not to be broadly referenced
in inter-ministry or international correspondence, but was more frequently
referenced in dialogues within the Ministry of Land and Colonization. That
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recognition leads us to conclude that debates about the welfare of peasants in the
countryside, as well as those pertaining to urban migration and economic
development, often neglected to address problems as “indigenous.” Instead, they
glossed over racial and ethnic divisions within Chilean society. Coñuepán recognized
that tendency, and for that reason fought hard for the creation of an official
government agency dedicated to helping indigenous Chileans, and specifically the
large population of Mapuche in the rural south. Within six months of his
appointment as Minister of Land and Colonization, Coñuepán would get the chance
to lead the newly created Office of Indigenous Affairs. In that role he would be able
to expand his efforts to problems faced by his people, and in doing so he would
contine to collaborate with other ministries on a variety of projects, although his
efforts to connect to the broader transnational indigenista network were stymied.

Government Reorganization of 1953
In the first year of his presidency Ibañez undertook a substantial
reorganization of the government. In order to carry out his campaign promises of
fiscal responsibility and the reform of bloated and inefficient government agencies,
Ley 11.151 gave the president the power to reorganize all branches of the public
administration for a period of six months, and set the number of employees in each
agency.554 In addition, the law gave the president the power to set certain rents and
prices, as well as regulate interest rates and foreign investment for a period of one
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year.555 As Ibañez carried out the reform of public administration, a fair amount of
chaos and uncertainty ensued on the part of public employees of the agencies being
restructured. Over the next several months, numerous personnel had their positions
eliminated, consolidated or altered. According to many documents from the
Ministry of Land and Colonization, the restructuring of government made it
impossible for the Ministry to continue carrying out the normal functions required
of them. Capable administrators like Carlos del Rio, Director General of Land and
Colonization, were replaced and others simply quit because they found it impossible
to do their jobs with the time and resources allotted to them. 556
As they were appointed and began their duties, the new officers within the
Ministry of Land and Colonization began to point out errors in the original plan.
Only one week after assuming his charge, the new Director General of Land and
Colonization Victor Chaves Dailhe wrote to the Minister to point out that the
employees in his service were struggling with low morale and less productivity.
Among other things, they did not have access to background information in the
cases they were trying to resolve, and in some instances the superiors in the
provincial offices were of lesser rank than those they supervised.557 Two months
later, Chaves Dailhe wrote to the Minister again, suggesting that the President
should promulgate a new decree law to rectify the mistakes made in the original
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reorganization scheme.558 He followed that with a letter detailing complaints against
an incompetent boss in the Temuco office, who continued in his post despite his lack
of experience and expertise, and numerous infractions of protocol.559 A year later,
those problems persisted. In his letter of resignation in July of 1954, sub-secretary
of the Ministry of Land and Colonization Francisco Javier Fermandois complained
that the goals of the 1953 reorganization of the ministry had not been realized
because it operated with insufficient funds and personnel. He added that he himself
often worked outside of the regular business day to fulfill the duties of his
position.560
Soon after taking over as Minister of Land and Colonization, in January of
1953, Venancio Coñuepán requested a report from the general office of the Ministry
of Land and Colonization. That report provided a number of suggestions for
reorganizing the offices, personnel and their duties within the Ministry. At that time,
there were no specific provisions for staff or functions dedicated to indigenous
affairs.561 But on April 25, 1953, Ibañez promulgated Decree Law 56, which created
the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas as a dependency within the Ministry of Land and
Colonization. The law charged DASIN with carrying out the settlement and
subdivision of indigenous communities, and liquidation of credit according to the
provisions of Ley Indígena 4.111 of 1931. Because Ley 4.111 created the Indian
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Courts as a mechanism for carrying out those tasks, Decree 56 effectively placed
DASIN in charge of those courts. The agency would be staffed with a total of five
employees, including one director and one attorney. In addition, Decree 56 gave
DASIN the power to “supervise the rational economic exploitation of agricultural
lands” and “establish cooperatives, organizations or associations of an economic
character” to carry out that supervision.562 Although simply stated in a one-page
decree, those powers were for the first time placed solely in the hands of an
indigenous representative, and for Coñuepán it must have seemed like the most
significant accomplishment for his people in a generation, at least since the Ley
Indígena 1.469 was reformed in 1931.
Coñuepán began his tenure as Director of DASIN with great optimism and
vibrant energy. Although headquartered in Santiago, he began making weekly trips
to the south and for a time spent Friday through Monday in Temuco, only returning
to the offices in Santiago midweek.563 That schedule enabled him to visit the courts,
judges and advocates who worked under him in the new bureaucracy. In the field,
he endeavored to meet personally with indígenas who sought his help and advice
and to remain available for consultation. However, once in the role of Director,
Coñuepán struggled to lead an office with a poorly defined mission, shortages of
staff and resources, all the while meeting resistance from entrenched interests in
the south.
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More than a year after its creation, the functions of DASIN were still being
worked out, and Coñuepán found it necessary to delineate the exact role of the office
and himself as its Director. In a three-page letter to the new Minister of Land and
Colonization, he sorted through apparent contradictions in indigenous law and
overlapping roles for DASIN and the Juzgados de Indios under its authority. He went
on to characterize the role of DASIN as having a “protectionist orientation,” and
argued that such was the intent of President Ibañez when he created it, “because on
many occasions (Ibañez) publicly demonstrated his favor for the rights of indígenas,
in his first administration and the current one, in a way that indígenas have always
had faith in his integrity, patriotism and spirit of justice.”564 In that way Coñuepán
constructed Ibañez as a defender of Indians, the way he had done when he
campaigned for him in 1952, “comparing him to Franklin Roosevelt and Mexico’s
Lázaro Cárdenas.”565 Implicit in his statement is the argument that in order for
Mapuche to integrate into the political system on a footing equal to white Chileans
they required special protections to compensate for a legacy of injustice and
ongoing discrimination.
At the national level, Coñuepán’s political clout stemmed from his ability to
deliver Mapuche votes to Ibañez in presidential campaigns. Indeed, his ability to do
so led directly to his ministerial appointment and also the creation of DASIN. But
once in the role of Director, he had little political capital to exchange with other
branches of government to get things done. On the occasion of the second
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anniversary of Carlos Ibañez del Campo’s election to the presidency, Coñuepán
wrote a flattering tribute to the organizer of a committee to celebrate the
anniversary, “by his help and valiant defense…he has always protected our natives,
like no other president of Chile has done.”566 Although he regretted that DASIN
could not play a more central role in the celebration given the shortage of time and
funds, he did promise to attend along with the Mapuche Diputados Esteban Romero
and José Cayupi, and a delegation from the Corporación Araucana.

The Role of DASIN within the State
A large part of Coñuepán’s work in government, first as a Deputy, then as a
Minister and ultimately as Director of DASIN, included serving as an interlocutor
between individual Mapuche complainants and various branches of the
government.567 The creation of the Office of Indigenous Affairs institutionalized that
role, which testified to the trust and credibility he maintained with those he served,
and also the fact that indígenas had experienced difficulty having their grievances
addressed by the courts and other officials that were supposed to resolve their
disputes.568 That work required his presence in the south, so by October 1953
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Coñuepán requested to close the office in Santiago on Mondays and Fridays, so he
could work in Temuco over the long weekend.569
Coñuepán filed weekly reports that detailed the work completed in the
DASIN office, which provide insight into the goals and challenges of the agency and
his work.570 At the end of the year, Coñuepán submitted an annual report, detailing
the agency’s accomplishments and outlining goals for the future. The first of those,
submitted in March of 1955, summarized the number and types of communications
sent and general schedule of meetings held. It also indicated the type of work
undertaken: awarding grants to indigenous students, working to protect indigenous
property (especially forests), facilitating the construction of schools, houses and
roads, and awarding 55 million pesos in loans for indigenous agricultural efforts. He
summarized the work of the various Juzgados de Indios under his jurisdiction. The
future plans that Coñuepán identified were ambitious and seemed to require more
funds than were imminently available. Coñuepán noted in closing that the important
work of the office was hampered by a shortage of personnel and a lack of funds.571
Although his judicial appointments had to be approved by the Minister and
President, Coñuepán appointed some personnel directly, for example the Inspectors
of Indigenous Affairs.572 That was a new position within the Ministry, and the
primary role of the Inspectors was to address land problems and intervene on
Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, Oct. 30, 1953. ARNAD,
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Indians’ behalf in credit issues with the Agricultural Credit Fund.573 As the Office
undertook its work, requests for the appointment of more inspectors were regularly
made. In many cases those came attached to other requests, such as in the letter
sent to Coñuepán by L. Amaza and J. Cheuquihue in October of 1953. Their letter
indicates they had also communicated their request to Esteban Romero as a
Diputado representing them and also the President of the Corporación Araucana.574
Those communications show how institutionalized this cadre of Mapuche leaders
had become, and how their official roles overlapped with their personal connections
and Mapuche identity.
Much of Coñuepán’s correspondence in the first years of DASIN involved
receiving and forwarding complaints and requests that indígenas in the south sent
him. In June of 1954 he reached out to the Juez de Indios (Indian Court Judge) in
Pitrufquén to bring a halt to some logging activity that was unsanctioned.575 He
wrote to an official at the National Archives to request a copy of a 1934 Decree Law
on behalf of a community who needed it to protect their land.576 Coñuepán also sent
two letters to the Director General of Primary Education in the Ministry of
Education, first to ask for clarification as to why a request to found a new school had
been denied, then to forward a complaint against a teacher who was accused of
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trying to usurp land from the comuneros.577 Coñuepán also used his office to keep
tabs on ongoing legal cases, as in the case of Andrés Huaiquimil, where he simply
requested an update.578 In other instances, Coñuepán’s interventions seemed to take
on more of a tone of requesting or even dictating certain actions. In the case of Maria
Cayupi Neculman, he suggested in a pretty direct way that the judge should evict the
offending party.579 While he had the authority to supervise and manage the courts,
telling a judge how to rule would almost certainly have been perceived as
overstepping his authority.
Coñuepán regularly received complaints about unjust legal action and
requests for legal help. In some cases he simply forwarded the complaint to the
appropriate person. In the case of Alejandro Hueichaqueo, who was being
repeatedly harassed through the courts, Coñuepán forwarded his telegram to the
Juez de Indios in Temuco.580 In other instances he contacted judges and other
officials personally and tried to move things along. When he learned that someone
was trying to collect taxes unjustly from Indians in Ranquilhue, he wrote the
Director General of Internal Taxation to ask him to investigate.581 In other instances,
requests were formulated by groups or communities and sent to Coñuepán, whom
they viewed as a representative. He would then forward the requests to the
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appropriate officials in government. In May of 1954, Coñuepán wrote to the
Agricultural Department of the Bank of State to request the addition of a staff
person in the Traiguén office dedicated to servicing credit to indigenous peasants. In
that instance, Coñuepán was forwarding a request from a group of small farmers in
the area of Paillahue, who were seeking to increase yields and improve their land.582
The next letter he sent (on the same day) was to an official in the Ministry of
Education, requesting assistance with a school matter for a group of parents, also
from Paillahue.583 Although the original requests that he forwarded are not included
in the record, they fit a pattern of indígenas using Coñuepán and DASIN as advocates
and go-betweens with the state.
Coñuepán would also attempt to use his influence within the government to
encourage officials in positions of specific authority to take particular action. On
many occasions Coñuepán brought abuses by court officials directly to the
Minister’s attention.584 In 1955, he lobbied the Minister of Land and Colonization to
curtail the practice of using the courts to harass Indians through litigation, which
caused “recurring distress and expense for members of the community.”585 In
addition, over the years the actual jurisdictional boundaries of Juzgados de Indios
were changed. Sometimes those changes were undertaken to make their function
more efficient in keeping with natural geographic considerations, which was the
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explicit reason given by the Director General in 1952.586 However, that practice also
presented opportunities to manipulate outcomes and increase or decrease the
authority of particular agents. Coñuepán’s work as Director was also hampered by
interpersonal conflicts and the failure of some within the courts to adequately carry
out their charge to protect indígenas under their jurisdiction.
Coñuepán and the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas were not always able to fix
the broken state apparatuses that led to the loss of indigenous land and the ongoing
frustration of indígenas seeking restitution through the courts and the government.
In 1958, as the Ibañez government was drawing to a close, the account of Doña Rosa
Licopan Neculqueo bore witness to that reality. Doña Rosa had travelled all the way
to Santiago to request an audience with Coñuepán and the Minister of Land and
Colonization personally. In April, Lorenzo Lemunguier, another Mapuche politician
and representative of the Corporación who was at the time serving as Acting
Director of DASIN, wrote to the Juez de Indios of Temuco requesting that he take
action and find a permanent resolution to her case.587
Coñuepán’s intercessions extended to very personal and peculiar needs of his
indigenous constituents. In September of 1954 he responded to a complaint
forwarded to him by the mayor of the small town of Galvarino by requesting that the
director of a psychiatric hospital admit the indígena Manuel Quintriqueo Nahuelñir.
He claimed that Quintriqueo’s “freedom in this state constitutes a danger to the
people,” and that “in my role as Director of Asuntos Indígenas, I have the obligation
Carlos del Rio to Minister of Land and Colonization, Nov. 1952-Feb. 1953. ARNAD,
Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libros 3739, 3844
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to find a solution to this problem.”588 That type of personal care and intervention
seems to be what Coñuepán did best in his role as Director of DASIN. He was clearly
very invested in it, often working all weekend long to reach out and remain
personally accessible to indígenas in the south. Coñuepán’s style of political
patronage was indicative of the era in which he operated, and also Mapuche
traditions of political leadership inherent to the role of the longko.
Of the personal requests for assistance that he received, land claims and
disputes consumed much of Coñuepán’s time at DASIN.589 Oftentimes, individuals
would solicit the aid of the office in prompting action from the Juzgado, which
otherwise was slow to act. Interventions often consisted of referring complainants
to other branches of government or other offices within the Ministry to stimulate a
response, as was the case with Pedro Morales, who had been attempting to obtain
redress for ten years following the division of his community in 1940-41.590 After
the reorganization of 1953, DASIN took over much of that work. It seems that
Coñuepán thought his role as Director of DASIN would elevate and streamline those
efforts. However, in some ways it may have actually served to cordon them off and
marginalize his effectiveness. Even though some Mapuche lands had been illegally
absorbed into other properties, and though all conditions for the expropriation of
those plots were met, the actual carrying out of the restitution was often held up by
lack of funds available from the state to compensate those who had usurped the
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land in the first place.591 For example, in order to bring about the expropriation of
land, Coñuepán had to request action from the Ministry of Land and Colonization.592
Ministers and their Directors General did not have the protection of indigenous
interests as their top priority, rather they represented a broad variety of interests,
as evidenced by Coñuepán’s own work when he was Minister.
Another significant aspect of Coñuepán’s career was his effort to reform the
way in which Mapuche farmers borrowed money. As far back as the 1930s he had
created and promoted an indigenous credit fund under the auspices of the Sociedad
Caupolicán. The fund facilitated the lending of money between Mapuche.593 Working
within the Ministry of Land and Colonization in the 1950s, he interfaced with
creditors and tax collectors to ease the burden and diminish consequences of debt
peonage.594 To an extent, Coñuepán’s efforts to reform lending practices to Mapuche
smallholders were also supported by the Ministry of Land and Colonization. In
January of 1955, the Minister authorized the vice-president of the State Bank to
release 30 million pesos in loans to indígenas to support the “organization of
indigenous property.”595 Although it is not clear toward what purposes those loans
were intended, or whether they enabled communities to keep their lands together
or facilitated the division of community land, Coñuepán did find support for some of
his efforts from the Ministers under whom he worked.
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Coñuepán also communicated regularly with the legal department of the
Ministry of Land and Colonization. In early 1954, he requested a legal opinion from
the General Counsel on the question of whether or not indígenas could form and/or
join agricultural cooperatives, in light of the special protection guaranteed them by
the Ley Indígena of 1931. In May, he received a response, stating that yes they could
indeed form and/or join cooperatives. Importantly, they could also borrow against
their land, counsel advised, so long as they were constituted as limited liability
partnerships. Proscriptions on dividing communally owned land established by the
1931 law made unlimited liability partnerships invalid, because land could not be
sold or forfeited to pay off debts incurred. Using this line of argument, Counsel
affirmed the constitutional equality of indígenas as individual citizens, and neither
afforded them special consideration nor special restrictions stemming from their
ethnic identity.596
In order to proactively cultivate relationships with leaders in other branches
of government, Coñuepán utilized personal connections and relationships
developed during his time as an elected official. In April of 1954, he wrote a lengthy
and flattering note to Jorge Ardiles Galdames, Director General of the Carabineros, in
celebration of the twenty-seventh anniversary of that institution, in which he
referenced their long friendship.597 The following month, Coñuepán wrote Ardiles
again, that time to request the appointment of “four men of my race” who wished to
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join the Carabineros, making explicit reference to their ethnic identity.598 A week
later he wrote again, apologizing profusely for the imposition, acknowledging that
“although this constantly asking you to fill vacancies in the Carabineros with men of
my race is bordering on nonsense, I have no choice but to continue in order to meet
the requests of those who ask, and meanwhile the General Office of the Carabineros
continues to keep me in its good graces.”599 In June, he sent a fourth request, once
again referencing their friendship and the magnanimous gesture that Ardiles’s
assistance demonstrated.600 At least some of those requests seem to have been
granted, because later in the year he reached out to Ardiles again to relay a transfer
request for the Carabinero Domingo Ñanco Huenuhueque from that officer’s
father.601
Coñuepán also had the power to grant favors directly. He was involved in
securing a property in Loncoche to build quarters for the Carabineros, and then
reached out to the Mayor of Loncoche, don Arturo Coñuepán (relation unknown),
letting him know that the Minister of Public Works was about to expropriate a
parcel there for that purpose.602 He lent his support to a variety of development
efforts, including the electrification of the city of Loncoche.603 In November of 1953,
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Coñuepán forwarded a request for a subsidy from the director of a school in Puifú
directly to the Minister of Education. He noted in his letter that the director asked
Coñuepán to write before sending his own request, “so that (the request) would be
executed as quickly as possible.”604 In late 1959, Coñuepán sent several more letters
to the Minister of Education, requesting that property be leased to an indigenous
community for a school, and that a school in Temuco be subsidized by the Ministry
of Education.
Coñuepán also used DASIN to check the power of other branches of the
federal government where indígenas were concerned. In September of 1956, he
wrote to the Ministry of Public Works to request background documents concerning
the seizure of land from a Mapuche community for the construction of a railroad.605
More significantly, he regularly received complaints about abuse of power on the
part of Carabineros in the south. In addition to making many requests of his friend
Jorge Ardiles Galdames for the appointment of indigenous Carabineros, Coñuepán
also repeatedly asked him to intervene in an ongoing pattern of abuse. Reporting
such a case in November of 1954, Coñuepán added,
“I have been made aware of many cases such as these, committed against
indigenous citizens, by functionaries who have not upheld the honorable and noble
mission of the Carabineros de Chile, that correspond to the carrying out of life in our
country. For those reasons I ask one more time, Mr. Director, take appropriate
actions…instruct your people in the southern provinces to give greater
consideration to the modest indigenous peasants, who are often maligned and
mistreated without any cause.”606
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In some instances, reports of such mistreatment came to Coñuepán directly and
personally. At other times he acted upon more general and public information, for
example sending Aldines a newspaper clipping detailing alleged abuses.607
In addition to ongoing social tensions between indígenas and Euro-Chileans
in the south, DASIN struggled with the perennial problems related to the meager
funds allocated to sustain their operations. Although the Dirección de Asuntos
Indígenas cooperated with many other officials in the execution of its duties, the
overlapping authority and expenses seemed to regularly impede efficient
operations. Following the creation of DASIN, employees of the office loaned their
services to other branches of government, which had to be reported to the Treasury,
presumably so their wages and expenses could be billed out. For example, in
October of 1953 four Inspectors were loaned to the Juzgados of Temuco and
Pitrufquen.608 In May of 1954, Coñuepán wrote the Juezes de Indios in Temuco and
Pitrufquén, informing them of several layoffs in their courts because DASIN did not
have enough funds to pay their salaries.609 Shortages of vehicles, drivers and funds
for maintenance and repairs also seem to be recurrent themes in Coñuepán’s
requests.610
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Regional agents also attempted to protect their meager budgets by billing
travel costs back to DASIN.611 When duties carried an Inspector outside the
jurisdiction of a particular court, judges would sometimes request that personnel be
added or redistributed between courts.612 In August of 1953, the Director of the
Office of National Land and Property Victor Chaves Dailhe formally asked the new
Minister of Land and Colonization to order the return of a vehicle that Coñuepán had
loaned to the Juzgado de Indios in Temuco.613 That request prompted Coñuepán to
submit a lengthy letter justifying the Inspector’s need for a vehicle to his new boss,
and pitting him against his former employee, Chaves Dailhe.614 Because DASIN’s
jurisdiction extended into more aspects of indigenous life, Coñuepán’s role gave him
influence into a broader array of options, for example advising judges on particular
points of logging contracts.615 The development of the forestry industry in southern
Chile provides a window into the relationship between Mapuche communities and
state actors in the 1950s, and shows that DASIN created a unique opportunity to
insert indigenous questions into broader narratives of economic development.

Forestry and the Bernardo Ñanco Community
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Historian Thomas Klubock has shown that “the spread of the North American
conifer throughout southern Chile was largely the result of state-directed
development programs and forestry policy before 1973.” As pine plantations
penetrated the southern landscape, they also reshaped a complex system of social
relations in the rural south, and although indigenous Mapuche were impacted
directly, they were caught up in the transformation along with other sectors of
society, including non-indigenous migrant laborers, squatters and inquilinos
(resident estate laborers). Collectively, rural peasants viewed the incursions of the
state and private landowners as part of a broader trend of injustice that had
displaced and dispossessed them since the nineteenth century.616 Although the
Ministry of Land and Colonization clearly played a role in the state’s broader
development strategy, DASIN was positioned to check injustice against indigenous
communities as the forestry industry grew.
In south-central Chile, forestry was a particularly important industry to the
development of the national economy, and also one that disproportionately and
negatively impacted Mapuche peasants. From the perspective of the state, forestry
practices were conceived as questions of rational scientific exploitation, industry
and national wealth. Despite the fact that the growth of privately owned tree
plantations impacted Mapuche communities by detracting from their native cultural
and material uses of forests as natural resources, and the fact that the land on which
timber was harvested was sometimes owned by Mapuche communities, indigenous
concerns and questions rarely entered the discourse. In July of 1953, the Chilean
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Senate and Chamber of Deputies undertook a legal project to reform forestry laws.
In the ten-page text of that law, indigenous lands and cultural impacts are not
mentioned or considered.617
Forestry was also an issue that prompted collaboration between branches of
the Chilean government and a substantial amount of international cooperation and
consultation. The Chilean method of planting fast-growing trees that could be
harvested quickly borrowed heavily from a North American model of industrial
agriculture. Furthermore, most of the trees that were planted in southern Chile were
Eucalyptus or Monterey Pine, species that consume large quantities of water and
have significant impact on watersheds. They had the effect of drying up watersheds
used by Mapuche farmers and other native species. Those effects led to problems
with erosion and forest fires. As the Chilean state promoted that model of industrial
development, they relied heavily on consultants from the north and cooperation
with neighboring countries. For example, in December 1952, Argentine officials
proposed a meeting of Chilean and Argentine forestry technicians to reach an
“international agreement to combat forest fires” in Patagonia.618
As Minister of Land and Colonization, Coñuepán’s primary role was to
determine the effectiveness of projects in developing forests as national wealth. In
doing so, he consulted experts like agronomist Jacques Chonchol to determine the
suitability of various projects. In April 1953, Chonchol wrote to advise that
establishing a farming settlement in the Malleco Forest Reserve would be a terrible
Message No. 2, addressed to Senado and Cámara. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes
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mistake. First of all, the terrain was too hilly with poor soil, suitable only for trees,
he explained. Secondly, neighboring inquilinos (some of whom would have claimed
a Mapuche identity) had the practice of using the reserve for collecting piñones and
firewood, and also grazing cattle and sheep there. The reserve was also part of the
Bío Bío watershed, and therefore held the potential to disrupt the purity of water
downstream, not to mention that it was isolated from markets by great distance and
poor roads.619 In instances like this, even though the impact was not specifically
identified as one that affected indígenas, Coñuepán was in a position to protect
indigenous interests when they aligned with particular projects.
As Minister, Coñuepán found his authority largely sufficient to protect the
interests of the state. In January of 1953 he asked the Director General to take
administrative measures to stop Don Osvaldo Jarpa Bisquertt from unlawfully
harvesting timber from state-owned land in Hueñivales. He instructed the Director
General to contact the forestry agent in the region to intervene, and also to ask the
Governor of Curacautín to use public force if necessary. At the same time he
requested an appellate court in Santiago to intervene to stop the illegal logging.620
Two weeks later the Director General wrote back confirming that he had instructed
the administrator of the forestry reserve to suspend forestry operations, pending
the outcome of the legal case.621 However, as Director of DASIN he no longer had the
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authority of a member of the president’s cabinet, which made protecting the
interests of indígenas more difficult.
Even though his overall authority had diminished in the transition from
Minister to Director of DASIN, Coñuepán was able to more directly advocate for
indígenas and protect their interests pertaining to a broader range of issues.
Companies engaged in logging on indigenous lands often sought to manipulate the
terms of agreements they had made with indigenous communities, sometimes by
logging more land than they had contractually agreed to or by felling other species
of trees. Coñuepán used DASIN to provide a check on that tendency, writing to
remind officials “the appointment of inspectors and regulations…is the exclusive
power of this office.”622 The case of the Bernardo Ñanco community provides an
example that illustrates the power and limitations of Coñuepán’s role as Director of
DASIN, and some of the strategies he employed to overcome them.
In 1947, the Comunidad Bernardo Ñanco signed a contract with the Fresard y
Viñuela logging company, which allowed the latter to harvest old-growth timber on
the community’s land.623 However, the firm soon began breaking terms in the
contract by harvesting species that they were not supposed to and exploiting terrain
that should have been off-limits. The timber firm’s activities created ecological
problems with erosion and runoff, and the firm also tried to get away with paying
the community less than they had agreed to in their contract. Although the troubles
began while Coñuepán was still a Deputy, as Minister and then Director of DASIN he
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was able to insert himself into the conflict more directly. In addition, Coñuepán
eventually succeeded in implementing new protocols for the awarding of forestry
contracts on indigenous lands by instituting a public bidding process and requiring
the approval of contracts and payment of monies to be funneled through DASIN.
The Ñanco case involved a broad public debate about the exploitation of
Mapuche communities and preferential awarding of contracts, and can be viewed as
a victory for Coñuepán and DASIN. While Coñuepán was the Minister of Land and
Colonization, his Ministry worked through the courts to resolve the conflict. In
November of 1952, Francisco Javier Fermandois, working as an attorney for the
Juzgado de Indios of Victoria, wrote a brief for the Director General of the Ministry,
outlining the intervention of the Supreme Court and a committee within the
Chamber of Deputies that had evaluated the case. He offered assistance and
collaboration between the Juzgado in Victoria and the Ministry to resolve the
questions pertaining to the Fresard-Ñanco forestry contract.624
After DASIN was created, a special investigative committee was formed to
help settle the Fresard-Ñanco dispute. That commission met with representatives
from both sides in September of 1953, but the session ended abruptly when the
community claimed Fresard y Viñuela was out of compliance with their contract.625
In addition, the courts held up payments to the community. In January of 1954,
Coñuepán sent nine telegrams to the Juez de Indios in Temuco, requesting that 2
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million pesos deposited by the logging company be dispersed to the community.626
Those efforts illustrate a series of systemic problems inherent to the process of
developing indigenous lands for forestry. Primarily, those difficulties centered
around the role of the Indian Courts, which were responsible for approving
contracts and also receiving and dispersing funds.
As Director of DASIN, Coñuepán was in a position to reform the procedure
due to the agency’s role in overseeing the courts. He tried to establish a more
transparent, public process for awarding logging contracts on indigenous lands, but
his efforts attracted the attention of the regional press and the involvement of his
former colleagues in the Cámara. Stemming from the difficulties made apparent
through the Ñanco case, on August 20, 1954, Coñuepán published a call for bids in El
Mercurio, the nation’s paper of record, for logging on a number of indigenous
reducciones in the province of Malleco, including the Ñanco reducción. Then on the
26th of August, a commission within the Cámara de Diputados instructed the
Ministry of Land and Colonization to send it all the antecedent documentation
associated with Coñuepán’s solicitation. They claimed there were a number of
problems with it, including the fact that the Ministry of Defense had not been
consulted, that the lands in question were covered in snow and therefore impossible
to survey in that season, and finally that the firm of Fresard y Viñuela had already
been contracted to log the Ñanco community’s land, a contract that Coñuepán
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himself had approved.627 On August 31st, El Diario Ilustrado (a conservative Santiago
newspaper) ran a story detailing Coñuepán’s public call for bids and the
congressional commission investigating the procedures. The author challenged the
validity of the process.628 On September 3rd Coñuepán forwarded the requested
documentation to the Minister of Land and Colonization and requested clarification
on the appropriate next steps to take.629
On September 7th the Minister of Land and Colonization Mario Montero
Schmidt wrote to the legal department of the Ministry, asking if he had the power to
intervene in logging contracts and negate the contract. They responded that the
Ministry did not have special powers to intervene on behalf of indigenous
communities, only on public lands. However, intervention could be made by the
Juzgados de Indios, but only in the normal course of the application process, which
took place under their jurisdiction.630 Curiously, later that month Coñuepán
requested the sum of $4,128 pesos from the Juez de Indios in Temuco to pay for the
advertisement he had run soliciting bids.631
The case reached a favorable conclusion for Coñuepán and the Ñanco
community in November of 1954, when the Juez de Indios in Temuco ruled that
Fresard and Viñuela should pay an increased rate per unit of timber to the Ñanco
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community. In his summary of the judge’s ruling, Minister Montero Schmidt
congratulated Coñuepán, whose intervention “has come to put a final end to a whole
class of abuses, giving indígenas a protection that they lacked and securing their
well-being for the future. The Office of Indigenous Affairs has attained for the
Indians of Ñanco, the use of five million pesos, which no one could have
imagined.”632
Following the court’s ruling, one of the bidders, Honorio Cortez Orrego,
published a lengthy letter to the editor in El Diario Austral (a conservative
newspaper in Temuco) claiming that the court had unjustly thrown out his bid and
accepted a lower bid.633 However, in response to an inquiry by the Investigative
Commission of Indigenous Affairs in the Cámara de Diputados, the judge explained
that Cortez had attempted to “game the system” by bidding just a few centavos
higher than the next highest bidder as a closing “discounted” bid. The judge also
credited Coñuepán’s new strategy of advertising and implementing an “open bid”
system for protecting the indigenous landholders’ rights.634
Coñuepán’s intervention in the Ñanco community’s dispute with the Fresard
and Viñuela logging company illustrates the existence of counter-currents within
the mechanisms of state. Although the primary goal of state policy was to expand
the production of agricultural commodities and thereby increase the nation’s
wealth, Coñuepán used DASIN to check the irresponsible and unjust exploitation of
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indigenous property. Although he was successful in bringing minor changes to the
state’s process for evaluating and approving contracts for logging on indigenous
lands, the overall expansion of the forestry industry had much greater and farreaching effects of the ecology of southern Chile, and continues to impact Mapuche
communities today. Since the return to democracy in 1992, the Mapuche movement
has grown in strength and numbers, and opposition to forestry companies is a key
point of contention within the movement. In particular, Mapuche activists
frequently vandalize or destroy forestry trucks and other equipment. In seeking to
curb that activity, the state has controversially applied harsh anti-terrorist
legislation to prosecute Mapuche activists, and routine clashes between activists
and Carabineros have led to several deaths, which then became rallying cries for
indigenous leaders and activists.

Evaluating DASIN as an Indigenista Project
In the first and last decades of the twentieth century, indigenista and Indianled efforts to valorize and promote indigenous culture and identity dominated
discussions surrounding indigenous populations, but in the middle decades the
discourse was primarily about economic development and formal political
participation. The Chilean case roughly fits that pattern. Although cultural
promotion was a lesser element of indigenous affairs in Chile in the 1950s, it was a
feature of the discourse. For example, in 1955, Minister of Education Oscar Herrera
Palacios helped the Rector of the University of Chile evaluate a collection of
indigenous art offered for sale by a private individual. The Minister acted as a
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middleman, facilitating an evaluation of the collection by Tomás Lago, Director of
the Museum of Popular Art, and suggesting to the Rector that the university acquire
the collection.635
The creation of DASIN represented an attempt to institutionalize the
protection of indigenous interests within the state. As that agency’s Director,
Coñuepán continued to try and expand that institutional protection in a variety of
ways. Although he used his office to promote Mapuche culture and art, unlike
Manuel Aburto who pursued an agenda of cultural preservation as an end unto
itself, Coñuepán tended to promote the commercialization of culture. In November
of 1953, Coñuepán requested 150,000 pesos from the Minister of Land and
Colonization for costs associated with filming and recording folklore at a “large
Mapuche gathering” the following month.636 In October of 1954 Coñuepán sent a
press release to sixteen radio stations announcing “the Trio Nahuelpangui,
composed of indigenous guitarists and singers from Villarrica.”637
Six months after the creation of the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas,
Coñuepán formally requested 5 million pesos for the creation of an Indigenous
Institute. The Minister’s response is not recorded in the archive, but Coñuepán’s
letter suggests that he anticipated the request would be approved. He mentioned a
personal conversation they had and said that he wanted to announce the creation of
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the Chilean Indigenous Institute at a big meeting and celebration five days later.638 It
is not entirely clear what the goal of that institution was to be. It is interesting to
note that Coñuepán calls it an “indigenous” institute, rather than an “indigenista”
institute. The distinction would not have been lost on him, and although he does not
reference the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano in his request, Coñuepán
certainly knew that the creation of a national indigenista organ was a criterion for
participation in the III because it was established as such at the 1940 Patzcuaro
conference, which he attended.
Coñuepán tried to continue formal participation in the transnational
indigenista discourse, but his efforts were frustrated. In June of 1954, Coñuepán
wrote the new Minister of Land and Colonization to let him know his plans for
forming a delegation to attend the third III Congress in La Paz, Bolivia in August of
1954. Coñuepán noted that the previous Minister of Land and Colonization had
authorized the trip and empowered the Director of DASIN to form the delegation. He
went on to propose that he, in addition to Esteban Romero or José Cayupi as
indigenous Diputados, should attend. Alfredo Lea Plaza, a lawyer and Diputado, and
two Mapuche professors would round out the delegation. In closing, he indicated
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would cover the expenses incurred.639 Three
days later the Minister of Land and Colonization wrote directly to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs to say that the Chilean delegation would have to decline the
invitation because “consistent with the cost-saving policies introduced by the
Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, Dec. 7, 1953. ARNAD,
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government, all types of commissions would be suspended for the current year.”640
In that note, the author referenced four previous communications he had received
from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Combined with Coñuepán’s note on the subject,
it seems that many parties were in favor of attending the conference, but that it was
blocked at the last minute. It is unclear whether the reason given (austerity
measures) were valid or simply an excuse. In the end, a group of IIC members did
attend the 1954 La Paz Congreso, but apparently without the support of the state.641
Despite Coñuepán’s efforts to support Mapuche interests through cultural
means and international collaborative efforts, the primary mechanism by which he
could most directly benefit his people remained the Juzgados de Indios.
Consequently, Coñuepán focused much of his effort as Director of DASIN to the work
of overseeing the courts. However, the Juzgados had existed for decades and so the
bureaucratic structure within which they operated was well established and staffed
with officials who were not necessarily inclined to embrace new leadership or a
revised mission. Additionally, the courts had not been very effective in protecting
indigenous interests and agents of the courts often contributed to problems through
corruption, ineffectiveness and pressure brought to bear upon them by wealthy
landowners in the rural south. It is not surprising, therefore, that Coñuepán
struggled to overcome those legacies once supervision of the courts was transferred
to DASIN’s authority.

Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Foreign Relations, Jun. 14, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de
Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4024.
641 “III Inter-American Indigenista Congress,” Boletín Indigenista, 1954, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 201.
Representatives included historian Álvaro Jaro, Mapuche professor Domingo Curaqueo, and
others.
640

271
In many instances, official decrees were missing, incomplete or not officially
recorded. In the case of Fundo Lumaco, an official decree was recognized as valid
despite the original copy being lost and a facsimile being used in its place.642 In
other cases, officials in the Juzgados de Indios were uncooperative, inefficient or
incompetent. In July of 1955, Coñuepán wrote to the Juez de Indios of Pitrufquen
requesting that he send a file on a pending case that had either been lost or that the
judge was delayed in sending. Coñuepán listed four complaints, including that he
had been sent only one-fourth of the file, because the evidence had been folded in
half and much of it was missing. That was apparently not his first request for the
missing evidence.643 Other times official documents contradicted one another. In
July of 1955, Coñuepán wrote to the Juez de Indios in Temuco to ask for background
information to help him reconcile two “certificates of settlement” that contradicted
one another. In that instance, the indígena José Miguel Rapimán was trying to
confirm the community in which his parents had been settled by examining the
original títulos de merced, upon which the entire system of radicación was based.644
After decades of corruption and fraud, DASIN had dozens if not hundreds of cases to
examine and try to resolve. In 1958, the Chief Counsel of the Ministry of Land and
Colonization wrote to Coñuepán to inform him that he was recommending a twentyyear-old claim should be paid to the communities of Antonio Rapimán and José
Gineo for mining operations that had been carried out on their land by the state
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railroad department since 1938.645 Delays, inaccuracies and other problems with
official documentation upon which the courts based their decisions represented a
tremendous barrier to their effectiveness.
The courts were also put to more nefarious purposes and were sometimes
used to harass indígenas who had little understanding, resources or time to defend
themselves in court. In September 1956, Coñuepán wrote directly to the Minister of
Land and Colonization to ask him to instruct the Juez de Indios in Pitrufquén to
dismiss a case in which an Indian was being harassed.646 Often, indígenas claimed to
have received verbal instructions that later turned out to be false or misleading. In
July of 1955, Coñuepán wrote to the Director of Internal Taxation to say that José
Santos Colillanca Raipan had been told he did not owe any taxes, but later his land
was seized for failure to pay taxes. In requesting a solution to this particular
problem, Coñuepán refers to the problem as “maltreatment,” implying that it was
intentional, and also claimed that many such cases existed.647 Coñuepán later
requested that all such procedures be cleared through DASIN so that he and his staff
could verify that the seizures were valid.648 Those actions fit the longstanding
pattern of fraud and usurpation whereby white settlers in the region attempted to
defraud indígenas by using the courts and government officials who were generally
unsympathetic or outright corrupt.
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By 1958, it appears that Coñuepán’s ability to effectively manage DASIN and
oversee the Juzgados had declined. In two separate communications, Chief Counsel
for the Ministry of Land and Colonization wrote directly to the Minister,
complaining first that vacancies in the Juzgados de Indios were allowed to remain
open or filled with unqualified personnel and requesting that the Minister appoint
qualified people to fill the vacancies, a function that would have previously been
attended to by Coñuepán himself. 649 In his second message, the Chief Counsel took
aim at Coñuepán directly, asking the Minister to order the Director to visit and
supervise the function of the Juzgados de Indios under his charge.650
In November of 1959, after Jorge Alessandri succeeded Ibañez as President,
Coñuepán was still using his platform as Director of DASIN to press the Minister of
Land and Colonization for redress of indigenous grievances. Addressing a case of
unjust eviction by a former prosecutor in the Juzgado de Indios, he noted that José
Cayupi, the former Diputado, had carried the complaint directly to the President.651
In a separate instance, indígena Clorindo Ancavil Manqueo delivered a broad
indictment of indigenous education directly to the new President of the Republic,
which Coñuepán relayed to the Minister. In it, Ancavil claimed that resources for the
adequate education of Mapuche were not available and that a number of primary
school teachers had begun to agitate students and comuneros for “political
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interests…provoking confusion and unrest among the rural indigenous
population.”652
By the late 1950s, Coñuepán was pushing back quite strongly against the
Minister of Land and Colonization and the Alessandri government more broadly. In
December of 1959, he wrote to the Minister, complaining that Decree number 1051
of October 2, 1959 lacked a clause that would return background files to the
Juzgados from which they originated. Instead, files would be kept by the Ministry in
Santiago, making it very difficult for the Juzgados to function efficiently and with full
background knowledge of the disputes they were adjudicating.653 The loss or lack of
antecedent information had hampered DASIN’s and the Juzgados’ ability to resolve
old cases for Coñuepán’s entire tenure as Director.654
Coñuepán was also fighting an uphill battle against the Juez de Indios in
Temuco, Hugo Figueroa Figueroa. On December 19, he penned two messages, the
first to Figueroa directly, nullifying a logging contract with the Comunidad
Huaiquillán, which he had the power to do as Director of DASIN.655 The second
missive, sent to the Minister of Land and Colonization, levied a series of charges
against Figueroa, ranging from the arbitrary administration of justice, to
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deliberately stalling the resolution of cases in his court.656 Ultimately, Coñuepán was
successful in bringing about the reorganization of the Juzgado de Temuco, but it did
not reverse the decline of his effectiveness as Director of DASIN. In the same letter
that called for the reorganization of the Court, Diputado Jorge Lavandero called for
Coñuepán’s dismissal, citing his “repeated public appeals, including before the
Minister of Agriculture, for the dismissal of the Juez de Indios of Temuco.”657
Without the support of Carlos Ibañez behind him, Coñuepán’s leadership of
DASIN became less impactful during the Jorge Alessandri administration that
commenced in November 1958. As the three sitting Mapuche deputies had lost their
re-election bids in the same year, this signaled a monumental shift in the leadership
of the Mapuche movement and also its connection to state-level power. Chilean
historians Augusto Samaniego and Carlos Ruiz attribute the transition to the
fragmentation of the movement on the ground, as well as the failure of
Corporación’s long-time political strategy. “The crisis had reached the heart of the
Corporación Araucana, marking the end of Mapuche-led indigenismo according to
partisan logic and wingka power” (emphasis in original).658 Cońuepán would
continue to lead DASIN until he was appointed to the Board of Directors of Chile’s
Banco del Estado in 1961. But his leadership of the Mapuche movement was
eclipsed by a new generation of activists in the 1960s.
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Summary
Unlike indigenista projects in other countries, DASIN was created in response
to a call directly from Indians and indigenous leaders like Coñuepán, who were
chosen for leadership roles within the agency. In contrast, in Lázaro Cárdenas’s
Mexico, the official organ of state-led indigenismo was created and supervised by
indigenistas, not indigenous leaders. In Mexico, that agency was also called the
Office of Indigenous Affairs until 1949, when it was transferred to the Ministry of
Education and renamed the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI). One of the INI’s
goals was to cultivate indígenas as citizens and therefore it directly served the
interests of the state as well as Indians. Although housed within and funded by the
Mexican government, the INI was deeply connected to the Instituto Indigenista
Interamericano. As the Chilean equivalent, DASIN remained largely an organ of the
Chilean state and relatively disconnected from the broader Pan-American discourse
of the mid-twentieth century, as evidenced by the government’s refusal to recognize
or fund a national indigenista institute, officially ratify the Patzcuaro Convention, or
even support delegations in attending indigenista conferences. In addition, the goals
of DASIN often seemed at odds with the goals of the state, for example the checks
that Coñuepán placed upon unbridled expansion of the forestry industry.
However, despite the lack of formal ties, intellectual connections did exist.
Through the world of ideas, Mapuche leaders sought to improve conditions for their
people by working within and between state bureaucracies, and as they did so they
drew from a range of ideas, as Coñuepán’s leadership illustrates. Some were
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uniquely Chilean, to be sure, but others came from his knowledge of the emerging
relationships between indigenous peoples and other modern nation-states in the
twentieth century. Once Coñuepán became an employee of the Ministry of Land and
Colonization rather than the Minister in charge, he was required to request
resources and petition for action from the Minister. Although the goal of creating
DASIN was to establish an office dedicated to the protection of indigenous interests,
in some ways his dependency upon the Minister hampered his ability to assist
Mapuche in their struggles. Coñuepán himself was marginalized within the Ministry
and more and more of his work was rendered ineffective as the 1950s wore on.
Under Coñuepán’s leadership between 1953 and 1961, DASIN represents a
uniquely Chilean form of institutionalized indigenismo. As Director of DASIN,
Venancio Coñuepán achieved a measure of institutional protection for indígenas
that had not been possible before. His work crossed several branches of the Chilean
government and enabled him address issues like taxation and credit, legal
protections for indigenous lands and development efforts, all of which were in
keeping with his personal philosophy that the path toward equal citizenship for
Mapuches lay in developing their economic sustainability and prosperity. Those
aims were also consistent with the indigenista discourse across the Americas in the
1950s. Even though Coñuepán and DASIN were rarely involved directly in that
network, their work can be viewed as an indigenista project in Chile.
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Conclusion

After 1959, the access that indigenous leaders had to Chilean state channels
of power decreased. In the 1960s, Jorge Alessandri and his successor Eduardo Frei
Montalva (1964-1970) undertook agrarian reform efforts, but Mapuche peasants
did not benefit significantly considering the modest scale and pace of land
redistribution. Frustration with those programs and the failure of conservative
alliances to produce meaningful change led the next generation of Mapuche activists
to align with the left wing of the Chilean political spectrum. Salvador Allende
famously signed the “Cautín Pact” with left-leaning Mapuche leaders during his
unsuccessful campaign for the presidency in 1964, in which he promised to support
and protect historical rights of the Mapuche people. DASIN continued to exist until
1972, although it was less effective without Coñuepán at the helm. Following his
election to the presidency in 1970, Allende’s government passed a new indigenous
law that created the Instituto de Desarollo Indígena (IDI – Institute for Indigenous
Development), which replaced DASIN. But ultimately Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 coup
d’etat and ensuing military dictatorship ushered in a renewed assault upon
indigenous lands and identity that continued through the 1970s, until the eventual
return to democracy in 1990.659
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The marginalization of Mapuche organizations and activists in the late
twentieth century make the period examined here all the more remarkable.
Between 1920 and 1960, Mapuche leaders created a vibrant political movement that
carved out space within a state apparatus that was overwhelmingly stacked against
them. Despite their small numbers in proportion to the overall population of the
country, between 1924 and 1958 the grassroots infrastructure of Mapuche
organizations supported the election of six of their leaders to the lower house of the
Chilean National Congress. In addition, Venancio Coñuepán secured an appointment
to President Ibañez’s cabinet and convinced him to create DASIN. With his own
appointment as Director, Coñuepán had the institutional mandate to guide and
supervise the administration of justice for Mapuche through the Juzgados de Indios.
This history shows that the connections between indigenistas (traditionally
defined as non-indigenous allies of indigenous peoples) and indigenous leaders
extended to the very beginning of Mapuche organizations in the early twentieth
century. But shortly after the founding of those organizations, Mapuche leaders, not
their white allies, steered the movement according to their own determinations
about the best interests of their people. Their decisions led them toward
inconsistent and sometimes unlikely political alliances. Although the main body of
the movement trended toward conservative allies and strategies, especially under
the leadership of Coñuepán and the dominance of the Corporación, each time
political space opened factions within the movement took advantage of
opportunities across the political spectrum. Manuel Aburto courted the Communist
Party in the late-1920s and early 1930s, urban youth organizations challenged the
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hegemony of Coñuepán and the Corporación during the Popular Front era and allies
of the working class began to support Allende’s socialist revolution after 1960.
In order to understand how those patterns unfolded, I have argued that we
must observe at least three inter-related discursive fields. Beginning on the ground,
the persistence of traditional aspects of Mapuche political culture must be
understood as significant to the way indigenous peasants in southern Chile selected
and followed their leaders. José Ancan has shown that Coñuepán combined
important personal qualities of lineage, wealth and charisma as he built a following
among Indians, brought the major Mapuche organizations together and maintained
their alliance, and convinced them that he could function effectively as a go-between
with elite Chilean society. André Menard and Jorge Pavez explained that Manuel
Aburto accessed long traditions of alliance making with the Chilean state to cultivate
his own authority and also to choose political allies. With that mindset, the strength
of his friends as well as his adversaries reflected upon Aburto’s own power,
explaining in part why he would have supported Ibañez after being persecuted by
him during his first presidency.
The political context of Chile, both at the regional and national levels,
represents a second field. In some ways it was obvious that Mapuche leaders would
ally with conservative parties because those factions held more sway in the rural
southern part of the country, as Corporación leader Carlos Huentequeo explained. In
addition, the educational and material support provided by religious leaders in the
region, both the Anglican Carlos Sadleir and the Catholic Guido Beck, conditioned
some Mapuche leaders and their followers to prefer conservative political views and
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eschew communist and socialist principles that cast religious belief and distinct
cultural identities as obstructions to the unity of the working classes and the
process of proletarianization. Within the Mapuche movement, tension existed
between the preservation of cultural traditions and the very real and immediate
material needs of the people.
Cultural traditions were indeed important and valuable political tools, but
leaders within the main thrust of the Mapuche movement concentrated their efforts
on fulfilling the material needs of their constituents. The ever-present specter of
dispossession from rightful land and territory haunted Mapuche peasants in their
everyday lives and pervaded every layer of the political discourse. The fact that land
loss was accompanied by violence and fraud contributed to the weight and
significance of the conjoined themes of land, dispossession and injustice that
remained central to the movement. The combination of a growing population and
shrinking base of land on which to support the people contributed to consistent
rural-urban migration throughout the period, which is responsible for other facets
of the history we observe.
At times, urban Mapuche populations and organizations threatened to
fracture the cohesiveness of the movement. We saw this in 1936, when Aburto
broke with the Communist Party over their support of urban organizations that
began hosting large “congresos” that he perceived as threatening the centrality of
his own annual gatherings. Then again in 1938, the Frente Único de la Araucanía
formed at the same time the Corporación consolidated the three major
organizations based in the south. The rural-urban divide also helps to explain the
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limited influence of Lipschütz and the other indigenistas working in Santiago on the
Mapuche movement that was based in the south, and it likely contributed to the
generational shift that took place around 1960, as more and more indigenous youth
were forced to leave their communities in search of work in the capital and other
cities.
The national political landscape of Chile clearly influenced the shape and
direction of the Mapuche movement. Throughout the period, state policies
prioritized economic development over more integrated efforts that were observed
in Mexico, and which the transnational indigenista movement promoted. While
national priorities were formulated from a set of options articulated through
transnational discourses, in the case of Chile in the mid-twentieth century, the
United States’ focus on anti-communism and the promotion of free-market
capitalism overshadowed the discourse of social science technocracy. The state’s
emphasis on forestry as a vehicle for enhancing the nation’s productive capacity
grew out of that discourse, while the broad-based indigenismo supported by the
state in Mexico (in the 1930s, at least) never took hold as a priority for the Chilean
state. So while ideas circulating through that third transnational discursive field
were important to the Mapuche movement and the Chilean state, the indigenista
discourse was overshadowed by the free market discourse in southern Chile.
That is not to say that transnational indigenismo had no effect on leaders
within the Mapuche movement or state support of their efforts. On the contrary, this
history shows that indigenismo provided a powerful lens through which to view the
reality of indigenous populations in Chile, and from which solutions to their
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problems could be formulated. But indigenismo functioned more like a menu of
options from which Mapuche leaders and state actors could choose, rather than a
formula to be implemented wholesale. For example, DASIN was clearly the Chilean
equivalent of state agencies in other countries, like the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs
or the Mexican INI. But the function and purpose of the agency was conditioned by
the needs of indigenous people living in southern Chile and the priorities of the
state. Although it would be over-simplified to say that Coñuepán and Ibañez
determined its structure and function directly, it is not inaccurate to view those
leaders as representatives of larger coalitions, who negotiated the terms by which
Mapuche could and would interact with and through the state.
Indigenismo also served to connect individuals grappling with similar
questions in very different contexts. White Chileans and indigenous Chileans were
brought together through the founding of Mapuche organizations. Indigenistas
connected with one another across great distances, as this letter to Alejandro
Lipschütz from the British biochemist, historian and sinologist Joseph Needham
shows.
“Although you were so kind as to say that I need not answer your letter of the 31st of
March, I cannot forbear from doing so, since it was the kind of letter which does
more good than you can imagine to one who “plows a rather lonely furrow” – at any
rate in his immediate environment. I know that very many throughout the world
appreciate my work, but I suffer a good deal because there is no recognition of the
fact that I have metamorphosed from a biochemist into an orientalist and historian
of science, so that I have to carry a particularly heavy burden in performing all the
duties of my nominal post. Another thing which touches me very much was your
realization that it is possible to fall in love with a civilization, of course to begin with
through personal friendships with many people of that race and civilization. We
cannot deal any longer with them except on a basis of absolute equality...”660

660

Joseph Needham, to Alejandro Lipschütz, Apr. 1955. CAL, Caja 6372.
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For individuals working within each of those fields, their labors were a little less
isolated as a result of their connections to the indigenista discourse. But perhaps
most significantly, Mapuche leaders were able to access circuits of power,
knowledge and authority through indigenismo, as when Arturo Huenchullán left
Chile to study in the United States, or when Coñuepán attended the Patzcuaro
Conference.
Finally, Venancio Coñuepán’s life and career illustrate significant crossover
and bleed-through between the categories of indigenista and Indian, as well as the
fluidity of the three discursive fields. As an “indigenous indigenista,” Coñuepán
carved out space within the bureaucracy of the state to provide a check on the
unbridled free-market takeover of southern property. DASIN functioned to push
back against the broader goals of the ministry in which it was located in defense of
indigenous Chileans. In that way it functioned very similarly to the overall
indigenista discourse, which checked the unbridled advance of western social,
political and economic systems. While Chilean indigenismo did not effectively tackle
as broad a range of issues as national efforts in other contexts did, it took on the
ones that mattered most to the Mapuche: land, legal rights and material
opportunities. Thus we see that while direct ties to transnational indigenismo were
relatively weak, their impact was considerable. As with any transnational discourse,
the implementation of ideas was filtered through concentric rings of competing
interests and unequal power.
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